[lit-ideas] The Triteness of Dispositional Talk
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 28 Apr 2010 18:33:31 EDT
In a message dated 4/26/2010 8:58:17 A.M., donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx
writes:
This"observation" can be viewed as trite or false, depending how it is
interpreted. False if construed to assert that a person can only ever find (at
some point in the future) what "is already" present within them. This is
false in respect of some of the many things that evolve or develop e.g.
sexual desire, awareness of others' sensibilities and feelings, and a wide
range of character-traits, which must develop from what is _not_ "already"
present, unless we deny there any such thing as character building or
development."
That is Donal as his Baden-Powell worst. Of course there is NO such thing
as 'character building or development'. You build a house; you develop a
development. To think that you can rear a child is obscene.
-----
Donal goes on:
"It is true, but quite trite, if interpreted to assert merely that we
cannot find within us anything that does not exist "already" within us as a
disposition or propensity. All behaviour, whether of persons or objects, can be
said to be possible only because of prior, or "already" existing,
dispositions or propensities. For example, the cd I just cracked placing it in
the
player, could only crack because it had "already" a disposition or
propensity to so crack - one activated by my action. Put another way:- nothing
can
happen without there being some prior disposition or propensity for it to
happen. While this point is trite it may still be the basis for a powerful
and explanatory 'metaphysical' and even 'scientific' research programme, a
per the view Popper outlines in the last volume of the Postscript to Logik
der Forschung, where he defends a metaphysic of reality as "changing
propensities for change". The powerful explanations arise from predictive and
probabilistic (in a propensity, non-inductive sense of probability)
explanations which posit _specific_ dispositions and propensities. To take a
simple
example from evolution (where these kinds of explanation are often used; see
"The Selfish Gene" for an excellent account of some): in a drought a mammal
may well be provoked to 'activate' its disposition or propensity to move
in search of water by walking; a tree cannot uproot itself and walk but may
well be provoked to 'activate' its disposition or propensity to move in
search of water by extending its roots downwards - it may hit an underground
water-table that ensures its survival. But "changing propensities for
change" also points up the sense in which "propensities" are not simply there
"already" - except in the vacuous sense that to come into play propensities
must be logically possible, and therefore exist "already" as logical
possibilities. But to say that anything that exists, or potentially exists as
a
matter of disposition or propensity, must be something that can exist as a
matter of logical possibility, is not to offer much in the way of concrete
explanation. Logical possibility does not really explain what exists; rather
logical impossibility rules out the existence of, say, contradictory states
of affairs."
This is slightly obsolete. Of course the CD broke because it is
"breakable". But, it is a mere implicature that prohibits from saying, "The CD
is
breakable. I broke it". Usage suggest we express the first conjunct in the
past tense: "The CD WAS brekable. I broke it". The fact that this is a mere
conversational implicature can be seen from the 'defeasible' character of a
claim like, "She is a virgin. I deflowered her."
----
J. L. Speranza
for the GriceClub.blogspots.com
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