[lit-ideas] Re: ...the collapse of distinctions is rhetoric, but whose?
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 06:35:03 +0100
Popper's theory of World 3 (which some might regard as simply as modification
or adaptation of Frege's "Dritte Reich") - or some such theory - can throw some
light on these questions.
Consider:
">> One can think about Euler's theorem by means of ink marks (it
is done everywhere everywhen) it doesn't follow the theorem is ink marks or
even is about ink marks."
In so far as "ink marks" are World 1 physical marks then we may say the World 3
content of Euler's theorem is neither any World 1 "ink marks" that might be
used to express that theorem, nor is it about those W1 "ink marks" (or indeed
"about" W1 at all).
"What is
Shostakovich's Tenth Symphony? Since Dmitri often composed on paper,
directly into an orchestral score, without even a piano, is the Tenth
Symphony the score, a performance of it, or the process of composing it?
Or is it what an individual auditor hears? Is it a harmonic analysis of
the Tenth?"
This is a more complex question on which Popper wants to distinguish the Tenth
as a W3.3 object from any attempt to embody this object by W1 means - say by
reducing it to a "score" or by performance (including recorded performance) -
or any attempt to grasp this object in W2 terms (including DSH's own attempts
while composing): that is, the Tenth has a status as a W3.3 object that
transcends both its encodement in W1 and its grasp in W2 [i.e. the Tenth as
W3.3 object > the Tenth as W3.2 or W3.1 content]. A similar argument applies to
other kinds of artistic object, like The Tempest.
For Popper this argument applies at a very early stage in artistic creation -
the caveman who applies paint to a wall with the purpose of drawing is working
with an "object" that transcends both his primitive W1 marks and his W2
understanding. It is even conceivable that a W3 "object" might be 'discovered
by accident' as where a caveman conceives physical patterns (even shadows) in a
cave as resembling animals, and with this discovery sets out to model such
natural patterns by using W1 objects like clay or paints. (In this last case,
the natural patterns do not themselves encode W3 content but encode W1 content
from which the human W2 mind may 'derive' W3 content by an act of imaginative
reconstruction.)
The pov that there are objects with a W3 status, and even a W3.3 status, is
perhaps easier to understand first for "objects" or intellectual products such
as Einstein's theories or Euler's theorem - for these may have W3.3 content
that is there to be discovered years after the theory or theorem was initially
put forward, and this content may far transcend the W2 grasp of those who
initially put forward and understood the theory and also far transcend what has
been initially encoded in W1 as to the content of that theory. This W3.3 depth
to the "objects" may be be shown by following the on-going critical discussions
of these "objects", their consequences and their relation to other W3 "objects".
In Popper's view all this is much less a question of definitions than a series
of questions of a substantive metaphysical character - questions that lie at
the heart of why Popper suggests we need to replace traditional Western
epistemology, which fixates on "knowledge" in a "subjective" sense focused on
the "knowing subject" [as per 'JTB theory'], with a theory of "objective
knowledge" that includes "knowledge" without a "knowing subject".
Dnl
On Tuesday, 30 September 2014, 22:51, Eric <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>As for the question posed by "eric" the symphony si the symphony, which
>>ontology eric likes is utterly irrelevant, if eric think it is identical with
>>a performance that is one of the possible choices, that, to reiterate, makes
>>no difference to the truth of identity statements.
This seem to be the nub of our disagreement: the "truth of identity
statements." In the example of the DS Tenth Symphony, I agree that my personal
choice is irrelevant. However, the simultaneity of multiple true identity
statements has not been addressed.
Cases in which, for example, the Schrödinger equation truly mean one thing,
i.e., the Schrödinger equation IS a description of the form of probability
waves for small particles--such cases--are a very small subset of identity
statements, which if true are a sampling of eternal verities.
However, in everyday life, we encounter simultaneous multiple true identity
statements. While not equations or any sort of mathematical statements, these
multiple true identity statements are part of the natural world, as real as an
abstraction like Platonic solids, and candidates for philosophical discussion.
Additionally, there is no way to defend the meaning of one identity statement
over another. If you think DS's Tenth is the score and I think it is any
particular performance of the score, there is no way to prove one or the other
is solely correct.
Except by beginning with a consensual definition, a definition which carries an
almost tautological argument for one identity or another. Perhaps I am
exceptionally dense, but I do not understand the significance of discussing
identities without definitions.
Eric
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