Or Futilitarianism and its enemies.
McEvoy writes as per ps. He uses the phrase, “detailed analysis” and the saying
(“originally in the Bible,” Geary recalls us) that the devil is in the details.
The issue Grice would see as having to do, not so much with detail, but with
the analytic-synthetic distinction.
When we speak of conceptual ANALYIS (detailed or not) we are dealing with
something very specific, that some philosophers even found paradoxical (vide:
“the paradox of analysis”: “a bachelor is an unmarried male”).
The fact that details follow has to do with the fact that ANALYSIS aims at
providing a correlative of a given ‘concept’ (McEvoy gives three examples –
consider the third one, and take it as an analysis of the demarcation principle
for the concept of ‘science’ in terms of the concept of ‘to falsify’). This
correlative concept is formulated
A iff B
Or rather
p iff q
So we are given a bi-conditional for the analysans (“p” – an answer to “What is
this thing called science?”, to echo Chalmers who’s echoing Porter) in terms of
“q”, the analysandum. The analysandum is usually a throng of clauses which,
taken together provide the necessary and sufficient conditions: hence the ‘iff’
– i.e. ‘if and only if’.
I mention this because one can go into loads of detail without aiming at this
type of analysis.
Grice alas did not consider Popper’s criticisms of conceptual analysis – but he
did take those by Bergman (Grice was offended when Bergmann, and in Oxford,
too, called him a ‘futilitarian’ (“an English futilitarian,” “and I’m not
wasting anytime with him”) and Gellner, a Frenchman.
In his “Valediction,” Grice saw the analytic-synthetic distinction as a
pragmatic one, not a ‘given’ one, which may complicate the views, if not for
Grice, at least for Popper. Or not, of course.
Cheers,
Speranza
McEvoy: “Among the issues we might otherwise discuss is the alleged failure of
Popper to provide "detailed analysis" or do detailed work (of a kind beloved by
some analytic philosophers). This was long ago the complaint of JL Mackie in
his review of Popper's Schilpp volumes, and it resurfaces in the review of this
Cambridge Companion.There is something to this charge: for example, (1) Popper
does not present a detailed working out of how his theory of World 1, 2 and 3
would apply to explain to a given experience, such as writing (or reading) this
post; (2) Popper does not present his theory of democracy in a way that
provides a detailed working out of what would be the preferred voting systems,
or the balance of powers between executive-legislature-judiciary (Popper did
write a late period essay against proportional representation, a very fine one,
and one that drew on his account of democracy - but it did not follow
analytically from that account, and was not based on 'analytic' but largely
practical considerations) (3) Popper does not present sets of detailed workings
out of how the logic of falsificationism applies to clarify the workings of
actual scientfiic practice. Yet there is a defence also for this so-called
'lack of detail'. It is part of Popper's aim to stick to big ideas and not get
lost in comparatively unimportant detail. Moreover, he is too rational to shore
up big ideas with spurious support in the form of details (when such details
might provide a convincing appearance but rationally do not support the idea
being advanced as against its alternatives). To return to example (3), even a
detailed set of analyses of actual examples of scientific debates, in terms of
a falsificationist methodology, would not show that those examples were not
consistent with an alternative inductive account - it might just be spurious to
think such detailed examination provided 'rational grounds' for
falsificationist methodology (as opposed to the arguments that _the logic_ of
such a methodology does not raise problems of logical validity that attend its
inductive alternatives). It is also true that Popper prefers to work on big
ideas and leave certain kinds of detailed examination to others (of course much
detailed examination goes into Popper's work, but without it then being
presented as if the result of such detailed examination _instead it is
presented in terms of key arguments_). If the devil is in the detail, then
Popper prefers to leave plenty of work for the devil. But it is also true that
Popper presents key ideas without always indicating where he stands on certain
resultant questions. For example, as to the 'ontological status' of World 3, as
some philosophers might call it, we do not get a detailed answer in Popper's
works - instead Popper writes, for example, (1) that he is not offering an
ontology (2) that World 3 content exists but in a sense exists "nowhere". This
is far from entirely satisfactory. Again though, there is a defence that can be
made for this drawing back from these kinds of issue, including that it is not
possible to give entirely satisfactory answers to such issues. We should take
with a large grain of salt claims that various of Popper's theories have been
outpaced by historical developments e.g. that his theory of demoracy is
outmoded given the problems faced by modern democracies, or his theory of
scientific method is outmoded given more modern developments, or that his
theory of World 3-2-1 has been overturned by some or other development in some
or other field. What is true is that Popper's theories leave unaddressed many
detailed problems, and that while some such supposed problems may be
misconceived (e.g. the alleged disconnect between 'the people' and their
democratic representatives) some are very important, and may even be so
important that their answer inclines us to theories quite different from
Popper's.”
