[lit-ideas] Re: Kataphatic, Negative and Apophatic Theology

  • From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2004 20:17:48 -0400

Michael Chase wrote:

"I'm not sure, however, that the distinction negative vs. apophatic
theology is really a valid one: isn't "negative" simply a translation of
the Greek *apophatikos*"

If I were being more careful, I would suggest that under Negative
Theology one has the Via Negativa and the Apophatic.  The via negativa
attempts to circumscribe the Divine by listing what the Divine is not.
The apophatic rejects the possibility of even circumscribing the Divine.
As Michael notes, in the via negativa the Divine comes to be called 'the
One' or 'Being'.  Here, there is a sense of a continuum where the Divine
is, and you can pick your favourite metaphor, the highest, deepest, most
real, etc.  This can be contrasted to the apophaticism of
Pseudo-Dionysius or Aquinas where the Divine is not in anyways
comparable to things.  Following Platonism, the metaphor here is one of
participation and all accounts of God are, ultimately, analogical.
Ironically, through analogy kataphatic theology is then made possible.

M. Chase continues:

"In any case, when you cite Gregory Nazianzen, what he says seems
clearly negative rather than apophatic, according to your definition,
since Gregory does not hesitate to tell us what God *is* : "God always
was, and always is, and always will be. Or rather, God always
Is....etc"."

Gregory refers to God as Eternal Being, who in Himself sums up and
contains all Being.  I would argue that this is something different than
identifying God with the One or Being itself.  This is not an account of
what God *is* since, for Gregory, God escapes all concepts and is
perceived only as like the lightning flash which catches our attention
but escapes our sight.  In good apophatic form, Gregory tells us what
God *is* and then immediately tells us that this is to be understood
figuratively.  This is in contrast to the via negativa where the
negations of God are intended to have an ordinary/literal meaning.


M. Chase continues:

"Surely what the Christological controversies were *about* was not
declaring that it's impossible to "give positive content to God's
nature", but in taking *one* definition of God's nature - the
*homoousian* Creed enshrined at Nicaea in 325 declaring all the other
ones (particularly Arians and other *homoiousians*)  false, and
excommunicating everybody who thought differently."

I realize that Michael's reading of the controversies is a pretty
standard one but I would argue it is mistaken.  The *homoousian*
formulation does not set out positive content to describe the Trinity
but rather ensures that any account of the Trinity or God will remain
figurative.

"We believe (I believe) in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven
and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord
Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, and born of the Father
before all ages. (God of God) light of light, true God of true God.
Begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father, by whom all things were
made. ..."

This establishes the following criteria for orthodox talk of God: There
is one God and the Father and Son are consubstantial.  It doesn't
explain how this is possible nor does it even begin to resolve the
problems of logic involved.  The effect of these criteria is that any
attempt to resolve the problem of the Trinity or of God's identity, that
is any attempt to provide positive content to the idea of God, is
rejected as unorthodox.  While the occasions of the Church councils were
specific disputes, the outcome was always one that maintained that any
account of God must remain figurative.


Sincerely,

Phil Enns
Toronto, ON

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