[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Modified Occam's Razor
- From: "Donal McEvoy" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "donalmcevoyuk" for DMARC)
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 08:47:48 +0000 (UTC)
JLS' other post raises a host of points to address but two comments on the
the bibliography on Occam at
http://www.iep.utm.edu/simplici/#H6
quotes Popper:
Popper, K. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.
- Argues that simplicity = empirical content = falsifiability.>
(1) The equation is somewhat misleading. Not all forms of "simplicity" equate
with "empirical content" or "falsifiability", and Popper does not argue
otherwise.
What he argues in LSD is along the following lines. A theory like "e = mc2" is,
in its formulation, better from a scientific pov than a theory like "e = mc2,
except on Ash Wednesday or when e is sluggish or when mass behaves in
unmass-like ways" etc. Its being "better" by comparison, from a scientific pov,
is because from a scientific pov it has no get-out clauses etc. - and so is
more falsifiable and has greater empirical content. Popper argues that it is in
this crucial sense also "simpler" than an alternative with get-out clauses
etc., and, further, that this is the sense of "simplicity" that is important as
a value in scientific explanation.
N.b: the value of "simplicity", in this sense, is correlated with how it is an
adjunct to increased "falsifiability/empirical content" - i.e. this sense of
"simplicity" is derived from considerations aiming at increased
"falsifiability/empirical content" and not the other way round.
So Popper does not argue that whatever we call "simplicity" helps us increase
"falsifiability": that would be wrong, for "The cat is on the mat" is simpler
in many ways than "e = mc2" but it has less falsifiability. Rather he argues
that what most increases falsifiability, in the formulation of theories, will
correlate with a form of logical "simplicity" in the formulation.
(2) Given (1), we can see how Popper also argues that reductivism as an
approach within scientific explanation is contradictory to reductivism as a
philosophical approach.
'Scientific reductivism', such as taking an area explained by a combination of
chemical and physical theories and reducing that combination to an explanation
solely in terms of one theory of physics, is a worthwhile aim - because it
increases the falsifiability of the theories under test i.e. the one theory
will be more falsifiable than the combination it replaces. Whereas
'philosophical reductivism', such as denying the existence of mental events on
the basis it would simpler to say these are unnecessary because everything can
be explained in terms of physics, lessens "falsifiability" by denying _on
untestable grounds_ the existence of a class of entities (e.g. mental events)
that would otherwise constitute potential falsifiers (e.g. their existence
would of course falsify the claim that only physical events exist).
Even though they are logically in contradiction from the pov of increasing
falsifiability, the confusion between 'scientific reductivism' and
'philosophical reductivism' is still widespread. Many flawed arguments are
based on the confusion. This confusion lies at the heart of many attempts to
defend 'physicalism', especially 'physicalism' as an answer to the mind-body
problem i.e. to claim the solution is that there is no mind, or mental event,
just bodily or physical events, such as physical brain events (which we mistake
for distinct mental events when this is "beyond necessity").
(3) GIven (1) and (2), we can understand why in "Objective Knowledge" Popper
gets to the crux of what is debatable about Occam's Razor when he asks on what
grounds are we to decide what is "beyond necessity" (nevermind guess what Occam
had in mind)?
E.g. What entities should we admit as possible (from the pov of further
investigation) and which we should disregard? If we admit an entity as possible
and worthy of further investigation (e.g. distinct mental events), then surely
that event can't validly be discarded as "beyond necessity"?
DL
From: "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wednesday, 20 September 2017, 2:23
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Modified Occam's Razor
For the record, the bibliography on Occam at
http://www.iep.utm.edu/simplici/#H6
quotes Popper:
Popper, K. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.
- Argues that simplicity = empirical content = falsifiability.
Cheers,
Speranza
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