[lit-ideas] Re: Giving Reasons [Iraqi] with morality considered
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "'Walter Okshevsky'" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>, <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 15 Sep 2006 10:43:28 -0700
Walter,
I did receive it before, and there was a gap in my understanding, but
perhaps I was more involved in other discussions so I didn't pursue it. I'm
reminded of a concern in Aerospace that documents not introduce "shop talk"
if at all possible and then when it was necessary to explain what was meant.
I meant to ask whether you were saying that the four terms comprised all
"moral principles and norms" or just examples of them, in other words some
"moral principles and norms." But beyond that these are just abstract terms
and not "moral principles and norms" until some elaboration is assumed or
explained. You have hinted at explanations here and there, but not provided
definitions. No doubt you will say, "well of course they appear in X and I
assumed everyone knew that." Well perhaps I might have known that at one
time but when one lives a long time, one needs a bit of help to become
oriented. I have a modest philosophical library and if you are referring to
something out of Kant, I have a few of his works:
Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn translation
Critique of Judgment
On History,
Prolegomena
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
The Modern Library: The Philosophy of Kant
And Korner's Kant
Perhaps you can point me in the right direction
Lawrence
-----Original Message-----
From: Walter Okshevsky [mailto:wokshevs@xxxxxx]
Sent: Friday, September 15, 2006 8:37 AM
To: lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Giving Reasons [Iraqi] with morality considered (longer than
longish (fwd)
Lawrence -- I sent this reply to your post awhile back during a time when
my computer was on the fritz. A number of messages never reached their
destination. If you have received the below please ignore this post. No
obligation to reply, of course. But if you do wish to reply, I'll re-send
it to the list for context. Have a great day. Cheers, Walter
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2006 19:44:43 -0230
From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: Giving Reasons [Iraqi] with morality considered (longer than
longish
Lawrence -- Thank you for your thoughts here. Please see specific replies
below
("W").
Quoting Lawrence Helm <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>:
> I'm seeing both the Hussein and Bush reasons as exceptions to your
criteria
> -- unless you are implying that there may be "moral principles and norms"
> which have nothing to do "with quality, autonomy, reciprocity and
> universality."
W: Neither A nor B would subscribe to that view. A claims that the 4 norms
you
identify above are moral norms and they function as criteria for moral
judgement and the legitimacy of moral reasons. In other words, these norms
are
accessible to us as moral norms and then they come to function as criteria
for
the legitimacy and relevance of moral reasons. There is nothing about the
intrinsic character of argumentation/justification as such that is able to
yield moral norms or principles. Reasons can function as reasons only if
they
ride on principles identifying the relevance of the reason to a conclusion.
What make reasons moral reasons is not simply a matter of epistemic
considerations. B claims, pace A, that these 4 norms are originally
epistemic
norms. Equality, for example, is a moral norm only because it originally
functions as an epistemic norm or principle governing the cogent giving of
reasons. If I disrespect you as a person of equal worth, I am making an
epistemic mistake, and only subsequently a moral mistake.
"Publicity" is another epistemic norm. Bush, Hussein and all others engaged
in
partisan politics are engaged in private, not public, discourse. Morality is
a
public framework of obligations that all rationally autonomous persons could
accept (without violation of their conception of the Good) after assessing
the
reasons given by all parties who are to be affected by the result of the
maxim,
policy or decision arrived at through reason-giving or
discourse/argumentation.
Rational deliberation, together with its consequent institutionalized form
as
democratic deliberation, is essentially a public matter. No agent whose
primary
purpose is the maintenance and perpetuation of her own interests or the
interests of her tribe (i.e., re-election or sustaining the political status
quo) is engaged in moral-practical discourse. Note certain states' refusal
to
abide by universally valid conventions even though they are signatories to
the
resolutions of UN Security Council norms. (Kant identifies such
impermissibility as illegitimate self-exemption, revealed through the
regulative ideal of the Kingdom of Ends.)
If so then I misread you, but I now see that is a possible
> interpretation of your first sentence in Version A -- although "equality,
> autonomy, reciprocity and universality" are so abstract that I could fit
> Hussein's & Bush's reasons into them -- perhaps in "autonomy."
W: No, private reasons are "private" precisely because they fail to meet
epistemic criteria of publicity, autonomy, reciprocity, equality and
universality. Any policy or maxim that violates the equal dignity and
autonomy
of personhood is private, and hence morally impermissible. But this
originally
on epistemic grounds, not substantively moral grounds. (That was the genius
of
Kant.)
> Hussein has
> his reasons, according to Bowman, but they may or may not be moral. They
> are, Hussein thinks, expedient. Does morality even enter in it? And
> Version B is no further help because given Hussein's reasons morality
isn't
> learned. He thinks it the prudent or wise thing to do but I fail to see
> morality here.
W: There's alot packed into those 5 sentences, not all of which is
transparent.
Just a few remarks: 1) Expediency is not a moral motive or reason. It's a
pragmatic or instrumental one. 2) Not all reasons are moral reasons. But
reasons given in a moral context are required to meet epistemic conditions
of
reason-giving.
> In regard to Bush's decision, perhaps autonomy is the abstract term that
> comes closest to the decision he made; although a case could be made for
> reciprocity, but only in senses that preclude their being "moral norms."
> The US had been attacked and his inaccessible reason is that to avenge the
> 9/11 attack by an attack against Iraq will be fitting according to an
> ancient Honor Code. Perhaps we could say that this action will (according
> to the Honor Code) make it less likely that America's autonomy will be
> impinged. But Bush probably isn't aware of this reason according to
Bowman
> and so doesn't engage in any language game to justify it. Furthermore
since
> it isn't accessible, it isn't relatable to morality. Even if it were
> accessible it wouldn't necessarily be relatable to morality. Actions by
> heads of state may be prudent and necessary and only moral insofar as it
is
> needful that the head of state do them and not shirk his duty.
W: I confess I don't understand most of that paragraph. But I do want to
suggest
that "honour" is an ethical catgeory not a moral one. It's a consideration
important to Aristotelian accounts of the good life, but of no relevance to
conceptions of morality and deliberative democracy that accord with
universalist, cognitivist, formalist and procedural epistemic
presuppositions/requirements of reason-giving and -assessment in moral
contexts.
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U.
P.S. The difficulty, of course, is to see the simply epistemic charatcer of
the
moral categories we operate with. It's not that the moral motive is the same
as
the epistemic motive (Scanlon is quite right about that). But imagine a
world
in which the very idea of "moral motive" was embedded within incommensurable
discourses. Surely all that we have left for identifying grounds of moral
authority acceptable to all is the idea of giving a reason.
> I don't know, Walter, are there questions here? I guess the implicit
> questions were intended to be "aren't these two examples exceptions?" If
> they aren't, I don't see why they aren't.
>
>
>
> Lawrence
>
>
>
>
>
> Included as reference:
>
> Version A
>
> Moral principles and norms having to do with equality, autonomy,
reciprocity
> and universality are general criteria which we apply to different
contexts,
> actions, policies, etc.. Reason-giving is one particular activity or
> language-game. We can do it either in accordance with the above stated
moral
> norms or we can engage in the activity while violating those same norms.
> Moral principles originate within our socialization into a particular
> culture, set of traditions, etc.. So we, for example, come to learn to
> respect the equal freedom of all persons and then we apply this norm
within
> our particular activities, one of which is reason-giving. (Or we fail to
do
> so.)
>
>
>
> Version B
>
> Moral principles conceptually originate within the activity of giving
> reasons.
>
> The former necessarily presuppose the latter. Without this practice, we
> could not learn, nor would we have, moral concepts such as equality,
> autonomy, right and wrong, obligation, etc.. It's not that these moral
> principles and concepts are available to us first, learned first within
> acculturation, and then applied to various activities and contexts, one of
> which is reason-giving. Rather, what it means to respect others as free
and
> equal persons, what it means to have an obligation, etc., are intelligible
> to us only because we understand what it means to give reasons.
>
>
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