[lit-ideas] Re: w1&2
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2014 09:07:49 +0100 (BST)
"[S]carcely meaningful in every-day modern
English" was the claim: and "Every human being has human rights" is meaningful
in every-day modern English - just try, in a real case, to say it to a modern
English speaker. A philosopher [like Bentham] might claim, because of some
theory as to "rights" and their existence, that this "rights" claim is scarcely
meaningful; but a modern speaker of English - irrespective if they agreed the
"rights" claim was true - would not find it scarcely meaningful, at least in
many contexts. In the context of a pregnant woman facing execution they might
find this "rights" claim highly meaningful and with a high degree of truth.
Dnl
Ldn
On Monday, 16 June 2014, 8:37, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The example 5."Every human being has rights" is obviously some kind of a
quasi-philosophical statement. If the speaker were asked to explain why he
thinks that every human being has rights, he would probably mention something
like the US Declaration of Independence, or perhaps the UN Charter, which in
their turn have been influenced by Enlightenment philosophers like Locke. It is
'ordinary' only in the sense that philosophizing, or quasi-philosophizing, can
also enter ordinary discourse - at the back door as it were- but it is hardly a
very elucidating use of 'being'. Something similar is the case with example 8.
O.K.
On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 9:14 AM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>>Well, I don't want to go Heideggerian, but such terms as 'being' and
'essence' are scarcely meaningful in every-day modern English.>
>
>
>This is the kind of claim that Wittgenstein would think could only be made
by someone trapped like a fly in a fly-bottle by philosophical
approaches to terms. "[S]carcely meaningful in every-day modern
English"?
>1. I am being criticised from every quarter.
>2. The essence of any good relationship is trust.
>3. Why are you being such a fool?
>4. To complete the recipe add some essence of vanilla.
>5. Every human being has human rights.
>6. Their analysis cuts to the essence of the problem.
>7. Sometimes being in the office is the most depressing thing.
>8. In essence, the idea that philosophers have access to privileged
meanings, denied to ordinary users of language, is based on a mistake or set of
mistakes about the character of language.
>
>
>DnlLdn
>
>
>
>On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 21:05, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
>what is interesting and non trivial is relatively simple.
>wittgenstein gave an overinflated idea of what a language is and does.
>then with several tricks tried to re-prioritize the view that people have
>thoughts, states, minds, etc, and get to his point that the "language" is
>prior to something else.
>wittgenstein was a confused behaviorist. in my humble view while tractatus is
>wrong in interesting ways (see e.g. peter simons on this) the so-called 2nd
>wittgenstein is a waste of time, if not for historical reasons
>
>
>
>On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:56 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>As a 'thought experiment', we might imagine the mason and his assistant
>working together while not talking at all. Let's say that they had a heated
>argument the previous evening over the assistant's share of the wages, and
>they are not talking to each other now, but the work still needs to be
>finished by the deadline. Since the tasks are fairly routine, and they are an
>old tandem, the assistant knows when the mason needs a brick and when a slab
>without him saying anything at all. This does not take anything away from
>their being representatives of human life-form, if that is what is meant, or
>of a masonry life-style. Still waiting for an interpretation of W.'s statement
> that says something meaningful and nontrivial about this. (Where is R.P. ?)
>>
>>
>>O.K.
>>
>>
>>
>>On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:17 PM, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>yes, though the man lw would refuse to allow any talk of necessary and/or
>>sufficient conditions, so if asked the question would be fudged by the usual
>>bluster
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 9:11 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>>So, perhaps W. does not mean that language is a necessary condition for
>>>something being a form of life, but that something having a language is a
>>>sufficient condition for it being a form of life. (To give it a charitable
>>>interpretation, although it certainly sounds like he is saying that life is
>>>defined by language.) Well, computers can use quite a few linguistic
>>>expressions nowadays; quite a few more than 'brick' and 'slab,' as the
>>>matter of fact. My computer is even capable of sending ambiguous messages
>>>like: "The application is not responding; you can close the window, or
>>>continue to wait." Is it therefore a form of life ?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>To sum up, I don't think that there is any kind of necessary connection
>>>>between forms of language use and forms of life.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>O.K.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 6:53 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>"to imagine a language... is to imagine a form of life." is, in my humble
>>>>>>opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W. that do
>>>>>>not stand to critical examination even of a superficial sort.
>>>>>>Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the other
>>>>>>hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and
>>>>>>specialized code of communication consisting of a few expressions like
>>>>>>'brick', 'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life
>>>>>>separate from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to,
>>>>>>and makes sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Unlike some commentators, I take "form of life" as a non-technical
>>>>>expression, at least in Wittgenstein's own hands: while admitting W might
>>>>>have been clearer and his compressed style can be gnomic, the expression
>>>>>"to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life" might be re-written
>>>>>as "to conceive the sense of a language is to conceive of a form of life
>>>>>within which it has that sense". It is a Kantian point:- that sense of
>>>>>what is immediate in language depends on an assumed background that is not
>>>>>'given' by that immediate language but only against that background can
>>>>>immediate language have the sense it has.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Long ago I posted how a 'slab-brick' language, which might appear to a
>>>>>language for performing tasks with 'named' objects, might turn out to be a
>>>>>language of prayer or of honour to the memory of a deceased builder - how
>>>>>a hidden background, not apparent from the immediate language used by
>>>>>speakers, might entirely change the sense of that immediate language from
>>>>>its sense in the background we assumed. For Wittgenstein this kind of
>>>>>background - the background we might check by making a 'surveyable
>>>>>representation' - is indispensable to the sense of any kind of language;
>>>>>and it is a background that can be seen as linked to a specific "form of
>>>>>life".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>As flowers do not have language in W's sense, it is irrelevant that they
>>>>>are a "form of life": that they are a "form of life" (without language)
>>>>>neither refutes nor proves W's contention about how the sense of language
>>>>>correlates with the "form of life" within which it is used.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Nor is W suggesting the builders have a "form of life" distinct from other
>>>>>humans: on the contrary, their slab language makes sense to other humans
>>>>>because humans share a "form of life" within which referring to objects to
>>>>>perform tasks makes sense across widely different cultures and between
>>>>>widely different occupations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>As far as the above goes, it seems to me W's Kantian point is on the right
>>>>>lines and is far from merely mystical. The key (as always with W) is that
>>>>>W also thinks there are "limits of language" such that we cannot express
>>>>>in language the conditions by which language has sense and we can only
>>>>>show them - but we show them only by assuming a "form of life " within
>>>>>which language has the sense it has. It is this doctrine of showing that
>>>>>is perhaps 'the mystical'.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>Dnl
>>>>>ldn
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>On Sunday, 15 June 2014, 16:58, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>"to imagine a language means is to imagine a form of life." is, in my
>>>>>humble opinion, one of those solemn, semi-mystical pronouncements by W.
>>>>>that do not stand to critical examination even of a superficial sort.
>>>>>Rhododendrons don't have a language, yet are a form of life. On the other
>>>>>hand, a mason and his assistant who have a very simplified and specialized
>>>>>code of communication consisting of a few expressions like 'brick',
>>>>>'hammer' and the like do not thereby constitute a form of life separate
>>>>>from wider human society. (For one thing, their work belongs to, and makes
>>>>>sense only within, a wider network of economic relations.)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>O.K.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>On Sun, Jun 15, 2014 at 4:03 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>
>
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