In a message dated 2/20/2015 2:02:16 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: Popper's account throws some light on these issues. Rather than speak of "causal laws" etc. [laws do not cause anything except in the presence of initial conditions and may exist without actually causing anything], P uses the term "natural laws" to refer to laws of nature. Oddly, and nicely coincidental, an author that J. L. Scherb quotes in his essay, [translated, "Does the Nothing really noth?"] quotes from Friedman who co-authored the below: De Pierris, G. and Friedman, M., "Kant and Hume on Causality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/kant-hume-causality/>. "[S]ince particular causal relations, for Kant, necessarily involve causal laws, all of our inferences from particular perceptions to universal causal laws of nature are grounded in synthetic a priori principles of pure understanding providing a synthetic a priori conception of the unity and UNIFORMITY OF NATURE in general. Hume was correct, therefore, that THE PRINCIPLE OF THE UNIFORMITY OF NATURE governs all of our inductive causal inferences; and he was also correct that this principle is not and cannot be analytic a priori." Indeed, the keyword here would be what Grice calls "PHILOSOPHICAL ESCHATOLOGY", a branch of metaphysics. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html