McEvoy has a knack to figure out my implicatures -- only in a recent discussion
of the swans and ravens counterexamples, there was, I noticed on second reading
what I sent, that I wrote 'black' when I meant 'white' (or something like
that), and instead of correcting the typo, I tried to defend from McEvoy's apt
criticisms!
In his most recent, he notes some problems with my approach. The first, he
notes, is that
"this 'proof by implicature' is not proof of truth. At most 'implicature'
proves a meaning meant by someone, it does not prove what they meant is true
(because they meant it)."
On which I commented, inter alia,
"[Yet], except under very SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, what one utterer implicates is
_false_."
I meant to say, of course:
i. ONLY under very special circumstances what one utterer implicates is false.
or
ii. Except under very special circumstances, what one utterer implicates is
true.
-- I was having in mind Grice's example in "Way of Words":
GRICE (to Strawson qua tutee): I expect you'll bring me a paper for next week.
STRAWSON: A newspaper?
Grice is flabbergasted at Strawson's query, and writes (Grice does) to the
effect that, only under very special circumstances, "would I, by uttering
'paper,' mean newspaper" -- in that scenario. He uses further eccentric
examples, using this charming phrase, "VERY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES," to note
that there is no conventional link between an expression and what an utterer
means by it. ("Only other very special circumstances, would I mean that
Strawson is intelligent by uttering "It is raining,"" say).
So, this just for the record!
I should now have a look at McEvoy's latest post.
Cheers,
Speranza
