[lit-ideas] Re: The universal applicability of moral judgments
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2008 16:05:15 -0330
A medley of ripostes to the honourable Eric Dean! I wish I had time to give his
thoughts their proper due. Some of my replies at certain points must be short
and I apologize for that. We can all get back later on to any particular point
somebody might be interested in ------------>
Quoting Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> Thanks to Walter for his extended replies to my lengthy note. Since I enjoy
> thinking and writing about this stuff, I'm going to reply to him at length
> too. Those of you who don't enjoy this sort of thing are forewarned...
>
> The core point I was making is that in my view the following make the same
> assertion just with different emphases:
>
> (1) A moral maxim is a universal assertion;
--------------> Technically, maxims are subjective policies that may or may not
be universalizable. Eg: "When my scotch supply is depeleted, I will make a
lying-promise in order to get money to secure refurbishment." (That is still
not the comprehensive, correct form, but I think we can skip the details. Onora
O'Neil is excellent at reconstructing the formal structure of a maxim, going
way beyond anything Kant's hurried efforts in the *Groundwork* permitted.)
Eric:
> applying a moral maxim to a
> particular situation always requires the exercise of judgment.
>
> (2) A moral maxim may be a useful guide to decision-making in the real world,
> but it is not unequivocally true and therefore not universally true.
----------------> Maxims are not T or F in any recognizable sense of those
terms. Their moral modalities are "morally permissible," "impermissible" and
"don't even think about it." (The latter is aptly named "contradiction in
conception.") The form of a maxim is either universalizable or not. (This has
nothing to do with "universal acceptance" of a maxim, which is an empirical
matter.)
Eric:
> I say this because I think that moral maxims are, inevitably, about human
> interactions. Human interactions, unlike, say, the circles and triangles of
> geometry, are almost never unequivocally one thing or another. Therefore the
> assertion that a moral maxim is a universal assertion (i.e. is universally
> true) can amount to no more than: in all those circumstances in which the
> terms of the assertion apply without qualification, the assertion is true.
> In practice, I believe that ends up being no more than to say that when the
> assertion is true, it is true.
--------------> Try this: If a maxim is universalizable (U) then it is that
across all rational agents and it applies universally to all rational agents
within relevantly similar circumstances. This is a normative claim, not an
empirical claim. Not one living or dead soul in the world may be right about
whether the maxim is U or not; the maxim retains its own form regardless. The
CI makes no empirical predictions. In that sense, yes, maxims are "about human
interactions."
(The idea that U is an intrinsic property of a maxim allowed
Kant to claim that all rational agents could arrive at the same assessment of a
maxim, all agents being members of the same
Kingdom of Ends and possessed of the same form of rationality allowing them to
recognize this shared space of reason and morality. Habermas insists this is
but a woeful Cartesian dimension of
Kant's moral theory. Das heisst, all is comprehended under the metaphysics of
"substance:" mind and body are distinct entities, each possessing its own
intrinsic property ("essence.") Each is immanently self-constituting,
possessing
its essential integrity wholly within itself, and each bears only adventitious
relations to the other substance. (Thanks to Eric Y for reminding me of that
word :). You, too, would have a "problem of knowledge" if you believed stuff
like that!
Eric:
> Take Walter's example again: "Teachers ought to respect the autonomy of their
> students." I believe this assertion is unequivocally true in all those cases
> in which teachers are doing things which are best furthered by respecting the
> autonomy of their students and the students are those participants whose
> interests are best furthered by their autonomy having been respected. That
> is circular, of course, but its circularity isn't vicious because it calls
> for one who might be a teacher to consider whether in point of fact what
> he/she is doing is best furthered by respecting the autonomy...
>
> I do believe that in some cases it is worth asserting that a moral principle
> is a universal truth. I just don't think that such assertions constitute the
> only valid, reasonable or accurate descriptions of what moral maxims are.
-----------> We could simply say that teaching is an educational practice and
all participants in that practice ought to be respected in that way. (What of
cultures that don't have educational practices in that sense? As Hegel queried,
what about societies that have no conception of private proerty? Is it still
immoral to steal in such societies? Note the confusion operative in that
question.)
Eric:
> Walter writes:
>
> > There's ethics as the philosophical (normative/conceptual,
> > non-empirical) study of moral judgement and principles. There's
> meta-ethics
> > which studies the transcendental conditions, limits and possibilities of
> moral
> > deliberation and rightness. And then there's applied ethics - i.e.,
> medical
> > ethics, jurisprudence, educational ethics, etc.) Only the latter is an
> applied
> > field necessarily. The other two may be studied as pure moral theory, akin
> to
> > pure mathematics or theoretical science. (Not all inquiry dealing with
> humans
> > is necessarily "applied.")
>
> I am completely befuddled about what a study of moral judgment and principles
> would be about were it not about how human beings actually interact with one
> another, which, imho, makes it "applied" in the relevant sense.
----------------> Ethics is the philosophical (transcendental) study of moral
judgement and deliberation. It is not an empirical discipline. "How human
beings actually interact with one another" is of no necessary relevance for
philosophical inquiry and appeals to such facts have no probative force in
moral justification.
(Evil or deceptive practices may motivate us to ask ethical questions
and that is clearly an empirical matter. But what motivates us or not is a
psychological and cultural matter, not a philosophical one.)
As well, we can examine what ought to be done in situations like Y ....
Paranthetical note: Yes, that's
the way to put it, I think. Nobody ever encounters a situation in its immediate
particularity. We understand a situation only when we can say "This situation
is
like one of those situations." Not even Hegel accepted the squirelly idea of
"an immediate, particular present." Returning now to my fragmented sentence
above:
... without being committed to the maxim that we will act on the results of the
examination. Questions of justification are not questions of motivation
necessarily. Moral knowledge can be justified, yet motivationally inert. Moral
insight identifies only the epistemic situation that we have no better reasons
to act otherwise.
(Aristotle, with his notion of a "practical syllogism" never seemed to
understand that point. My colleagues reply that when I see the Mac truck
bearing down on me, there is only one "valid" conclusion, and that conclusion
takes the form not of a statement but of an action. Life is hard.)
Eric:
> Mathematics, famously, has objects of study that are not in any meaningful
> sense 'about' the real world. The simplest example I know is from the
> century or so between the invention of non-Euclidean geometries (was it by
> Reimann?) and Einstein's application of such in his theoretical physics.
> During that time non-Euclidean geometries were intellectual curiosities, not
> about the real world.
>
> But it seems to me that moral assertions have to be about the real world,
> i.e. about how real humans really interact with one another, otherwise they
> are entirely pointless. If they are about the real world, then it would seem
> to me that they are "applied" in the usual sense of the word.
-------> Moral assertions are prescriptive, not descriptive. I can go on about
how Alex Kovalev ought to be treated, without once describing
anything about how he is or has been treated. (From a rhetorical perspective of
persuasion, it would of course be prudent for my position to cite empirical
cases where players the likes of Carter from Philly have transgressed the
bounds
of due respect. Grrrr.)
>
Eric:
> Walter goes on to say:
> > The application of a principle requires judgement. That a
> > principle applies here and now, and should be applied in such-and-such a
> > manner, is not identified by any property intrinsic to the principle
> itself.
> > However, some judgements are better than others.
>
> Mathematical logic defines two classes of abstract structure -- the terms,
> logical operators, sentences, and rules of proof which comprise the formal
> "language" in which a mathematical theory can be written, at least in
> principle, and the mathematical objects with their relationships, which the
> theory is about. It also defines the notion of "about" -- a theory expressed
> in the formal language is "about" a mathematical structure (known, in this
> case, as a "model" of the theory) just in case there is a particular
> mathematically definable relationship between the theory and the model. That
> relationship amounts to a mathematized version of the assertion that the
> provable statements in the formal language are "true" in the model. Any
> mathematical structure for which such a relationship can be defined is a
> model of the theory, sometimes called an 'interpretation' of the theory.
>
> The great lengths to which mathematical logic goes to define all these
> relationships is intended to guarantee that the principles of mathematics can
> be expressed in a way that does not retain any residue of the notion that
> mathematical principles are self-interpreting. The entire structure of a
> theory has to be fully interpreted or none of it is and therefore the
> interpretation can be entirely divorced from the particular expression of the
> language, and in particular no 'judgment' is required in interpreting the
> theory.
-------> I know I asked for this and I am grateful to Eric for this extended and
very kindly attempt at clarification, but, alas, the math theory is all way over
my head. I can say something about Eric's next paragraph, though. (Anybody still
here?? Mike? Eric Y? Daphne?)
Eric:
> Absent such a comprehensive denaturing of language, though, I'm not sure just
> what it means to say "that a principle applies here and now, and should be
> applied in such-and-such a manner, is not identified by any property
> intrinsic to the principle itself." Surely the words used to express the
> principle are 'properties intrinsic to the principle', and I would think the
> meanings of the words have a lot to do with determining whether & how the
> principle should be applied.
----------> To determine what "Stop at stop signs" means, one needs to
understand the command and the words are important. But even once one knows
what the command and the corresponding rule states, one does not know how and
when to apply the rule. (Who was it that said that rules do not themselves
provide rules for their application? Besides my mother, that is.) I need to
look at the features of a set of circumstances external to the rule itself in
order to be able to decide how to "apply" the rule to that context, or whether
to apply it at all. (You'd be crazy to abide by that
rule on most Montreal streets, for example.)
Eric:
> Walter:
> > "Teaching" can occur only in genuinely educational contexts; "training"
> > can occur in any context of technical skill or prudence. We should also
> > remember that Codes of Ethics govern military personnel in their treatment
> of
> > each other as well as of the enemy. Moreover, unless one is enslaved,
> one's
> > autonomy as a soldier (and an officer) is retained. If you wipe out an
> entire
> > village of civilians, you remain morally responsible for the maxim you
> willed
> > and acted on.
Eric:
> It seems to me this just substitutes a new term requiring interpretation --
> "genuinely educational contexts" -- for another, "Teaching". Moreover, the
> question wasn't whether the student retained his or her autonomy. In the
> sense Walter is invoking here, no one ever loses his or her autonomy unless
> they are comatose or dead. The question was about the teacher *respecting*
> that autonomy.
>
>
> Walter:
> > Restrictions upon one's own freedom, or that of another, are
> > permissible, and often required, on moral grounds. Such constraints seek
> to
> > preserve threatened autonomy and well-being precisely by curtailing wanton
> or
> > uninformed freedom.
Eric:
>
> Yes, but my point is precisely that such constraints constitute exceptions to
> the universal applicability of "teachers should respect..."
----> I'm not clear on how. What is entailed by my principle is that "No
teacher who violates the autonomy of her students is engaged in education. As
such, she forfeits all claim to the title of "teacher." (Is this an
ethnocentric view? Consider: "Newton's laws of gravity are British.")
> Walter:
> > I am ignorant of the mathematical reference, though I'd be interested
> > in hearing about it in its relevance to the matter of the distinction
> between
> > the "meaning" of a moral claim and its "interpretations."
*The manuscript is warped at this point*
> See above.
>
Eric:
> > > The distinctions in law, plagiarism and semantics that Walter cites as
> > > illustration for our ability to recognize 'relevant similarity' seem to
> me
> > > far from perspicuous. The distinctions Walter cites -- between 1st
> degree
> > > murder & accidental homicide, between copying another's work and
> coincidental
> > > independent creation, and between the meanings of each word in various
> pairs
> > > of related but distinct words -- all operate within realms in which the
> space
> > > of possibilities is established in advance and the question is which of
> a
> > > pair or group of correlated attributes applies, given that one of them
> must
> > > apply (someone's dead by another's hand, so the law presumes the events
> fell
> > > under one of a list of possible headings, murder 1 and accidental
> homicide
> > > being two on that list).
Walter:
> > -----> Eric loses me here. It's a potentially important point though, since
> the
> > claim is that the examples I give may not be completely relevant or
> > appropriate to the question of the application of principles. Perhaps Eric
> could
> > unpack his above comments a tad.
Eric:
>
> What I was saying, to use the homicide example, was that discriminating among
> which of the various degrees of homicide applies is a different task from
> determining whether one is a teacher in the sense relevant to the maxim's
> applicability. In the case of the degrees of homicide, the presumption is
> that the act was in fact a homicide (i.e. a human is dead at another human's
> hands) and that all homicides must fall under one of a fixed list of category
> headings. The classification of the situation is given in advance (it's a
> homicide) and the choices of type within the class are fixed.
>
> In the case of the teacher maxim, the question of whether one is a teacher in
> the relevant sense is, I was tacitly hypothesizing, not something given in
> advance, but rather is something to be ascertained at least in part by how
> well the maxim fits the situation one is in (e.g. to the extent one thinks
> one should not respect a student's autonomy, one is not a teacher).
--------> In light of the distinction I drew above between a principle and a
maxim, we can say that the maxim here is: "In educational contexts, I as a
teacher will respect the autonomy of my students." Maxims don't "fit
situations," just as true statements don't "correspond with" the facts. True
statements *express* facts and maxims *identify* circumstances of willing and
action. Maxims are not assessed by how well they fit situations; they are
assessed only for their form.
Eric:
> Walter:
> > Here, Eric laments the fact that judgement is required for the cogent
> > and justifiable application of moral principles. There is no alternative.
> (Note
> > that the universality of a maxim needs to be differentiated from the
> generality
> > of a maxim. The class of teachers is less general than the class of human
> > beings; however, maxims may be specified to be universalizable across all
> > teachers, without risk of "qualification" in a sense that leads to
> relativism.)
Eric:
>
> I certainly don't think it's lamentable that judgment is required; I think
> instead that it's forlorn to think that there can be a universally true
> assertion that can be understood without the application of judgment
-----------> Please permit an interruption. A "universally true assertion" - is
that different from a "true assertion"? - is surely intelligible independent of
any act of judgement of the kind required by the judicious application of moral
principles. "Between 1990 and 2006, female students of high school math in NL
have on average scored higher on final exams than male students."
Eric:
> and
> therefore forlorn to think that the exercise of judgment can be relegated to
> discerning whether the current circumstances are of the sort to which the
> maxim applies. I understand that the fact that 'teacher' is a subset of
> 'human' doesn't mean the maxim is less than universal.
>
Eric:
> Walter:
>
> <snip>
>
> > The moral order is not an order which is obliged to answer to
> > interrogations of prudential or strategic value or relevance -
> interogations
> > that cannot but unjustifiably privilege the values and rituals of some
> cultural
> > or religious tribe. Indeed, all "practical" or instrumentalist
> justifications of
> > morality are self-contradictory. All we can say is that morality is a
> function
> > of our capacity to engage in rational discourse, and this possesses itw
> own
> > intrinsic worth.
Eric:
>
> I basically agree with Walter's last sentence -- "morality is a function of
> our capacity to engage in rational discourse, and this possess its own
> intrinsic worth." What I disagree with is that the way to preserve that
> intrinsic worth is to pay homage to moral maxims as "universal assertions".
-------> That raises the question whether morality is necessarily concerned
with universally valid and applicable principles. In that it is the sole form
of
discourse and inquiry known to humans and angels to be concerned with
establishing the impartiality and objectivity of moral deliberation and
judgement, I would reply in the affirmative.
Eric:
> I'm not sure I know what the moral order is, but I certainly think that any
> human institution must absolutely be available to "interrogations of
> prudential or strategic value or relevance," and it was the human institution
> of insisting on the possibility of an unqualified moral truth expressible in
> human terms which I was objecting to and calling to account.
----------------> I provide seminars on the moral order and how to bring it
about every MWF in my office and this at very reasonable rates. At any rate,
I agree with everything Eric avers above except for the final conjunct. I hope
my comments above are helpful.
Eric:
> I do not see why objecting to that is objecting to the notion that morality
> is a function of our capacity to engage in rational discourse. I think
> rational discourse is advanced when we attempt to engage each others'
> understandings without insisting that either of us has access to, or ever
> will have access to, an unqualifiable truth.
---------> Something somewhere has been snipped so I'm not clear on the context
for Eric's remarks here.
Once again, kudos and thanks to Eric D. for his penetrating and insightful
critical probings of my frequently wafting reflections on Kant's moral theory.
I await expectantly any further comments from Eric D and the rest of the gang,
and esp from Eric Yost, who I know is following this exchange with rapt
attention.
Walter O.
MUN
>
> Regards to one and all,
> Eric Dean
> Washington DC
>
> P.S.
>
> Walter adds:
> > --> The CI is not itself a universal law. Maxims are judged, as per the
> CI,
> > regarding their possible status as universal laws. (There's no point in
> asking
> > whether the CI is itself a universal law.)
>
> I'm no Kant scholar, so perhaps I am missing something important, but it
> seems to me that the categorical imperative is most definitely a universal
> law. Kant writes (as translated by Abbot, quoted from Gutenberg.org) "Act so
> that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a
> principle of universal legislation." That seems to me pretty unequivocally a
> law ("Act..." it says, in the imperative voice, like laws do). The buildup
> to it has been at pains to distinguish maxims, which are infected by the
> empirical, from practical laws (that word again), which are the only true
> laws per se and which, to avoid the contamination of the merely empirical,
> are forced only to deal with the form rather than the substance, the logic of
> which leads Kant implacably to the CI as *the* one law of pure practical
> reason. I don't get why Walter would say it's not a law...? CI screens
> maxims so that actions can be permitted insofar as they conform to maxims
> which can be made universal without contradiction -- but note, it says "ACT
> so that..."
>
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