Michael Chase wrote: "I'm not sure, however, that the distinction negative vs. apophatic theology is really a valid one: isn't "negative" simply a translation of the Greek *apophatikos*" If I were being more careful, I would suggest that under Negative Theology one has the Via Negativa and the Apophatic. The via negativa attempts to circumscribe the Divine by listing what the Divine is not. The apophatic rejects the possibility of even circumscribing the Divine. As Michael notes, in the via negativa the Divine comes to be called 'the One' or 'Being'. Here, there is a sense of a continuum where the Divine is, and you can pick your favourite metaphor, the highest, deepest, most real, etc. This can be contrasted to the apophaticism of Pseudo-Dionysius or Aquinas where the Divine is not in anyways comparable to things. Following Platonism, the metaphor here is one of participation and all accounts of God are, ultimately, analogical. Ironically, through analogy kataphatic theology is then made possible. M. Chase continues: "In any case, when you cite Gregory Nazianzen, what he says seems clearly negative rather than apophatic, according to your definition, since Gregory does not hesitate to tell us what God *is* : "God always was, and always is, and always will be. Or rather, God always Is....etc"." Gregory refers to God as Eternal Being, who in Himself sums up and contains all Being. I would argue that this is something different than identifying God with the One or Being itself. This is not an account of what God *is* since, for Gregory, God escapes all concepts and is perceived only as like the lightning flash which catches our attention but escapes our sight. In good apophatic form, Gregory tells us what God *is* and then immediately tells us that this is to be understood figuratively. This is in contrast to the via negativa where the negations of God are intended to have an ordinary/literal meaning. M. Chase continues: "Surely what the Christological controversies were *about* was not declaring that it's impossible to "give positive content to God's nature", but in taking *one* definition of God's nature - the *homoousian* Creed enshrined at Nicaea in 325 declaring all the other ones (particularly Arians and other *homoiousians*) false, and excommunicating everybody who thought differently." I realize that Michael's reading of the controversies is a pretty standard one but I would argue it is mistaken. The *homoousian* formulation does not set out positive content to describe the Trinity but rather ensures that any account of the Trinity or God will remain figurative. "We believe (I believe) in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, and born of the Father before all ages. (God of God) light of light, true God of true God. Begotten not made, consubstantial to the Father, by whom all things were made. ..." This establishes the following criteria for orthodox talk of God: There is one God and the Father and Son are consubstantial. It doesn't explain how this is possible nor does it even begin to resolve the problems of logic involved. The effect of these criteria is that any attempt to resolve the problem of the Trinity or of God's identity, that is any attempt to provide positive content to the idea of God, is rejected as unorthodox. While the occasions of the Church councils were specific disputes, the outcome was always one that maintained that any account of God must remain figurative. Sincerely, Phil Enns Toronto, ON ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html