[lit-ideas] Re: Is a computer program a performative?
- From: "Peter D. Junger" <junger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 16:31:32 -0400
I want to thank Teemu Pyyluoma who writes:
: This goes to the very heart of a version of mind-body
: problem that appears with technology "when describing
: technical artifacts we simultaneously use these two
: basic conceptualizations: technical artifacts are
: physical objects that are described by physical
: concepts (the tungsten wire has a length of 15
: millimeters) and by intentional concepts such as
: technical functions (the tungsten wire has the
: function of emitting light). Moreover, both
: conceptualizations are indispensable for technical
: artifacts: if an artifact is described by only
: physical concepts, it is in general unclear which
: functions it has, and if an artifact is only described
: functionally, it is in general unclear which physical
: properties it has. A description of technical
: artifacts thus uses both conceptualizations and in
: that sense technical artifacts have a dual (a physical
: and an intentional) nature." (from the site of a
: research program called "The Dual Nature of Technical
: Artifacts"
: (hthttp/wwwwwudualnatureutudelftlnlndex.hthtmat Delft
: University of Technology.)
:
: Analogically, the logic of a program is one way to
: look at it, its function (spspecification, task,
: application, etc.) is another. The two are somehow
: related, but how exactly is the problem.
:
: Using pperformative to solve the issue has some
: promise, that is program x in social context y
: performs task a, because social context could be
: defined in such a way that it includes the intentions
: of designer and user, relevant skills and knowledge of
: the user, arrangement of work, infrastructure needed
: and so on. But on the other hand, a concept that broad
: is not informative at all. And I also have a nagging
: suspicion that on closer analysis this would turn out
: to be a tautology.
:
: Personally, I think of using computers as translating
: from natural language to logical syntax, which is hard
: precisely because like formal logic it is extremely
: precise and thus less expressive. As a side note from
: this follows that at the end there is only one
: uber-problem in computer science, human-computer
: interaction. Programs are translating devices,
: carefully limiting your input and formating output in
: a form the user is supposed to understand. Like phrase
: books really. Also, I have no problem communicating
: using phrases such as "what does this program do?" but
: "do" in the previous doesn't function the same way as
: it does in "so what does an executive assistant do
: anyway?" and ought to be understood as "what can I do
: with this program?"
I fear that most lawyers, even---or perhaps
especially---those who deal with the law relating to
computers are remarkably ignorant of the ``dual nature''
of computers and computer programs. I am, therefore,
delighted to have the citation to "The Dual Nature of
Technical Artifacts."
The particular difficulty that confronts me all the time
in my concern that the protection of free speech and of
the press be extended to the writings of computer
programmers is that many legal scholars and lawyers seem
to be firmly convinced that a computer program is a device
and therefore that computer programs can be regulated the
same way that, for example, machine guns are.
Now to my mind, a "computer program" is either a text
containing instructions saying---or descriptions of---what
a the computer is supposed to do _or_ it is the
function---the process---that is actually performed by the
computer.
As a text it seems to me that the computer program should be
treated as any other text, although there are many who argue
that since it is not directed at communicating something
to other human beings it is not entitled to such protections.
(That's usually where the claim that a program is a device
arises.)
As a process, on the other hand, it seems to me that a computer
program should only be regulated in the same way that other
processes---like writing or printing or speaking---that produces
signs or symbols are regulated.
I hope that there are others on the list who can direct me
to discussions that relate to this concern of mine. I have
never found anything very helpful in the ordinary legal
literature, although I do know of one article that does
raise the issue of computer programs as performatives.
Thanks in advance for any further suggestions.
--
Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH
EMAIL: junger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx URL: http://samsara.law.cwru.edu
NOTE: junger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx no longer exists
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