[lit-ideas] not even wrong, says...
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2014 10:06:32 +0200
dear prof. Enns, all real quotes, I have not found any constructions there.
The point is: thinking is not constructing, unless and until someone shows
that when, say, the greeks thought that the sieve was the method to get
primes, they constructed primes, which honestly I am at a loss. Kant, in a
convoluted language, (I think) states that in thinking one "relates" to
something that is a manifold of noumenal and phenomenal contents. One can
disagree (though I am not fully clear about what) but nothing says in Kant
that the noumenal content was constructed by anybody. It is a content whose
relational properties (Kant thinks) *requires * a mind, in neither case
minds are constructed or contents are constructed. If anything what is
acutely problematic is that Kant has a highly developed view about what
necessarily is required to be able to think contents (categories, a priori
intuitions, & more)
On Sat, Sep 13, 2014 at 9:53 AM, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Adriano Palma wrote:
>
> As matter of fact anyone who has any (textual? Conceptual?) basis to
> claim that a noumenon is an “intellectual” construct is welcome to
> provide such, because I fear there’s none available.
>
> From the Critique of Pure Reason:
>
> Thinking is the action of relating given intuitions to an object. If
> the manner of this intuition is not given in any way, then the object
> is merely transcendental, and the concept of the understanding has
> none other than a transcendental use, namely the unity of thought of a
> manifold in general. Now through a pure category, in which abstraction
> is made from any condition of sensible intuition as the only one that
> is possible for us, no object is determined, rather only the though of
> an object in general is expressed in accordance with different modi.
> (A247/B304)
>
> The principles of pure understanding, whether they are a priori
> constitutive or merely regulative, contain nothing but only the pure
> schema, as it were, for possible experience; for this has its unity
> only from the synthetic unity that the understanding originally and
> from itself imparts to the synthesis of the imagination in relation to
> apperception, and in relation to and agreement with which the
> appearances, as data for possible cognition, must already stand a
> priori. (A237/B296)
>
> I call the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all
> moral laws a moral world. This is conceived thus far merely as an
> intelligible world, since abstraction is made therein from all
> conditions and even from all hindrances to morality in it. Thus far it
> is therefore a mere, yet practical idea, which really can and should
> have its influence on the sensible world, in order to make it agree as
> far as possible with this idea. The idea of a moral world thus has
> objective reality, not as if it pertained to an object of an
> intelligible intuition, but as pertaining to the sensible world,
> although as an object of pure reason in its practical use ....
> (A808/B836)
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil
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