[lit-ideas] Re: "Must We Mean What We Say?"
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2007 19:36:47 EDT
J. Krueger:
"I'm wondering if there are any science types out there who could make a
comparison between the way the three words (inference, opinion, observation)
are used in a philosophical context vs. a scientific context. That is, I
wonder if the area of science has a broadly understood "special" definition
of those terms?"
Don't think so. I think it was McEvoy's tri-partition. To me, I don't think
things can be tri-parted like that.
"Opine" I don't use. It sounds too much like "charlatan" to me. "An
opinionated fellow". To opine is 'to think' but in a loud thinking kind of
way.
"Observe" is a Latinism. God (or Loeb) knows what Aristotle used for this. I
prefer the term "perceive" -- there is too much of a load or weight on
_visual_ perception in 'observe' which I dislike. Early philosophers of
science
did speak of 'observational' versus 'theoretical' terms, but 'operational' was
found to do better than 'observation'. If it means 'visually perceive', there
is the further question whether it is a _factive_ or not. E.g. "Macbeth
_visually saw_ (the ghost of) Baquo". Yet Baquo was apparently not there to be
seen. To be a good observer is to observe things such as they exist. Don't
expect scientists to use words more carefully. They have to be careful about
not
exploding their laboratories, not about the correct, Oxonian, use of words.
"Inference" is perhaps my favourite of McEvoy's terms, but I follow Grice to
the _letter_ that 'everything is inferential'. The term, 'inferentia' is
again a Latinism. Aristotle divided syllogisms into inductive and deductive --
where both would involve some 'inference' of some kind.
The cases start to mix when one thinks of the inference -- favoured by
phenomenalists like the early Grice -- from sense-data (sense-perceptions,
observations) -- to a conclusion regarding material objects.
Grice's favourite example was "Eddington's Table"
I perceive a bunch of atoms
_____________________________
Therefore, there is a table before me.
In McEvoy's terms, both premise and conclusion would pertain to the
Observational, whereas for me an inference is taking place. Opinion, too, in
that if
you ask for my opinion I would say that, say, 'the fact that there is a table
before me I infer from my perceiving a bunch of atoms'.
Eddington famously thought that there were "two" tables: the mostly vacuous,
empty table of atomic theory, and the pretty solid one of common-sense. That
was because he lacked good instruments of measurement.
Hume, before him, had been puzzled with inferences like:
I smell an apple-smelling thing
I see red
I touch soft apple-skin like thing, round surface
I munch apple-like piece of thing
etc.
----------------------------
Therefore, there is an apple in my hand.
Hume (or "Home" as I prefer to spell his Scots name) was cautious that the
inference from sense-datum (what he called 'impressions') to statements of
'substance' (like 'apple') was a chimaera that only non-Enlightened Scots or
others would fall for.
McEvoy was apparently insulted by my commentary on his exampl.
(3) I bet you have a long way to go.
I forgot to say that for Austin 'bet' was doubly nonsensical in requiring
for its fulfillment what he called the 'essential uptake' on the part of the
addressee. And I think he was right.
Unless the utterer finds a testimony on the part of the addressee (such as
"OK") then we would be very UNwilling to say
(4) The utterer did bet the addressee that the addressee had a long way to
go.
No act of betting is performed unless it's conjunctional between utterer and
addresee, reciprocating parts.
Cheers,
J. L. Speranza
Buenos Aires, Argentina
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