McEvoy was bringing a neo-Wittgensteinian perspective to this issue -- "Popper
and Grice on the meta-language of thought" -- which is interesting: it seems
Witters always comes in handy when discussing Grice and Popper, or Popper and
Grice for that matter.
The point McEvoy was bringing up was that of the ways in which behaviour can be
thought as the recipient of psychological attitudes. The keyword is: MANIFEST.
And I would think that the proper syntax would be that the psychological
attitude (of belief, say) MANIFESTS in behaviour.
So we can wonder.
i. I believe that it is raining.
This seems plain enough and hardly meta-thought.
ii. I believe that I believe that it is raining.
What behaviour may count as allowing such a belief (a meta-belief) to manifest?
Well, (ii) contrasts with
iii. I believe that I merely BELIEVE that it is raining; but I would hardly
qualify myself (if we may use that phrase -- cfr. 'justify myself') as KNOWING
that it is raining. It can all be an hallucination.
What about a third meta-belief:
iv. I believe that I believe that I believe that it is raining.
Again. Here Popper may discuss with Grice. For Popper might argue that indeed
it is a case of 'objective knowledge' that it is raining, and so, a Griceian
would utter (iv) just to prove to Popper that, no, Popper is wrong: it's NOT a
case of 'knowledge': I believe, with some grounds, that it is a BELIEF I have
about me believing that it is raining. This starts to sound slightly convoluted
-- but, as Geary would say, "I've seen convolutions compared to which, that is
a straight line."
Popper talks of 'thought' in terms of W2. For a physicalist Griceian, (i) and
(ii) and (iv) are different BELIEFS and thus 'realised' in different _physical_
scenarios. So, the interaction with the world of physicality -- Popper's W1 --
seems relevant. Also w3, because, of course, one can consider the "I" in those
utterances as being Kantian and transcendental in nature, and thus, not as the
subject of a mere psychological attitude, but a piece of conceptual
architecture that belongs in the realm of ideas -- Popper's W3 --.
And stuff.
On the other hand, most likely there is NO metalanguage of thought, for Grice
OR Popper (Unless there is).
Cheers,
Speranza
