[lit-ideas] brentano
- From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 03:20:52 +0000
The point is very old. Unless proven wrong F Brentano is right, belief is a
species of intentionality hence not causal. Quine who at last understood what
the question asked, and misfired answer (a simple short introduction to the
problem is by T Crane at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/589/1/T_Crane_Brentano.pdf)
The so called causal theories of knowledge are confused, as it has been pointed
out endlessly.
Assume you know that you know that seventimesnineequals63 unless you are of the
view that numbers have effects on you, such knowledge is not causal. The other
horn is to claim that you do not know that seventimesnineequals63, which to me
appears rather more solid that the junk epistemologists press as so called
theories, norms of beliefs and the like
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Omar Kusturica
Sent: 05 March 2015 21:02
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Popper and Grice on 'knowledge'
JL has wisely decided to ignore my previous post, and dedicate his last post of
the day to Grice's cats. I do hope that the Principle of Sufficient will be
tackled tomorrow.
In the meanwhile, I also know that Venus is hot. Does that mean that I went to
Venus and felt the hotness, which caused me to hold this belief ? No, it
doesn't; in fact nobody ever went to Venus and felt the hotness. The notion
that it's hot has been arrived at relatively recently through various indirect
calculations. Presumably Venus was hot before that, but it didn't cause people
to believe that it's hot; a few decades ago it was thought to have temperatures
similar to the Earth's. The causal relation, if any, between the state of
affairs and our beliefs is too weak to be taken seriously.
O.K.
On Thu, Mar 5, 2015 at 7:36 PM, Redacted sender
Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx<mailto:Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> for DMARC
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
How non-objective can knowledge be?
If Popper says that epistemic logic is irrelevant, that means he read a lot
about epistemic logic.
On the other hand, it struck to me that the contents of this new handbook
did dwell on aspects that might interest a Popperian.
In a message dated 3/5/2015 10:25:55 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
"modern "epistemic logic" is mostly a misguided and misconceived
irrelevance when viewed in the light of the theory of knowledge defended in that
book."
I see. It would be interested to see if the handbook cares to quote from
Popper!
O. K. was proposing one example that [THIS PHILOSOPHER I LIKE] talks about
a lot:
i. 2 + 2 = 4
ii. I know that 2 + 2 = 4
[THIS PHILOSOPHER I LIKE A LOT] says that it's to things that (i) that
'know' best applies. He provides a parallel with Plato on 'circulus', and I
traced the quote!
Plato says that surely (he is referring to Socrates), if Socrates draws a
circle on the sand (with his rough fingers), it won't be a 'circle' as
mathematics (or geometers) understand 'circle'. Ditto for
iii. My aunt is in the kitchen.
iii. I know that my aunt is in the kitchen.
In (iii) 'know' is used loosely -- Knowledge of (i) marks the 'limit', and
cases like (ii) -- empirical knowledge -- are _deemed_ to be 'knowledge'
because we work with an ideal conception of 'knowledge' that best applies to
(i).
Granted, [THIS PHILOSOPHER I LIKE A LOT] is not strictly a causalist, and
in the passage where he discusses a weaker notion of 'knowledge' than
Gettier's target of attack, [THIS PHILOSOPHER I LIKE A LOT] writes ("cf. causal
theory"). [The example, "He knows that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in
1805" -- referring to a student, who after some mumbling, does provide the
right answer in the oral examination. The idea is that there is some sort
of link -- back to Waterloo, in this case].
It _is_ interesting that indeed if one follows Witters, as O. K. notes, (i)
hardly paints a 'proposition' or depicts a fact of the world. But it may
still play a causal role. Epistemic causalists* (ps. 2 below -- Goldman is
one of them) usually 'know' this and have ways to formalise it!
Cheers,
Speranza
From "The handbook of epistemic logic":
"Epistemic logic and, more generally, logics of knowledge and belief,
originated with philosophers such as Jaakko Hintikka and David Lewis in the
early 1960s. Since then, such logics have played a significant role not only
in philosophy, but also in computer science, artificial intelligence, and
economics. This handbook reports significant progress in a field that, while
more mature, continues to be very active. This book should make it easier
for new researchers to enter the field, and give experts a chance to
appreciate work in related areas. The book starts with a gentle introduction
to
the logics of knowledge and belief; it gives an overview of the area and
the material covered in the book. The following eleven chapters, each
written by a leading researcher (or researchers), cover the topics of only
knowing, awareness, knowledge and probability, knowledge and time, the
dynamics
of knowledge and of belief, model checking, game theory, agency,
knowledge and ability, and security protocols. The chapters have been written
so
that they can be read independently and in any order. Each chapter ends
with a section of notes that provides some historical background, including
references, and a detailed bibliography."
ps. 2. Alvin Goldman's accounts of knowledge and justified belief, using
notions like causation and reliability instead of normative concepts like
permissibility and obligation, contributed to a philosophical approach that
came to be known as naturalized epistemology.
The first of these emerged as part of the efforts to find a "fourth"
condition in response to the Gettier challenge to the account of knowledge as
"justified true belief." In his essay "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Goldman
proposed that knowledge amounts to true belief appropriately CAUSED by the
fact that makes it true.
Later, he claimed knowledge amounts to true belief that is produced by a
reliable process.
More recently, Goldman has focused his epistemological efforts to questions
of social epistemology and has applied his approach to epistemology to
such issues as the law (especially evidence), voting and media. He attempts to
provide (in his words) a less radical view of social epistemology than
those suggested by cultural theorists and postmodernists under that name.
His approach uses tools of analytic philosophy especially formal
epistemology to analyze problems in social knowledge. Some of this work is
summarized in his book "Knowledge in a Social World."
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit
www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html<http://www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html>
Other related posts:
- » [lit-ideas] brentano - Adriano Palma
