Instead of getting into the gist of the argument in question, McEvoy chooses a
red herring ("figuratively," as Geary prefers), to wit (and to Wittgenstein, in
fact):
Meaning = use
which McEvoy refers to as
"[O]ne misunderstanding] in [Speranza's] post."
and goes on:
"[O]ne ... Robert Paul long ago addressed: the later W[itters] nowhere equates
meaning with "use", though he does suggest that in a large class of cases (but
not all) how a term is used gives us (or perhaps shows us) its meaning.
W[itter's] s position here borders on platitudinous - if the term "x" is used
in such-and-such a way then that 'use' may often show us the meaning of "x".
Its clout is in what it (tacitly) denies - it denies there is an expressible
theory of meaning in terms of which we can understand the meaning of words (as
if the meaning of words were a by-product of the truth of the right theory of
meaning), and it is this denial that explains why (as W explicitly says in PI)
the philosopher should not offer any kind of theory (but instead show what has
sense and what has not by examining the actual workings of language). What is
tacitly denied is central to what PI tries to show. One of the really great
things about this really old misunderstanding is that helping clear it up
allows me to reply to [Speranza's implicatural criticism] post without saying
anything more about the rights and wrongs of what the judge said (beyond the
few comments on its "sense", and that the judge got the better of the defendant
in the exchange - which is not to say the judge was right, or wrong, to reply
in kind - and my set of ludicrous comments on the Irishness of all [tho no more
ludicrous than other comments made on-line both for and against the judge.
There are many more serious things to criticise in the criminal justice system
than the judge in this case; nor do I think anything very substantial can be
extracted as a lesson - both copying this kind of repartee and always avoiding
it are with their risks. If the judge is officially rebuked, it will be
interesting as an exercise in what is now deemed unacceptable conduct but will
leave deeper problems untouched - including whether prison really is the best
sentencing option in this kind of case. This last comment is not meant as a
criticism of the judge so much as saying there are limited options within our
current system and that system is open to critical improvement, particularly as
may currently send too many to prison. Given the current limited options, it is
hard to consider the option of prison wrong in principle, given Mr. H had been
a persistent pest who had not learnt his lesson via ASBOs and whatever other
interventions were tried.]). A fuller account of the exchange has the judge
explaining that Mr. H is not helping matters with his use of language etc. -
this said after the c-word is batted back and where the judge's comment may be
taken as indicating that in mirroring his language she was trying to show Mr. H
how unhelpful his language is. This gives a somewhat different sense to her
c-word retort than if the retort stood alone."
I agree about the prison point. Since McEvoy is into 'context' ("a fuller
account of the exchange"), it should be pointed out, however, had the
proceedings gone:
Lynch: I hereby set you free.
it would have been very unlikely that Hennigan had himself had gone:
i. You are a [four-letter word].
One point that can further be made is that the judge expressed:
ii. You are a [four-letter word] yourself.
As Chomsky would agree, the implicature here is on 'yourself'. 'Yourself,' as
Geary notes, is a pronoun, reflexive at that, and that of minimum weight in
terms of conversational implicature. (ii) however contrasts with the simpler
(and by Grice's maxim, briefer), "You are a [four-letter word]." So there must
be something to Lynch's 'yourself'.
While Witters may NOT have equated "meaning" with use, as Grice notes, in
"Aristotle on the multiplicity of being" we have here "meaning is use" and
"meaning is use", i.e. the "is" of existence and the "is" of predication --
Grice uses "meaning izzes use" versus "meaning hazzes use." In any case, his,
and indeed, the right, way to go is analyzing Lynch's intention. This leads us
to Lynch's m-intention, and thus to her "meaning", in Grice's rather artificial
use of this lexeme. What Lynch meant by her two utterances (which followed,
"You are hereby sentenced to 18 months in prison.") is aptly described by
McEvoy (briefly, she dismisses Hennigan's insult by uttering (ii), which indeed
may be equivalent, via implicature, to:
ii. [I am not BUT] YOU are a [four-letter word] YOURSELF, as everyone in this
courtroom [except you] SHOULD agree.
By using "too" in her second conversational move in the cited exchange in "The
Guardian""
iii. You [go make love to yourself] too.
the implicatures are slightly more complicated, but run along McEvoy's lines,
that Lynch is here the 'master' (or 'mistress') and that she does not give, to
use McEvoy's figure, a 'fig' as to what Hennigan's figures of speech (and
thought) are.
It can be argued that Lynch is NOT misusing judicial language -- therefore,
since McEvoy's essay is entitled, "Judicial language: its use and misuse", one
wonders what examples of MISuse he is having in mind.
Cheers,
Speranza
