[lit-ideas] Re: "many of the usual marks of emotion were present in their beh...
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 09:05:10 +0000 (GMT)
>That is, she probably wasn't consciously dissembling, and she was persuasive
>precisely because of that.>
This point, unpacked, is central to the interesting book by Robert Trivers
"Deceit and Self-Deception: Fooling Yourself the Better to Fool Others" - this
attempts to sketch a Darwnian account of the role of deception in the animal
kingdom as a framework for understanding the role of deception and
self-deception at a human level. As an evolutionary biologist, Trivers brings
out that deception is absolutely central to any account of evolution and is
widespread and central at every level of evolution: even at the level of a
virus, which works by deceiving your body that it is a 'friendly' thing.
The book works with the idea that we can understand evolution as a series of
situations where dissembling can bring immense advantages (e.g. looking
poisonous when you are not, which may deter predators), and this sets up an
'arms race' between dissembling strategies and counter-strategies to detect
dissembling.
>Is it possible for animals to dissemble?> asks Mike. The answer from Trivers
>is an unequicocal yes: and not only animals but also plants and even viruses.
>But that does not mean this dissembling is consciously controlled.
At the human level, Trivers is trying to suggest that, while consciously
controlled dissembling occurs, much of our dissembling is the result of
processes inbuilt by evolution and is not consciously controlled but more like
a kind of 'survival' auto-pilot. Human dissembling bypasses conscious control
because it is more effective that way. Take two examples. First, it is possible
for a human to work out a lie and then convince themselves of it like an actor
learning a role, so that when they come to perpetrate the lie they act from the
devised 'script' as if it is something they consciously accept as true (rather
than try to act consistent with what they consciously know is a lie): here we
must use the idea that there are different levels and aspects to consciousness,
so that a person may engage in acting out their 'script' as if it were true
because they have suppressed that aspect of their (potential) consciousness
that knows it is lie. Second, it is
also possible for the mind to devise a false 'script' in a way that bypasses
consciousness in the sense that the falsehood is not consciously worked out: in
fact, Trivers seems to think this kind of 'self-deception' is widespread. There
may also of course be cases where both these kinds of self-deception are
combined.
Among the many pressing questions that the book does not address, however, is
why this font has turned blue.
Dnl
On Wednesday, 12 March 2014, 23:35, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On the other hand, I remember what a friend told me about a girl I was going
out with at the time: " It may well be that she means what she says now, but
she won't mean it tomorrow." (He proved to be right, time and time again.) That
is, she probably wasn't consciously dissembling, and she was persuasive
precisely because of that.
O.K.
On Thursday, March 13, 2014 12:16 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Well, that's an interesting point and difficult to account for from the point
of view of behaviorist psychology which Russell makes much of in that work.
Since behaviorist psychology only takes into account externally observable
behaviors and not internal mental states, it is not clear how it can account
for dissembling, whether in non-human animals or in human ones.
O.K.
On Wednesday, March 12, 2014 10:33 PM, Mike Geary
<jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
As JL points out, there's the problem of anthropomorphizing emotion in animals
(non-human animals, of course -- since human animals have already been
anthropomorphed). Humans, in fact are capable of "aping" a very wide range of
emotions -- the implicature being that humans are capable of insincere
emotional displays. Are any other animals? Is it possible for animals to
dissemble? I don't know. Could be. We tend to believe that animals have no
choice but to be honest in their behaviors, and in the expressions accompanying
such behaviors. Maybe. I wonder if animals always take our motives at face
value as we do them. One contrary to all this is the fact that opossums can
"play" dead -- the implicature here is that they cannot "play" alive -- I call
it an implicature, don't know what Grice would call it. Don't care either.
How about them apples, JL? Never has anyone ever seen a dead opossum "play"
alive. In fact,
never has any animal (including humans) ever fooled anyone by playing alive.
However, I know a guy down the street who once came upon was a huge "dead rat",
"Lord God" he says he said, "I'll be damned if that ain't the biggest damn rat
I ever seen." Being of a Whitmanian religious bent, he naturally raised his
hands and prayed to God to bless the poor, dead, giant rat's soul. Whereupon
the "dead rat" stood up and sauntered off. To this day he swears he raised
that rat from the dead. Most claim it was just an old opossum. His running
rumming buddy Bo dismisses it all. "Naw," he says, "that rat was just playing
alive."
Mike Geary
who, playing the Play Maker in Memphis,
is taking time off from human contact to
finish a play.
Later Dudesses and Dudes
On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 9:53 PM, <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>In a message dated 3/10/2014 5:31:11 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
>omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
>In Russell's Analysis of Mind, Chapter XIV, we encounter this passage:
>Sherrington, by experiments on dogs, showed that many of the usual marks
>of emotion were present in their behaviour even when, by severing the spinal
>cord in the lower cervical region, the viscera were cut off from all
>communication with the brain, except that existing through certain cranial
>nerves. He mentions the various signs which "contributed to indicate the
>existence of an emotion as lively as the animal had ever shown us before the
>spinal operation had been made."* He infers that the physiological condition
>of
>the viscera cannot be the cause of the emotion displayed under such
>circumstances, and concludes: "We are forced back toward the likelihood that
>the
>visceral expression of emotion is SECONDARY to the cerebral action occurring
>with the psychical state.... We may with James accept visceral and organic
>sensations and the memories and associations of them as contributory to
>primitive emotion, but we must regard them as re-enforcing rather than as
>initiating the psychosis."*
>*I am more into cats than into dogs, but I wonder what were 'the usual
>marks of emotion' ? Did the dog still appear to love his benevolent master ?
>Would Russell and Sherrignton still exhibit 'many of the usual marks of
>emotion' in similar circumstances ?
>
>---
>
>I believe Russell should have quote from Darwin,
>
>"The expression of emotion in man and animal"
>
>The title has a curious implicature: that man is not an animal, but still.
>
>It has nice illustrations.
>
>So I think it's EXPRESSION of emotion we need, not 'mark' of it.
>
>Mitchell Green has discussed this with regard to Grice as man/animal.
>Green's concern is Grice's frown (on occasion). If designed, it means x, if
>undesigned, it means y.
>
>And so on.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Speranza
>
>
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