[lit-ideas] Re: Transcendental or what's in a name?
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 17:12:41 +0700
Eric Dean wrote:
"there seems to me to be something that needs explaining about the
relationship between a term or proposition or maxim or whatever which
is supposed to be 'universal' and something which is supposed to be a
'grey area' to which said universal term, proposition or maxim refers
or applies."
The way I would answer is to suggest that while stealing is wrong, all
the time and everywhere, the particular details of what counts as
stealing will vary and in some cases be ambiguous enough that it is
not possible to determine whether that act constitutes stealing. In
some ambiguous cases, more facts may lead to the judgment that said
act is or is not stealing. In other cases, the ambiguity may not lie
in facts but rather in judgment so that some acts in some contexts can
never be determined either way. What I would emphasize is that the
universality of the prohibition against stealing doesn't lie in a
particular action but rather a judgment about particular actions that
bear a family resemblance. Where that judgment grabs hold of
particular facts, it asserts a universal moral prohibition. 'This'
act is unconditionally wrong. Where that judgment is unable to grab
hold, either for lack of facts or uncertainty, then the prohibition is
withheld.
Eric continues:
"I think Phil offers a false dichotomy -- either there are
transcendental meanings of moral terms or everything is only
historical, ethnically contextual."
I never suggested a dichotomy. I offered an alternative position,
beginning with the conditional 'If ...'. _If_ one holds this
particular set of beliefs, then these are the sorts of difficulties
one encounters.
Eric continues:
"while I agree with what I take to be Phil's preference that the UDHR
be as effective as possible, I disagree that, as a practical matter,
its effectiveness is dependent upon its principles being universal."
Perhaps we can agree to disagree on this?
Eric:
"It is politically treacherous -- by which I mean not necessarily
conducive to the long-term health of the liberal democratic processes
I take Phil to have been endorsing -- because in those cases where a
group feels marginalized, disenfranchised, or otherwise cut out of the
benefits of the liberal democratic process, to tell them they should
simply accept what they see as the wrong done them for 'the greater
good of the transcendental values our system represents...'"
First, a moral act cannot be a wrong done for any greater good.
Second, a functional liberal democracy could not ask any citizen to
suffer a wrong, for any reason. A necessary condition of a liberal
democracy is that all citizens are considered politically equal. I
would argue that the universalizability that constitutes moral claims
also constitutes liberal democracy, so that all citizens, regardless
of their social and economic standing, are understood as meriting the
same rights. So, contrary to Eric's claims, transcendental values can
be seen as the very things that protect the marginalized and
disenfranchised in liberal democracies.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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