[lit-ideas] Re: re
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 07:46:54 +0000 (UTC)
I mean, you know, like I can't even say we don't know anything because that
would implicaturize that we at least know that, and that would give the lie to
my contention. >
No, Mike. This is fallacious.
Saying "We know nothing for sure" equals "We don't know anything (for sure)"
and these give no lie to themselves. We only state something that gives a lie
to itself if we state something like "We know for sure that we know nothing for
sure". But even this can be made unparadoxical by rephrasing it as "We know
only one thing for sure and that is that we know nothing apart from this one
thing for sure."
Popper's position is clear: we not only know nothing for sure (in the sense of
having infallilble knowledge, which is the sense at stake) but we do no know
this for sure but guess it. After the overturn of Newton's physics, for there
was no more successful and well-tested "knowledge" at that point, we needed to
accept we know nothing for sure. And the guess we know nothing for sure became
endorsed by Einstein when he explained why the physics he put forward could not
be entirely correct, which means it would be false. Popper also explains why
his guess is that we not only know nothing for sure but will never know
anything for sure - that is, we will never attain knowledge that we know for
sure is infallible (though of course many people are deluded that they have
attained such "knowledge").
All this lies in the field of the 'theory of knowledge' and is not undermined
by the delusions of "certain knowledge" that haunt many people. And it is not
undermined by Mike's fallacy.
On Thursday, 28 May 2015, 4:16, Mike Geary <jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx>
All this time and we still don't know anything for sure, do we? Oh, well,
what the hell. I mean, you know, like I can't even say we don't know anything
because that would implicaturize that we at least know that, and that would
give the lie to my contention. I truly do hate philosophy. Not knowing that
you don't know is preferable to knowing. So that's my new philosophy: One
cannot know that one cannot know unless one knows that. Nihil Vobiscum.
John Michael Geary,
On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 5:19 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I could actually think of a defense of a common sense from a negative side- if
someone were to point at an empty space and say: "I know that there is a tree
there" we would all, realists and skeptics, materialists and idealists, agree
that he is a lunatic. From that it would seem that we do accept empirical
evidence as being of some value. What we make of it later is a matter of
On Tue, May 26, 2015 at 9:33 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Did you consider that the socalled real may be fermions and bosons?
Frankly why give a fig about the common sense exhibited by some?
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: 26 May 2015 21:29
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Mooreian Paradoxes
In a message dated 5/26/2015 3:15:12 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
"Realism turns out to be unavoidably metaphysical and not capable of being
decided by empirical tests or purely logical arguments. For a clearer
understanding of all this, I recommend Popper's "Realism and the Aim of
Science". I should perhaps mention that Popper nowhere mentions or addresses
"implicatures" in this book. But I think I can safely say that Popper doesn't
think "implicatures" can help us (where empirical tests and logical arguments
fail) to decide between "Realism" and its alternatives."
Popper nowhere mentions implicatures in
his essay. Well, perhaps he should?
It is a widely (if not universally) held view, that at least one part of the
business of metaphysics (not science) is to determine an ontology.
Or, if you prefer, to settle on an answer to the question what, in general or
particular terms, the 'universe' contains or consists. of.
For Moore (whom, as a realist and defender of common sense, but not surely as
a scientist Popper greatly admierd) it was people, people's hands, chairs (on
which people sit), tables.
I'm less sure about atoms, electrons, and quarks.
There is realism and realism.
For a scientific realist (a philosopher, not a scientist), a metaphysical
hypothesis is judicious to the extent to which, if true, it provides backing
or justification for the content (and methodology) of scientific theory.
A scientist realist regards the optimal metaphysical posture as being one
which accepts the general account of Reality which maximally justifies and
supports the deliverances of science.
But WHAT science?"
Palmistry? Phlogiston Theory?
It seems that we need at least a restriction to REPUTABLE deliverances of
REPUTABLE sciences, and this is a minor problem for the philosopher of science
who deems a scientific realist.
For how are these reputable deliverances of reputable sciences to be selected
EXCEPT ON THE BASIS of likelihood of truth, and how is THAT to be optimised in
advance of ANY CLUE about the nature of Reality?
It thus seems that there is an initial need for SOME GROUNDS of acceptability
of the findings of science which are INDEPENDENT of those which, it is hoped,
will be provided by a correct and adequate account of Reality.
A great admirer of Moore "as a realist and a defender of common sense", Popper
describes himself as. And I wonder if his implicature is that this is not like
"p & q".
i. Moore is a realist.
ii. Moore is a defender of common sense.
It may be argued that Moore is a realist _because_ he is a defender of common
In which case, the logical form is slightly more complicated than that
expressed by a mere 'and'?
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