In a message dated 5/20/2015 11:39:19 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
to claim "This is my hand ∴ There is an external world" is very different
from the claim "This is my hand" simpliciter
Point taken.
Apparently, Norman Malcolm, who knew Moore well, has still a different
version, in a form of a dialogue -- between PHILOSOPHER and Moore.
PHILOSOPHER: There are no material things.
MOORE: You are certainly wrong, for here's one hand and here's another; and
so there are at least two material things.
In Moore's conceptual analysis of 'proof', this IS a proof:
CONDITION 1: its premise ("Here's one hand and here's another") is
different from the conclusion ("There are at least two material things").
CONDITION 2: the reasoner KNOWS FOR CERTAIN that the premise is true.
CONDITION 3: the premise follows from (or entails) the conclusion.
The proof is based on one interpretation of "There are material things'.
The same interpretation used by PHILOSOPHER (in the example above) when
negating "There are material things" -- ii.e. an interpretation that makes
"There are not material things" INCOMPATIBLE with its being true to say that
Moore has two hands.
Cheers,
Speranza
References
Malcolm, N. "Moore and ordinary language", in Schilpp, The Philosophy of
Living Philosophers.
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