As to lawyer being abusive, my post was scherzo - but it may be used as a term of abuse and often has been (indeed the Hebrew term "o....-din" has often been used that way). [Does the Hebrew "din" relate to "noise" - and is this part of the sense of "Judge said to Curty: 'What's this noise about?'" in Dylan's version of Delia on World Gone Wrong?] And if "lawyer" were abusive, then it might be abusive whether or not I am one (abusive language may be true). As to being a lawyer, I have in the past made comments, perhaps unwisely, that may have purported that I am one - but what it is safe to infer from that may be left aside as beside the point of my scherzo post. But perhaps I should clarify something here. The most extensive posts I recall making on a legal issue were on the issue of a 'hidden trust' [in the English case Pilcher v Rawlins]. But these were not intended as merely lawyerly but as a preliminary to a Popperian account of legal thinking. This account I have not got round to presenting as yet; but we may take Pilcher as exemplifying how World 3, including World 3.3, is vital to understanding the law - for the soundness of the decision in Pilcher depends on evaluation in W3 terms. These terms include the unavoidable consequences that would follow from any decision, where those consequences hold in W3 and even W3.3 terms [rather than W1 or W2 terms]; such consequences may hold irrespective of how cognisant the court was of them [in its W2] or whether the consequences had been expressed in any W1 form. In my old posts, Pilcher was tacitly offered as a good example of how understanding and evaluating the law involves a W3 reconstruction of the relevant problem-situation - and this reconstruction may go far beyond what is encoded in W1 [say in the relevant law report - which, in the Pilcher example, does not analyse 'what is at stake' as set out in my posts] or what passed through W2 [in the minds of the judges in arriving at their decision - which may have fallen short of appreciating 'what is at stake' as set out in my posts]. On the contrary, our understanding of the Pilcher law report, and of what the Pilcher judges were thinking, depends fundamentally on our understanding of the W3 legal problem-situation exemplified by the case. So even these old posts on Pilcher were intended to introduce material, and its analysis, to bring out philosophical themes and ideas that have to do with the 'theory of knowledge' - given that any proper understanding of the law must involve using the right 'theory of knowledge'. Though I did not bother to make explicit the importance of a case like Pilcher for any viable 'theory of knowledge', I think anyone re-reading those old posts might see they present a challenge to anyone who thinks 'law' can be grasped via a Lockean kind of empiricism, or a Cartesian 'intuitionism' etc. Apologies for not making this clear at the time but I did not get round to developing this underlying point - and thanks to Omar for giving me this opportunity to clarify some things. DnlLdn On Tuesday, 3 March 2015, 12:23, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: Is 'lawyer' an abusive term ? Aren't you a lawyer ? O.K. On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 12:59 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >Donal orech-din.Donal is a lawyer.> Surely, after the recent exodus, we've all seen enough of the dangers of abusive language. Dnl On Tuesday, 3 March 2015, 10:35, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: 1. There is a way to express a more or less analogous message but I doubt that it would be very effective as a slogan 2. Not sure that this is correct. Islamic theology has concerns with what God is like; for Al-Ghazali, he is powerful, merciful, living, posesses language etc. The arguments in medieval Islamic culture between the orthodox theologians (Ghazali) and the philosophers (e.g. Ibn Sina and later Averroes) did not revolve around the existence of God but around issues such as the ontological status of God's attributes and the manner in which God created the world. The theologians held that God created the world in time, while the philosophers argued that the world was also eternal. 3. For the present tense of the other verbs, it is constructed without the aid of 'to be'. Where English has copula, in Hebrew it is simply omitted. Donal orech-din.Donal is a lawyer. O.K. On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 9:47 AM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >I thought that I already pointed out that Hebrew does not have the present >tense of 'to be,' hence it cannot express I AM THAT I AM.> 1. Does this hold for "I AM WHAT I AM" ("I AM THAT I AM" not being a gay anthem, nor ever likely to be)? 2. In addressing 1., is it of any relevance that pre-Newtonian philosophy (and "natural theology" as a response to the rise of modern science) did not pretend to arguments as to what God was only that God was [e.g. the First Cause or "cosmological argument" concerned proof only that there is God not what kind of God there is; post-Newton this argument took a different bent, via "natural theology", of trying to address what kind of God there is compatible with modern science - but this 'compatibility' was not an issue for Aquinas or Anselm or Aristotle or even any of the Bs or Cs]. 3. What in Hebrew does one do when in English one wants to say "I am thinking", "I am alive", "I am tired" etc.? What does Hebrew do where other languages use a present tense of 'to be'? 4. Perhaps 3. should be addressed first. Dnl On Monday, 2 March 2015, 8:37, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: B’seder (aside from the relatively highly marked distance between Hebrew =everyday or even classical in Agnon etc. – and the torahic Hebrew which is a bit of a difficult …. Spiel) best From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica Sent: 02 March 2015 10:36 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: tense In every-day Hebrew one can of course "ani nimza bebeit holim" etc. but that is location, not the ontological I AM that is meant here. O.K. On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 at 9:31 AM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: That is know (the absence of present tenses) Maybe it helps to remind people that tense structures are not at all conceptual, hence each particular idiolect and dialect has particular tenses, if at all. Not any specific tense need to be morphologically expressed (morpho expression= in English, e.g. the unmarked are stem+’ed’ at the final right end position) From:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica Sent: 02 March 2015 08:59 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The tetragrammaton I thought that I already pointed out that Hebrew does not have the present tense of 'to be,' hence it cannot express I AM THAT I AM. O.K. On Mon, Mar 2, 2015 at 3:16 AM, Redacted senderJlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: O. K. writes wonders (if that's the verb) that "whether God originally spoke to Moses in some language other than Hebrew, such as Egyptian - is a matter of conjecture." re: his previous quotation "is the common English translation (JPS among others) of the response God used in the Hebrew Bible when Moses asked for his name (Exodus 3:14)." Mmm. So let's revise -- after all, Emerson said that conversation is not permitted without tropes. I shall hypothesise that a conversation did take place between Moses and Good. Let's revise Exodus 3:13 and 3:14. 3:15 is mainly Moses's counter-move in the conversation, "Yet they won't believe me." But in 3:13 we have Moses's question: "Then Moses said to God, “If I come to the people of Israel and say to them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ what shall I say to them?”" This is clear as can be. It's not as if Moses himself is interested to know the name. It's just in case the people of Israel _wonder_. 3:14 opens: 14 God said to Moses, “I am who I am.”[a] And he said, “Say this to the people of Israel, ‘I am has sent me to you.’” Here there is a use-mention distinction: i. "I am" has sent me to you. Note that that differs from ii. "I am who I am" has sent me to you. God is advising Moses what his conversational move in reply to a possible question by the people of Israel to Moses as to what the name of 'the God of your fathers'. This possibly struck Kripke in "Names and descriptions". For consider: iii. If I come to the people of Israel and say to them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ what shall I say to them? In the above, Moses is distinguishing between what Donnellan has as a definite description: (D) "The God of your fathers". and a proper name. Note that it does not occur to Moses to have as a ready answer, "And why is THAT relevant. I'm saying HE is the God of your fathers. What does a name add to HIM?" Exodus 3:15 continues with what God thinks is the best reply for Moses to give, in case they ask for the name of the God of the fathers of the people of Israel. "15 God also said to Moses, “Say this to the people of Israel, ‘The Lord,[b] the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you.’ This is my name forever, and thus I am to be remembered throughout all generations." So, it does seem as, to echo Emerson, God is using a trope when he utters: v. Say this to the people of Israel, ‘I am has sent me to you.’” vb. Say this to the people of Israel: "I am" has sent me to you. As Geary notes, Moses was careful about this, since when he faced the people of Israel and they asked for the NAME of the God of their fathers, "he must have been emphatic in the quotation marks". Postulating Egyptian as the source of the tetragrammaton does not seem to fit that it's FOUR letters, and four letters only, which are involved here -- unless in Egyptian only four letters are involved, too? Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html