[lit-ideas] re
- From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 19:33:44 +0000
Did you consider that the socalled real may be fermions and bosons?
Frankly why give a fig about the common sense exhibited by some?
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Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Mooreian Paradoxes
In a message dated 5/26/2015 3:15:12 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"Realism turns out to be unavoidably metaphysical and not capable of being
decided by empirical tests or purely logical arguments. For a clearer
understanding of all this, I recommend Popper's "Realism and the Aim of
Science". I should perhaps mention that Popper nowhere mentions or addresses
"implicatures" in this book. But I think I can safely say that Popper doesn't
think "implicatures" can help us (where empirical tests and logical arguments
fail) to decide between "Realism" and its alternatives."
Popper nowhere mentions implicatures in
his essay. Well, perhaps he should?
It is a widely (if not universally) held view, that at least one part of the
business of metaphysics (not science) is to determine an ontology.
Or, if you prefer, to settle on an answer to the question what, in general or
particular terms, the 'universe' contains or consists. of.
For Moore (whom, as a realist and defender of common sense, but not surely as
a scientist Popper greatly admierd) it was people, people's hands, chairs (on
which people sit), tables.
I'm less sure about atoms, electrons, and quarks.
There is realism and realism.
For a scientific realist (a philosopher, not a scientist), a metaphysical
hypothesis is judicious to the extent to which, if true, it provides backing
or justification for the content (and methodology) of scientific theory.
A scientist realist regards the optimal metaphysical posture as being one
which accepts the general account of Reality which maximally justifies and
supports the deliverances of science.
But WHAT science?"
Palmistry? Phlogiston Theory?
It seems that we need at least a restriction to REPUTABLE deliverances of
REPUTABLE sciences, and this is a minor problem for the philosopher of science
who deems a scientific realist.
For how are these reputable deliverances of reputable sciences to be selected
EXCEPT ON THE BASIS of likelihood of truth, and how is THAT to be optimised in
advance of ANY CLUE about the nature of Reality?
It thus seems that there is an initial need for SOME GROUNDS of acceptability
of the findings of science which are INDEPENDENT of those which, it is hoped,
will be provided by a correct and adequate account of Reality.
A great admirer of Moore "as a realist and a defender of common sense", Popper
describes himself as. And I wonder if his implicature is that this is not like
"p & q".
i. Moore is a realist.
ii. Moore is a defender of common sense.
It may be argued that Moore is a realist _because_ he is a defender of common
sense.
In which case, the logical form is slightly more complicated than that
expressed by a mere 'and'?
Cheers,
Speranza
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