[lit-ideas] Re: as for 'fact'
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2011 16:16:53 +0100 (BST)
A "necessity" works as a prohibition on what can happen. If it 'logical
necessity', and an example is 'If A, then A', this 'necessity' prohibits it
ever being the case as a matter of logic that A can be true and its negation,
non-A, also true. If it is 'physical necessity' as in a law of nature, and an
example is 'E=mc2', this 'necessity' prohibits it ever being the case as a
matter of physics that there can ever be 'E' such that it equals something
other than 'mc2'.
The prohibitive effect of a physical law reflects the fact that the logical
form of a universal generalisation ['UG'], which may be given as "All As are
Bs", has no 'existential import' but merely asserts that there cannot be an
instance of 'A' that is 'non-B'. This also means that events may be the product
of physical necessity, i.e. of some level of law-like prohibition such that
they could not be to some extent otherwise (i.e. to the extent prohibited by
some law), without being fully determined to every extent. For example, if we
try to suspend a car from an ordinary cotton thread, physical laws may prohibit
as impossible that the cotton thread will not snap, but this prohibitive effect
of physical laws may not suffice to mean there is no leeway as to when the
thread will snap (to the smallest possible measurement) or no leeway to where
exactly the falling car will land (to the smallest possible measurement).
It is quite simple to say, a la Tarski, that a physical necessity of the above
kind is a 'fact' if the UGs used to express such a necessity are true and
if their truth is not merely coincidental but reflects a necessity in nature.
And we can test the truth of such a set of UGs by obervation. There is nothing
"utterly unclear" about this.
What is "utterly unclear" (at least to me) is why we need obfuscatory and
high-sounding talk of things like "a modal property (hence a property)" to
understand this. This is the kind of philosopher's talk that makes careful
people check they still have their wallet.
Donal
Checking his wallet
London
From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, 9 September 2011, 8:23
Subject: [lit-ideas] as for 'fact'
if necessity is a modal property (hence a property) it is utterly unclear what
it would be for a property to 'be' a fact, is that a statement of identity? if
so, it is very similar to claims of the laughable idiocy of truth is beauty und
so weiter
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||ξε ν’, γγέλλειν
Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀ ὅτι τ δεκείμεθα, το ς κείνων ῥήμασι
πειθόμενοι./begin/read__>sig.file: postal addresspalmaUniversity of
KwaZulu-Natal Philosophy3rd floor of Memorial Tower BuildingHoward College
CampusDurban 4041South AfricaTel off: [+27] 031 2601591 (sec: Mrs. Yolanda
Hordyk) [+27] 031-2602292Fax [+27] 031-2603031mobile 07 62 36 23 91 calling
from overseas +[27] 76 2362391EMAIL: palma@xxxxxxxxxxxxx: palma@xxxxxxxxxxxx
OFFICE # IS 290@Mtb *only when in Europe*: inst. J. Nicod29 rue d'Ulmf-75005
paris franceemail me for details if needed at
palma@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx e-mail message (and attachments) is
confidential, and/or privileged and is intended for theuse of the addressee
only. If you are not the intended recipient of this e-mail you must not
copy,distribute, take any action in reliance on it or
disclose it to anyone. Any confidentiality orprivilege is not waived or lost
by reason of mistaken delivery to you.This entity is not responsible for any
information not related to the business of this entity. If youreceived this
e-mail in error please destroy the original and notify the sender.
>>> Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 9/8/2011 8:01 PM >>>
A week and a half ago I wrote this response in the above thread (which explains
for example why, logically, from one set of initial conditions, A, nothing may
be inferred as to another set of "initial conditions", B) only to be met by a
barrage of silence and the comparative analytical spaghetti of sharia law. I do
not ask much, a simple "Popper is of course correct" would do. From the whole
list please.
Donal
London
From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Sunday, 28 August 2011, 2:05
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Necessity is not an established fact, but an
interpretation
--- On Sun, 28/8/11, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
>Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Necessity is not an established fact, but an
>interpretation
>To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Date: Sunday, 28 August, 2011, 0:18
>
>
>On 8/27/11 4:12 PM, Robert Paul wrote:
>Donal wrote
>>
>>...
>>
>>Cannot "necessity" be both a fact [e.g. it is the case that there is a
>>universal law such that "All Xs are Ys"] and also an interpretation [i.e. we
>>interpret, or theorise, the correlation between X and Y as one of
>>'necessity', as opposed to contingency]. If neither excludes the other, then
>>the fact 'necessity' can be regarded as an interpretative device does not
>>exclude it being also regarded as a fact, and indeed being a fact. When we
>>ask whether interpreting a relation in terms of 'necessity' is correct, we
>>are asking whether it is true that such a relation holds, and if it is true
>>it holds then it is a fact that there is such a relation.
>>I don't know what it would mean for necessity to be a fact or not be a fact.
>>I'd always thought that 'necessity,' and questions about its use arose when
>>one was confronted with expressions like, 'the conclusion of a valid argument
>>follows necessarily (i.e., it doesn't just happen to follow) from its
>>premises,' or "'x is is identical with x' is necessarily true." Facts usually
>>hide in 'that clauses' (where they really do no work, e.g. 'It is a fact that
>>the earth has two magnetic poles,' just means 'The earth has two magnetic
>>poles.' If I were asked to give some examples of facts, I'd give examples
>>like the foregoing, along with the fact that if I touch my nose with my right
>>index finger, my right elbow will be bent. If someone replies she didn't mean
>>facts that so-and-so, but just plain unadorned facts,
>>I wouldn't understand what she meant.
>>
>>Donal gives this account:
>>
>>
>>This leaves open in what way is 'necessity' "established". Taking the
>>"necessity" in a 'universal law' or, better perhaps, 'universal
>>generalisation' ['UG']:- such a UG as "All swans are white" cannot be
>>established by induction though it may, conjecturally and non-inductively, be
>>falsified by a counter-example such as a black swan. But even if we had
>>empirical omniscience, so that we could survey the whole universe and observe
>>that the only colour swans came in was white, this would not be enough to
>>establish "necessity" in the sense of law: it would not show that a non-white
>>swan was not a physical possibility. So there is a further sense in which
>>"necessity" cannot be "established": to assert "necessity" as a relation
>>between phenomena is to assert something beyond a universal but contingent
>>link between phenomena - yet what we observe, even if it were the whole
>>universe, is consistent with any UG that holds being only contingently true.
>>As far as I can tell, scientific 'laws' are empirical generalizations; they
>>are not necessary truths or true 'of necessity.' That is, if they're
>>falsifiable, they can't be true necessariy. My first cousin is so
>>necessarily, in virtue of our sharing at least one set of grandparents, which
>>entails that at least at least one of my cousin's parents is a sibling of at
>>least one of my cousin's parents. Maybe I should
>>draw a diagram... In any event, that Alice is my first cousin is a contingent
>>fact, but what makes her my first cousin is a relation which would make
>>anyone who stands in that relation to me,
>>my first cousin. I'm not clear about what an omniscient being's all-knowing
>>would have to do with the contingency or necessity of things: this being is
>>said to be empirically omniscient (although
>>it might know a few logical truths), which means, I think, that what it knows
>>is what happens, what is the case, here and now. Otherwise, we might be
>>faced, as Medieval theologians were,
>>with the problem of God's knowledge of 'future contingents.' If God, who does
>>not exist in time, knows everything (and if what he knows cannot be
>>otherwise) then what we see as the contingency
>>of the future is an illusion. Everything that happens, happens necessarily.
>>God, who has his whole being at once knows everything at once; his knowing it
>>makes it true, and necessarily true.
>>
>>So, the omniscient observer sees only time slices in which things are this
>>way or that way, and its seeing that all swans are black at t, does not make
>>'All swans are black,' a necessary truth,
>>for at t+1, it may observe a white one.
>>
>>Donal:
>>
>>Thus Popper rightly claims that the whether there exists even one natural
>>law, or natural "necessity", is a metaphysical question. It cannot be
>>"established" empirically. All that can be "established" empirically, and
>>then only conjecturally and non-inductively, is the non-existence of a
>>claimed 'natural law' by adducing a falsifying counter-example. There are no
>>logical relations (necessity being a logical or mathematical notion) between
>>objects or states of affairs. 'The only possibility is logical possibility;
>>the only impossibility is
>>logical impossibility.' I'm not clear whether Popper believes this or not.
>>
>>Can we establish the existence of natural laws by metaphysical argument? Not
>>conclusively, but the balance of the argument favours it as Popper sees
>>things. In any case, the search for UGs would be fruitful even if their truth
>>were contingent, for it would still be universal. And so the absence of a
>>clear metaphysical proof of the existence of any natural laws (which is not a
>>disproof of their existence), does not affect the rationality of searching
>>for such invariants. This argument can be reworked even for 'propensities',
>>that is probabilistic relations between phenomena that fall short of
>>necessity. As to whether the search for some kind of "regularity" is itself a
>>'necessity' of some kind, Popper would affirm for Kantian reasons: without
>>being oriented to interpret the world as forming patterns we would be lost.
>>But this does not mean we are lost because our world lacks _complete_
>>regularity; only that it is necessary that we search for some degree
of it and that there appears [contingent or not] to be some degree of it.
These last three paragraphs are extremely interesting.
>>
>>Robert Paul,
>>somewhere south of Reed College
>>
Please find our Email Disclaimer here-->: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/disclaimer
Other related posts:
