[lit-ideas] Lebanon's Force for Good
- From: "Stan Spiegel" <writeforu2@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 02 Aug 2006 00:36:23 -0400
Here's an extraordinary description of a monitoring group that mediated between
Israel and Hezbollah back in 1996. The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group was born
when Israel -- as today -- tried to root out Hezbollah from Southern Lebanon.
Through regular meetings of high-level military and diplomatic officials, the
monitoring group resolved disputes, arranged temporary cease-fires and reined
in spurts of violence. It gives me hope that this can happen again.
Stan Spiegel
Portland, ME
August 2, 2006
Op-Ed Contributor
Lebanon's Force for Good
By ADIR GURION WALDMAN
IN the summer of 1998, I was an infantry soldier in the Israel Defense Forces.
Preparing for an operation in southern Lebanon, my platoon received some
unusual orders: no one, under any circumstance, was to open fire. This was a
significant departure from our standard rules of engagement, which permitted
firing upon sight at Hezbollah forces. The apparent reason was that
representatives of the United States, France, Israel, Lebanon and Syria were in
the area that day for a meeting of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group.
Today, Israeli soldiers are again in southern Lebanon. As pundits propose
various diplomatic solutions to the crisis embroiling the region, lost in all
of these suggestions is the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group, the one
institution that in the past was able to prevent war in the Middle East.
The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group was born a decade ago when, as today,
Israel sought to root out Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. In late April 1996,
after two months of intense warfare, Secretary of State Warren Christopher set
out for a weeklong session of shuttle diplomacy that culminated in an agreement
calling for Israel and Hezbollah to shield civilians from violence. The
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group would oversee compliance with this pledge.
Over the next four years, until Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, violence did
not cease, but the parties were able to keep it from spiraling out of control.
Through regular meetings of high-level military and diplomatic officials, the
monitoring group resolved disputes, arranged temporary cease-fires and reined
in spurts of violence. In December 1999, for example, when Israeli shells
mistakenly hit a Lebanese school, a series of phone calls through the
monitoring group prevented Hezbollah from retaliating against Israeli
civilians. In another instance, the group facilitated an exchange of prisoners
between Israel and Hezbollah.
A long-term diplomatic solution to the current crisis should include the
resurrection of the monitoring group and the establishment of a parallel
Israeli-Palestinian body. These groups would be modeled on the old monitoring
group, but with a new mandate: to oversee the full disarmament of Hezbollah and
other terrorist organizations. If Western troops won't take on that mission,
the Israeli-Lebanese group could monitor the Lebanese Army's accomplishment of
the task. Routine meetings of both groups would help ensure enduring
cease-fires on all fronts.
Most important, the monitoring groups would create a constructive new channel
of communication among Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority.
Away from the spotlight that has doomed past diplomatic efforts, these parties
could freely negotiate over outstanding differences, and through those
meetings, rising military and diplomatic leaders could build key personal
relationships.
The monitoring groups would also provide a confidential forum where the parties
could work to restrain violent flare-ups, rather than engaging in escalating
tit-for-tat attacks. Thus, for example, an Israeli-Palestinian monitoring
group, which might also include Egypt and Jordan, could immediately convene in
the event of any spike in Israeli-Palestinian violence.
In 2000, I interviewed Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group delegates, who spoke
about their work with enthusiasm. They told me of times when, after
particularly egregious episodes of violence, the group was able to initiate
immediate back-channel contacts that staved off reprisals, and they recalled
how Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian military officers formed personal bonds of
trust. When an Israeli general's term on the monitoring group ended, he told
me, his counterparts gave their final farewells with tears in their eyes.
Today, diplomatic leaders must not overlook this extraordinary precedent for
calming tensions in the Levant.
Adir Gurion Waldman, a lawyer, is the author of "Arbitrating Armed Conflict:
Decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group.''
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