[lit-ideas] Re: What If?
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 18:51:58 -0400 (EDT)
In a message dated 6/9/2012 1:30:04 P.M. UTC-02,
lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I became attracted to Counterfactual History from reading Niall Ferguson,
but that isn't what I am engaging in when looking at battles. Students at
a war college wouldn't see these notes as "counterfactuals." One looks at
the two forces, at their leaders, numbers, arms, and logistics as well as
movements during the battle. It isn't counterfactual to suggest for example
that if the left wing of Hoods forces held out a little longer, and they
could have if Hood had the men he requested, his army wouldn't have
collapsed and General Thomas wouldn't have won that battle. Any military
instructor worth his salt would impress upon his students the consequences of
poor
logistics and tactical execution during a battle.
I engaged in counterfactuals briefly when I considered what the territory
that is presently the U.S. would have looked like if the South had won the
Civil War. As far as I can recall nothing else I wrote would qualify as
counterfactual history in the Niall Ferguson sense of the term.
Which isn't to say that I didn't enjoy your research on the subject. I
did.
Thank you. Yes, it would be interesting to check, in our prose, etc., as to
when we may be said to have indulged in a counterfactualism.
(Indeed, counterfactualism is more of a linguist's jargon. G. N. Leech, in
his second edition to his Semantics, published by Penguin) distinguishes
between 'factive', 'counterfactive' and 'nonfactive': "He is mistaken as
to..." is counterfactive; "he knows" is factive; and "he thinks" is
non-factive).
When Grice (he died in 1988) published, in 1989 (the book, "Studies in the
Way of Words" is posthumous) the fourth William James lectures on
conditionals, he entitled it, "Indicative Conditionals".
Grice is suggesting, by this phrase, that there are "subjunctive"
conditionals -- Note that 'if' ("p --> q") itself does not change: it's the
tense,
the aspect, and the mode, of the verb that does.
So, qua philosopher, it may to see if we can formalise something very
simple like: x has property F; x has property G -- and play counterfactually.
Part of the problem, for Griceians, is due to early observations by J. L.
Mackie (a student of Grice at Oxford) and D. K. Lewis.
"If the queen of England had been a male..."
Note that "what if?" is formulated as a question, which may complicate
things further. For empiricist philosophers, there's no fact-of-the-matter
regarding the Queen of England: being the Queen of England reduces, in logical
terms, to a mere property -- call it "F". Now, to be female is part of the
_essence_ of the Queen of England (Kripke's views on necessity further
complicate the issues here). So to argue, counterfactually, that had the queen
of England been male, this or that would have happened, amounts, to the
philosopher, to having 'changed the subject' somewhat abruptly. For the queen
of England would not have been the queen of England had she been male. And
so on.
How this relates to the Civil War is yet another issue. I was referring to
a clause -- not so much about the territory of the US -- but such as
(Helm): "Had Hood been able to replace his troops as Thomas or Schofield did,
he
would certainly have fared better."
As L. Helm notes, above, "Any military instructor worth his salt would
impress upon his students the consequences of poor logistics and tactical
execution during a battle."
Note, however, if you wish, the complexity, for purposes of logical
formalisation of the utterance above about Hood. It naturally concerns the past
tense, since indeed a subjunctive conditional requires a past scenario. How
can there be counterfactuals about the future? "Had Hood been able to
replace his troops as Thomas or Schofield did, he would certainly have fared
better." Alas, Griceians have focused on the implicatures (and entailments) of
the above. A VERY Clear "entailment" (or is it implicature?) of the above
is that the utterer (Helm) KNOWS that Hood was not able to replace his
troops. What may add a complexity as to the logical form of an 'ability'
statement: "Hood was not able to replace his troops". As per IMPOSSIBLE?
Recall
Alice, in Wonderland, "I think of at least five impossible things every day"
(or some such). It is not a conceptual impossibility. It was POSSIBLE,
factually, for Hood to replace his troops.
To complicate things even further, as we relate this to predictability or
lack thereof in history, this may trade on Aristotle on the contingent and
the necessary -- which sometimes invites the wrong implicature. For as Noel
Burton-Roberts ("Implicature and Modality", "Linguistics & Philosophy") and
others have noted, even what is necessary IS contingent; in other words,
if x is necessary, x is possible (although to say that x is possible usually
triggers a sometimes unwanted implicature to the effect that x is not
necessary -- Modal Square of Opposition).
"Had Hood been able to replace his troops as Thomas or Schofield did, he
would certainly have fared better."
L. Helm is right that the sort of scenario depicted in that tactical
evaluation seems pretty basic. The 'certainly' may invite an implication of
necessity, that is best understood as 'high probability'; for surely a
replacement of troops -- as Thomas or Schifield had it -- is not a sufficient,
let
alone necessary, condition for the planned outcome -- victory in battle.
So, again, even if L. Helm is right that his lines of reasoning have hardly
been ultra-counterfactual, one may need to elaborate on strong and weak
counterfactuality, and their thresholds. Or something like that.
Cheers,
Speranza
Refs:
wiki, counterfactual history.
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