(I'm not sure what R. Cummins means by 'homuncular intentions.' My guess is that he's referring to the intentions of homunculi which depend somehow on the intentions of other, nested, homunculi, ad inf. Info on Cummins below. The section on homunculi is in the subsection on what he calls "Gricean theories" for mental representation. As the online amazon review by Mr. Williams reads: >Chapter 2 explores the relationship between mental representation and meaning by giving a >short account of neo-Gricean theories and their concomitant woes. Too short for my taste, but I've written at great lenghts elsewhere -- nicely all deposited in the Buenos Aires University. I titled my essay, "Communication Without Representation", and must be there somewhere -- It would have the relevant quotes, and my disgrace (disgrice) at reading them books.google.com/books?isbn=1557868778... a theory that invokes an homunculus to explain thinking has ... hecause the homunculus itself has to think, and that thinking has not heen explained Must say the idea of an homunculus sounds pretty mediaeval, even Ockhamian, if you think of it. Yes, Ockham was good. He changed his name, Okham, his birthplace in Surrey, to Occam when he became normalien at Paris. Which was a bad thing, because had he stayed at Oxford (but then they failed him) it would have been a good thing. The OED must have a section on 'homunculus' for all the philosophical uses it has been put on. Should check that at some point. The real homunculus in reality was the spermatozoa. I read that in this book I got from the Metaphysical Ministry as a Christmas present -- with compliments from the Master: D. Friedman, A mind of its own: a cultural history of the penis. The Free Press. The figure 11 shows a homunculus within the head of a spermatozoon, as seen by Antony van Leeuwenhoek, the Dutch microscopist who was the first to report the existence of spermatozoa, in 1677 (Museum of Comparative Zoology, the Agassiz Museum, Harvard University). "According to leged, Paracelsus had his penis cut into pieces and buried in bloody manure; the plan was to have himself resuscitated months later as a virile young man; Unfortunately, so the story goes, his bumbling servant opened the grave too soon, finding only dust." "For Leeuwenhoek, his microscopic observation of his own semen confirmed his belief that mammalian ovaries were useless ornaments". "In 1685 Leeuwenhoek asserted the existence of a man inside every sperm. He claimed to see such 'men' ('homunculi'). At the end of the century, two scientists released drawings of 'homunculi' they had observed in the sperm. Nicolaas Hartsoeker drew a sperm that resembled a hot-air baloon with a tail. Inside was a tiny naked man ('homunculus') sitting on his haunches, his head bent forward, and his knees pulled to his chest, held there by his hands clasped over his shins. A few years later Francois de Plantade drew several sperm cells, each revealing within a minuscule man ('homunculus') standing on two legs, his two arms crossed in front of him, and his head encased in a hood." Geary still puzzles about the function of the 'hood'. I told him it possible relates to the adage, "Love is blind". "Midway through the next century, Gautier d'Agoty drew a tiny man-child (homunculus) inside a sperm with a gigantic bald heard much like the intergalactic aliens featured in supermarket tabloids today. "These sightings of 'homunculi' damaged the cause of spermism. Spermism was unable to explain why so many preformed men (homunculi) DIED in the uterus without being 'awakened' from inside the spermatozoa that encased them." Be careful what you wish for, Andreas would say. "Cheers, JL Cheers, JL _http://www.amazon.com/Meaning-Mental-Representation-Bradford-Book/dp/02625309 61/ref=sr_1_1/105-8373224-9873268?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1192468908&sr=1-1_ (http://www.amazon.com/Meaning-Mental-Representation-Bradford-Book/dp/0262530961/re f=sr_1_1/105-8373224-9873268?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1192468908&sr=1-1) In this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers, both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular theory or framework. Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts - by Locke, Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental representation, and evaluates those accounts within the context of orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the empirical assumptions of those models. In the final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in a connectionist context. ************************************** See what's new at http://www.aol.com