i consider car oil a non interesting issue, which likely explains why I
know shit about it.
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 1:16 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
My thoughts are that leans too much on a certain paradigm to be very
illuminating, besides Popper is on the record as considering meaning a non
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 12:22 AM, Donal McEvoy <
Popper talks of 'thought' in terms of W2. For a physicalist Griceian,(i) and (ii) and (iv) are different BELIEFS and thus 'realised' in
different _physical_ scenarios. So, the interaction with the world of
physicality -- Popper's W1 -- seems relevant. Also w3, because, of course,
one can consider the "I" in those utterances as being Kantian and
transcendental in nature, and thus, not as the subject of a mere
psychological attitude, but a piece of conceptual architecture that belongs
in the realm of ideas -- Popper's W3 --.>
This passage is excerpted in full because it does mention W3. But it
begins "Popper talks of 'thought' in terms of W2". It might look like this
is the only way Popper talks of thought, but this is not so. "Thoughts" -
at least certain kinds and level of "thought" - are, for P, W3-'derived'.
W3 content can be, within P's schema, instantiated in a W1 form (e.g.
sculpture, cd) but also instantiated in a W2 form.
In Popper's view, on my understanding, our acquisition of language (and
therefore of its sense) is largely a matter of accessing different kinds
and levels of W3 content throught the medium of language. For Popper, to
grasp that 'names name' is to grasp W3 content linking word and object - to
grasp an abstract W3 relation.
This W3 explains many things - such as why a certain work that seemed
impenetrable at a certain stage in our lives might seem crystal clear in
its 'sense' at another stage, or why something we thought 'deep' at one
point might strike us later as shallow, or why we might extract very
different levels of sense from a work (eg. book, string quartet) as our W3
framework alters in relation to grasping it etc. It is not that the W1
physics of the act of grasping have changed, and not even that the brain
has changed much in W1 terms, and not even that there is much change in
many W2 aspects aside W3 - these radical shifts in understanding (including
grasping the sense of language) are because the impact of W3 is very
different between the earlier and later act of understanding.
It is why Rudy cannot grasp why it is funny when he says, after I have
put my coffee aside saying 'It's not very strong", "Someone made you that
coffee" - which he offers in stern tones as befits an adult telling a
child, who has pushed away their barely consumed dinner plate, "Some one
worked hard to make you that dinner." He doesn't get how his language is a
transparent imitation of adult rebuke to him when he is being ungrateful,
and funny for that; in fact he gets greatly offended when the adults can't
help laughing at what he thinks is a very serious point seriously
expressed. Not only can Rudy not grasp why it is funny but it can't be
explained to him why he can't grasp it - because Rudy does not have an
adult W3 perspective on Rudy's developing use of language (which is what
makes it funny for the adults). I suspect that the very idea of W3 could
not be explained to him in a way that would give him much genuine
understanding of how it might explain things.
*From:* Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
*Sent:* Tuesday, 21 March 2017, 21:53
*Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Popper and Grice on the Metalanguage of
since i think that you insist on changing the title of every thread to
something mentioning Grice in order to increase google hits, no reply
On Tue, Mar 21, 2017 at 8:09 PM, Redacted sender jlsperanza for DMARC <
McEvoy was bringing a neo-Wittgensteinian perspective to this issue
-- "Popper and Grice on the meta-language of thought" -- which is
interesting: it seems Witters always comes in handy when discussing Grice
and Popper, or Popper and Grice for that matter.
The point McEvoy was bringing up was that of the ways in which behaviour
can be thought as the recipient of psychological attitudes. The keyword is:
MANIFEST. And I would think that the proper syntax would be that the
psychological attitude (of belief, say) MANIFESTS in behaviour.
So we can wonder.
i. I believe that it is raining.
This seems plain enough and hardly meta-thought.
ii. I believe that I believe that it is raining.
What behaviour may count as allowing such a belief (a meta-belief) to
manifest? Well, (ii) contrasts with
iii. I believe that I merely BELIEVE that it is raining; but I would
hardly qualify myself (if we may use that phrase -- cfr. 'justify myself')
as KNOWING that it is raining. It can all be an hallucination.
What about a third meta-belief:
iv. I believe that I believe that I believe that it is raining.
Again. Here Popper may discuss with Grice. For Popper might argue that
indeed it is a case of 'objective knowledge' that it is raining, and so,
a Griceian would utter (iv) just to prove to Popper that, no, Popper is
wrong: it's NOT a case of 'knowledge': I believe, with some grounds,
that it is a BELIEF I have about me believing that it is raining. This
starts to sound slightly convoluted -- but, as Geary would say, "I've seen
convolutions compared to which, that is a straight line."
Popper talks of 'thought' in terms of W2. For a physicalist Griceian, (i)
and (ii) and (iv) are different BELIEFS and thus 'realised' in different
_physical_ scenarios. So, the interaction with the world of physicality --
Popper's W1 -- seems relevant. Also w3, because, of course, one can
consider the "I" in those utterances as being Kantian and transcendental in
nature, and thus, not as the subject of a mere psychological attitude,
but a piece of conceptual architecture that belongs in the realm of ideas
-- Popper's W3 --.
On the other hand, most likely there is NO metalanguage of thought, for
Grice OR Popper (Unless there is).