[lit-ideas] more strategies and paths not taken
- From: Eternitytime1@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 14:21:57 EST
Hi,
Lots of interesting ideas in this article. Don't think any of them have been
implemented or even discussed much (that I have read/seen--certainly not on
Our List <g>)
What a great idea, though, to provide alternatives...'face-saving' ways and
ones which allow for respect rather than force...
Wonder why none of these were used?
Not to mention--I wonder if the Muslim scholars who changed minds and hearts
... were moderates?
Best,
Marlena in Missouri
thinking there is more creativity than we dream about--and sad that it is
usually ignored...
Commentary
Strategy: Political Warfare Neglected
By _Brian Michael Jenkins_
(http://rand.org/news/experts/bios/expert_jenkins_brian_michael.html)
____________________________________
This commentary appeared in San Diego Union-Tribune on June 26, 2005.
____________________________________
In Yemen three years ago, Islamic scholars challenged a group of defiant
al-Qaeda prisoners to a theological debate. âIf you convince us that your
ideas
are justified by the Koran, then we will join you in the struggle,â the
scholars told the terrorists. âBut if we succeed in convincing you of our
ideas,
then you must agree to renounce violence.â The scholars won the debate, the
prisoners renounced violence, were released and were given help to find jobs.
Some have since offered advice to Yemeni security services â a tip from one
led
to the death of al-Qaeda's top leader in the country.
As Americans watched workers sift the rubble for body parts at Ground Zero
after 9/11, few can have been thinking about winning the hearts and minds of
those responsible for the attack and their sympathizers. Mars ruled. Instead,
the United States responded with bombs and bullets. The Global War on Terror
had begun.
But armed force alone cannot win this war in the long run. In the continuing
campaign against al-Qaeda and the insurgency raging in Iraq today, political
warfare must be an essential part of America's arsenal.
Few Americans understand political warfare, which in its broadest sense, may
encompass everything other than military operations, from assassination to
political accommodation. Reversing Clausewitz's famous dictum that âwar is
the
extension of politics by other means,â political warfare is the extension of
armed conflict by other means.
Political warfare does not focus exclusively on enemies who are at large or
end with their capture. It targets those on their way in to enemy ranks, those
who might be persuaded to quit, and those in custody. Political warfare sees
the enemy not as a monolithic force, but as a dynamic population of
individuals whose grievances, sense of humiliation, and desire for revenge,
honor,
status, meaning, or mere adventure propel them into jihad and resistance.
Political warfare accepts no foe as having irrevocably crossed a line, but
sees enemy combatants as constantly calibrating and recalibrating their
commitment. It sees every prisoner not merely as a source of operational
intelligence, but as a potential convert. Political warfare is infinitely
flexible and
ferociously pragmatic. It accepts local accommodations to reduce violence,
offers amnesties to induce divisions and defections, and cuts deals to co-opt
enemies.
The United States, of course, does some of these things now. But America's
efforts are uncoordinated byproducts of intelligence, law enforcement or
military operations.
Americans remain suspicious of psychological operations beyond battlefield
leaflets. We are a nation of laws and believe in punishment. We bridle at local
accommodations with those who have been our enemies.
There are numerous lessons to be learned from past American political warfare
experiences and innovative approaches currently being pursued by other
countries.
Pre-emptive recruiting is one approach. During the Vietnam War, I was among
the U.S. Special Forces soldiers who recruited highland tribesmen to the South
Vietnamese side â knowing if we didn't give them rifles, the Viet Cong
would. In the same way today, the immediate benefit of recruiting large
numbers of
Iraqis into government security forces is keeping them employed and out of
the clutches of the resistance.
Another approach involves interfering with recruiting. As part of their
campaign against terrorists in the 1970s, German authorities deployed hundreds
of
young undercover agents to likely recruiting spots. Their mere presence
caused the already paranoid terrorists to suspect every new volunteer.
Luring back those in the terrorist fold is another task. Terrorists say they
are all determined to fight to the death, an illusion they foster with
suicide attacks. But the ranks of even the most fervent fanatics include
latent
defectors who might quit if offered a safe way out.
The Chieu Hoi or Open Arms program during the Vietnam War produced more than
100,000 defections to the South Vietnamese side by offering enemy soldiers
amnesty, cash, job training assistance and homes. Some of the âralliersâ as
they were called drifted back to the Communist side, but overall the program
was a less expensive and certainly less dangerous way of removing a sizable
number of enemy combatants.
Although it may be difficult to convert committed jihadists, it is not
impossible. Several years ago a former Egyptian militant wrote a fascinating
memoir titled âEarth is Better Than Paradise,â which described his
recruitment,
indoctrination, terrorist training, imprisonment and self-examination. Freed
from prison, he still had to liberate his mind. Only months after leaving the
extremists did he recover his ability to think independently, outside of the
texts and slogans that had been pressed into his brain. Translated only into
French, one wonders why the book has not been disseminated throughout the
world.
Faced with a direct terrorist challenge from al-Qaeda, the government of
Saudi Arabia cracked down hard, but it also offered its terrorist foes amnesty
and financial assistance for their families. A few openly accepted, but it
established that there was another road, and it gave greater legitimacy to the
Saudi government's continuing campaign against those who rejected the offer.
Last year, Iraq's interim president floated the idea of a broad amnesty to
the insurgents in that country. The objective, he said, was to split the
insurgency between nationalists fighting to evict foreign troops and foreign
fighters engaged in jihad. Iraq's new president revived the idea in April of
this
year, restricting the offer to Iraqi insurgents who turned away from the
resistance, not criminal terrorists from abroad.
American officials reacted negatively. âWe don't think it's appropriate to
give amnesty to people who have killed American or coalition forces,â
observed
a State Department spokesman. It is an understandable sentiment, but one that
narrows exit scenarios. Can the fighting end only when the last American
soldier in Iraq kills the last Iraqi insurgent?
Political warfare does not end with terrorist captivity. Determined to reduce
the number of Irish Republican Army detainees, British authorities compiled
evidence to justify the release of those individuals whose family or
community background suggested they could be moved away from violence.
Italy, a Catholic country, used an appropriate religious term to encourage
Red Brigade prisoners to renounce terrorism and cooperate with authorities.
Those who did were called ârepentantsâ and their sentences were reduced
accordingly. The mere fact that some repented dismayed those still at large,
and
the information they provided was crucial in cracking the terrorists' campaign.
Americans have not done well here. Despite holding hundreds of detainees,
some for three years now, including many whose participation in jihad was
minor,
not one has been publicly turned. One doubts that they are all so dedicated.
Is it instead because the interaction is limited to confinement and
interrogation, which produces only resistance and radicalization?
Ahmed Ressam, the man convicted of planning to bomb Los Angeles Airport as
part of the terrorist millennium plot, currently awaits sentencing. In prison
for more than five years, he has renounced terrorism and helped identify more
than a hundred terrorists. He faces a possible sentence of 35 years. Would it
not be better, if possible, to employ him as a spokesman against al-Qaeda's
brand of jihad, telling his story to would-be jihadists â his initial
illusions, his experience in prison, his decision to cooperate?
That would shift the public debate from terrorists versus government
spokesmen to terrorists versus former terrorists.
So long as we see political warfare as merely advertising American values,
dangerous deception unbefitting democracy, or dancing with the devil, we are
condemned to take down our opponents one at a time in endless combat. Even as
we defeat them, they will multiply.
Those who have dealt with earlier versions of the challenges we face, or less
hampered by American attitudes, can teach us things not learned at artillery
school. American military technology has no equal. What we need now is some
of those Islamic scholars from Yemen.
____________________________________
Jenkins is a former officer in the U.S. Army's Special Forces. He founded
the RAND Corporation's research program on international terrorism in 1972 and
is now a senior adviser to the president of RAND, a nonprofit research
organization.
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