How Simple Can Grice Get? I enjoyed McEvoy’s comments on ‘complexity.’ On
another thread, McEvoy notes: “[I]t is not just the weather or military systems
but the whole course of the evolution of life on earth that involves
“complexity….”. This complexity is added to if we add levels of metaphysical
complexity to the World 1 (in Popper's terms) that is studied by the natural
sciences i.e. if we accept there is a distinct World 2, and World 3 (and
perhaps other metaphysical levels). At the level of human history, this would
lead to a [very big] complexity, as it may involve continued interaction
between W1 (including man-made W1 products), human W2 and human W3 "objects".
This is in interesting vis-à-vis two things:
(a) In the scientific method, parsimony is an epistemological,
metaphysical or heuristic preference, not an irrefutable principle of logic or
a scientific result. As a logicalprinciple, Occam's razor would demand that
scientists accept the simplest possible theoretical explanation for existing
data.
(b) The fact that, when playing, H. P. Grice, an Oxford philosopher best
known for his concoction, ‘implicature,’ once coined The Modified Ockham’s
Razor, “Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.” “I would like to propose for
acceptance a principle which I might call Modified Occam’s Razor: Senses are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Like many regulative principles, it
would be a near platitude, and all would depend on what was counted as
“necessity.” Still, like other regulative principles, it may guide.”
But back to McEvoy: “… we add levels of metaphysical complexity to the World 1
(in Popper’s terms) that is studied by the natural sciences i.e. if we accept
there is a distinct World 2, and World 3 (and perhaps other metaphysical
levels).”
I wonder if this adds complexity _to_ “World 1.” It would seem, if I may speak
figuratively, that World-1 could care less. What Popper seems to be doing is
not adding complexity to W1, but just positing a different W2, and a different
W3. If these – W2 and W3 – are thougth as mere ‘additions’ to W1, they seem to
lose their point, or Popper’s point in positing them, rather. By “and perhaps
other metaphysical levels,” McEvoy seems to be implicating something like W4,
or as I would prefer, a continuum:
W = {W1, W2, W3, W4, … Wn}
Eccles once joked about trialism, and I wonder if we can list tetralist
philosophers. Some clues: “In the meantime, the death of Franz Joseph would
probably lead to approaches to tetralism.” “Unknowable; Epiphenomenic
Cosmicism; Neutral monism; Something else (tetralism?). “We might as well be
talking about spirit/perispirit/mind/body (tetralism).” And then of course
there’s pentalism, hexalism, and so forth.
McEvoy notes that “[a]t the level of human history, this would lead to a [big]
complexity … as it may involve continued interaction between W1 (including
man-made W1 products), human W2 and human W3 "objects".
Well, why W2 is for Popper mainly human, McEvoy was referring recently that
‘trees know’, so I suppose that W2 may be thought as comprising more than
Homo-sapiens-related items: ‘soul’ was ascribed by Aristotle not just to
‘anthropos,’ but to other ‘zoa’. Homo sapiens happens to be ‘zoon logikon,’
‘animalis rationalis’, but W2 concerns the ‘anima’ or ‘animus’ bit of this, not
necessarily the ‘rationalis’ qualification (or ‘differentia specifica’). I’m
less sure Popper would accept that W3 would accept to items not derivable from
Homo sapiens. In that direction, I’m not sure what he would say about W4, and
so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
