The dearth of interest in Spanish history makes it difficult to assess the reliability of some of the contemporary writings on the conquest of the Aztecs and surrounding Amerindian tribes. I acquired William Hickling Prescott's Mexico, and the Life of the Conqueror Fernando Cortes which was written in 1923 and seems to be one of the most reliable "recent" accounts available in English. He relies heavily upon Bernal Diaz, crediting him as one of the most reliable writers of this period. I'm presently half way through the Kindle edition of The Conquest of New Spain, 7830 "locations" out of a total of 15883. How this might translate into pages, I don't know. I also have the Penguin Abridgement, edited by J. M. Cohen, which is 413 pages long; so perhaps the Kindle edition which is Diaz's unabridged account is no more than twice that. Early on it seemed that Cortes and his men enjoyed the advantage of being deemed invincible teules (demons) come to conquer the Aztecs in fulfillment of an ancient prophecy. Motecusuma led in showing Cortes and his men respect due to deities, but then Narvaez showed up at Vera Cruz with 1000 or so men and sent word to the Aztecs that Cortes and his men were traitors, scoundrels and all sorts of other pejoratives. There were always plenty of Aztecs willing to attack Cortes and his men, but the more powerful Aztecs held him in awe; so with a very small force, perhaps 250 men (he had some others but not in Mexico City), and with Motecusuma as hostage, Cortes was able to maintain himself in safety in Mexico City. When Cortes learned of Narvaez's presence in Vera Cruz, he decided to return and deal with him. He knew that Narvaez was bad-mouthing him to the Mexicans and needed to put a stop to that. Narvaez had more men, to be sure, but they weren't soldiers of the caliber of those under Cortes. Also, they were over-confident, poorly led (Narvaez was a poor general) and inexperienced. After Cortes took Narvaez prisoner and cowed the rest, he announced he intended to return to Mexico City. He thought that with most of Narvaez's 1000 added to his total of 400 they would unstoppable, but the Narvaez soldiers were appalled. They wanted nothing to do with such an enterprise. Cortes eventually got his way and with his 400 and 1000 of Narvaez's men he headed back. Meanwhile, with the advent of Narvaez, the Mexican hotheads got their way. Not only did their war-god tell them to attack Cortes, but they had evidence in the person of Narvaez that Cortes had enemies and that his men and horses could be killed. This section, describing how Cortes and his men fought their way into and then out of the territory directly controlled by the Mexicans (Aztecs) is perhaps the most exciting in Diaz book, Cortes and his men fought their way back into Mexico City, but the Aztecs fought with a fury, and despite the courage of Cortes 400 (not so much the 1000 of Narvaez which Diaz despised) they could not conquer the wave after wave of Aztec warriors attacking them. They used up all their powder, lost their canons and apparently their arrows as well. Also, they were nearly all wounded. They decided to return to Vera Cruz but all the roads were blocked and the bridges had been damaged or destroyed. Many, mostly Narvaez men according to Diaz, who had their pockets filled with gold, fell into the water and drowned. When at last they found themselves in the open and they learned that the Aztecs were hiding in the brush and intended to ambush them; so Cortez had his few cavalrymen charge ahead, forcing their way through the Mexicans with their lances. The soldiers followed immediately and kept the passage clear for the rest of Cortes's forces. That battle, the battle of Otumpan, went on and on until Cortes saw a chance to capture the Mexican general. After that the Mexicans were disheartened and faded away. That battle was deemed by Diaz as the most impressive that Cortes forces ever fought. At Kindle location 7220, Diaz writes, "For memory's sake, I must here note down that we marched into Mexico on the 24th of June, 1520, to Alvarado's assistance (he had remained with Motecusuma hostage0, with an army of nearly 1400 men, among which there were seventy-nine horse, eighty crossbow-men, and a like number of musketeers, with above 2000 Tlascallan troops, and a fine park of artillery. On the 10th of July following we commenced our retreat, and on the 14th we fought the battle of Otumpan. I must now likewise recount the loss we sustained in that time. In five days, including the battle of Otumpan, we lost in killed, and those who were taken prisoners, above 870 of our troops, and above 1200 Tlascallans; to which must be added 72 men and five Spanish females, all of Narvaez's division, whom the Mexicans put to death in Tustepec. At Kindle location 7243, Diaz writes of the numbers who managed to get back to Tlascallan territory, "Our whole strength now merely consisted in 440 men, twenty horses, twelve crossbows, and seven muskets; besides that, we were all excessively weak, and covered with wounds; our cannon, with our store of powder lost; we were at present, therefore, doubly vigilant, and returned fervent thanks to God for having so miraculously rescued us out of the enemy's hand. Our troops, Cortes said, were now dwindled down again to the same number of men with which we had first set sail from Cuba, and entered the city of Mexico." Cortes, of course intends to rest up and go after the Mexicans once again. This time Narvaez forces are adamant: "Hell no, we won't go." So he gives up, letting them return to Cuba. The Tlascallans at this point are his only allies. They previously committed themselves to Cortes to such an extent that if he were to follow the Narvaez troops back to Cuba, they would fully expect to be slaughtered by the Mexicans; so they offered Cortes as many troops as he needed for his new war against the Mexicans. Cortes thought that his 420 men and 4,000 Tlascallan soldiers would be adequate for their battle against the Aztecs, at Tepaca. Diaz writes, "Notwithstanding all this, we commenced our march thither, but without either cannon or matchlocks, for we had lost all these in our flight from Mexico: though we had saved a few of the latter, we could make no use of them as we had not a grain of powder left." [Kiindle location 7413]. Fortuitously, a misinformed Spaniard sent several ships to Vera Cruz to start a colony in the vicinity. He thought the area was entirely at peace by this time. Cortes of course commandeered the soldiers, arms and supplies aboard these ships. Diaz summarizes, "After we had received these reinforcements, first the twenty-five men and three horses, which arrived in the two small vessels sent by Diego Velasquez, and then the 120 men, with the seventeen horses which arrived in Garay's vessels. . . ." Cortez intends this time to attack the Mexicans by sea: Diaz at location 7775 writes, "Cortes now determined to march, with the whole of his men, to Tezcuco, as the wood for constructing the brigantines was ready prepared, and we had got rid of Narvaez's men, who made difficulties in all our expeditions, and always argued against any attempt to besiege Mexico, maintaining we were not sufficiently numerous for that purpose; by which means they infected others with their cowardice. Previous to our leaving for Tezcuco, however, various deliberations took place as to which would be the most eligible spot for launching our brigantines. Some of our men maintained that Ayotzinco, near to Chalco, on account of its canals and harbour, was better adapted for this purpose; others, again, preferred Tezcuco, and were of opinion that, once having taken possession of that town, standing as it did in the midst of so many other populous townships, we should be better able to plan our operations against Mexico. We had scarcely decided in favour of the latter place, when three men arrived with the news from Vera Cruz that a large Spanish vessel had run in there from the Canaries, having on board a quantity of crossbows, muskets, powder, and other ammunition, besides three horses and thirteen soldiers. . . ." At location 7801, Diaz writes, "When Cortes found himself so well provided again with muskets, powder, crossbows, and horses, and observed how impatient the whole of us, officers as well as soldiers, were to commence the siege of the great city of Mexico, he desired the caziques of Tlascalla to furnish him with 10,000 of their troops to join us in the campaign of Tezcuco, as this was one of the largest towns of New Spain, and next in importance to Mexico. The elder Xicotencatl (now called Don Lorenzo de Vargas) assured him that not only the 10,000, but many more troops were at his service, and that the brave cazique Chichimeclatecl, our particular friend, would himself march out at their head. Cortes returned him the most sincere thanks, and, after having reviewed the whole of his troops, whose exact number I have forgotten, we commenced our march on the fourth day after Christmas of the year 1520." Cortes force, including the Tlascallans (first?) attacked the Mexicans and Tezcucans. Cortes wanted to give the Tezcucans the benefit of doubt and be lenient but the Tlascallans wouldn't hear of it. Then as far as I've read (location 7830), "The night following we took up our quarters in another township under Tezcuco. Here the whole of the inhabitants had fled; nevertheless we took every precaution, as we were almost sure we should be attacked by a vast body of Mexicans who were lying in wait for us in another mountain pass; this we had learnt from five Mexicans whom we had taken prisoners at the bridge just mentioned, but we afterwards heard that they had not dared to run the risk of an engagement with us, and had, consequently, marched off their troops; besides which, at that time, the Mexicans and Tezcucans were not upon the best of terms with each other; and the smallpox was raging throughout the whole of this district . . . ." Comment: I've included all the references to the numbers of soldiers under Cortes command up to this point. The number of Spanish soldiers "may have been" 420 plus the 145 that came by ship in hopes of founding a colony. Perhaps I have misread Diaz and the number is higher than 565, but it surely isn't much higher. The number of Tlascallans is at least 10,000. Diaz (writing, it should be remembered in his old age) recalls that the number Cortes asked for was 10,000 but the Tlascallans offered many more than that, as many as Cortes wanted, but Diaz doesn't remember the final number. Perhaps I'm wrong but reading of the way Cortes fought and liked to fight, I can't imagine him wanting many more than the 10,000. In earlier battles, he didn't use the Tlascallans in a coordinated attack. He told them to wait in a certain place and that he and his soldiers would defeat the Mexicans and drive them toward the Tlascallans. The Tlascallans could then pursue them as they fled. I wouldn't think 20,000 Tlascallans could pursue a fleeing army any better than 10,000, but I'll be sure to report any new information on this subject I read. As regards disease, Diaz frequently mentioned individuals being sick from this or that disease, even smallpox, but his comment above that "the smallpox was raging throughout the whole district, so that they (the Mexicans and their allies) were not able to bring many warriors into the field" is the first describing the wide-spread severity of the disease. Lawrence