JLS notes: "For Popper all theories might be definitely wrong."
This is almost definitely wrong. And for several reasons.
For Popper:
1) "All theories" are propositional and all theoretical propositions have a
negation (which is also a "theory"). Either the theory/proposition or its
negation must be true (it follows that there are just as many true
propositions/theories in philosophy as there are false ones, for every true
proposition/theory has a correspondingly false negation and every false
proposition/theory has a correspondingly true negation).
2) We may draw a fundamental distinction between a theory being "wrong"/false
and it being "definitely wrong", where "definitely" means something like
"conclusively", "provably" or "demonstrably". We may be definite (as definite
can be) that either a theory or its negation is "wrong" but be not at all
definite as to which is "wrong".
3) We may be definite (as definite can be) that it is not the case that all
theories are wrong (see 1) but admit all might be wrong, in the sense that we
cannot be definite as to which are wrong: but it cannot be the case that all
theories might be definitely (i.e. provably) wrong (for this is to assert that
where one of two propositions must be right [e.g. a p and non-p] we can
nevertheless prove both wrong).
These are just preliminaries, and more important points will be found in
Popper's works.
Dnl
