So, does the same discussion holds for "once upon a time"? When else could
"once" have been except upon a time?
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 11:21 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Grice loved an Oxford comma. Not using it, he warned, 'may trigger the
In a message dated 4/14/2015 10:27:46 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx quotes from Wodehouse:
"For once in a way there was nothing which he was trying to conceal from
his sister Constance."
"There are two theories as to the sense of the above - the standard one
THE STANDARD THEORY:
"The standard [theory about 'for once in way'] is that it is an idiomatic
as Grice's "pushing up the daisies". Grice says that 'to push up the
daisies' is an IDIOM, but 'to fertilise the daffodils' is NOT.
"where 'in a way' adds nothing"
in terms of Grice,
"Be as informative as is required by the accepted purpose of the
conversation you are engaged in".
"but a kind of flavouring to 'for once'. There are many kinds of such
which are anti-Griceian in nature
"where words are added for flavour and emphasis even though their omission
would not alter the substance: "Do it immediately if not sooner", "That
applies to everyone and anyone else""
and the famous one beloved by Hart, "rules and regulations". ("Imagine if
to my primary and secondary account of rules, I would have to add an
of primary and secondary regulations! Heavens!").
"Though closer in [Fregeian] sense would be an expression like "Once upon a
time and a time it was...""
"[Speranza's] theory is that "in a way" is added by way of "conceptual
analysis", to show that any "for once" holds ONLY [emphasis Speranza's]
way" i.e. [as a necessary condition]: without that "way" of its being,
there could be no "for once" of that particular once-itude. [This is what
Heidegger is trying to get at, pages 651-1032 "Being and Time".]" "as
by Ryle in "Mind".
Ryle: "Heidegger is full of Heideggerianisms". Implicature: That you have
to cope with if you are intent in reading him (+> Heidegger).
"Confirmation of [Speranza's] thesis that "Conceptual analysis is essential
to everything" today emerged from the Professional Footballer's
Association in England: their spokeperson proclaiming that "People are
[Speranza] maintains, is an analytic claim -"
and not as tautologous as "People are human beings" -- which is a
Heideggerianism. (Cfr. "Being there", Dasein, a feature film with Peter
"perhaps indeed one of the outstanding products of "conceptual analysis" in
the sporting field. People are human - PFA on Sterling. People are human -
PFA on Sterling
Liverpool's Raheem Sterling is only human and made a mistake, according to
the PFA's deputy chief executive Bobby Barnes. View on
www.bbc.co.ukPreview by Yahoo."
This possibly deserves a separate post.
i. For once in a way there was nothing which Lord Emsworth was trying to
conceal from Constance.
ii. For once, in a way, there was nothing which Lord Emsworth was trying
to conceal from Constance.
McEvoy's gloss of Speranza's theory applies to the comma-less version (i),
not (ii), which is pro-, rather than anti-Griceian (as (i) is). In (i),
being anti-Griceian, a maxim is EXPLOITED for the effect of an
on Plum's part.
In fact, Lord Emsworth's part. Since Plum's implicature has to be
TRANSFERRED to Lord Emsworth: it's HIS train of 'thoughts'.
""in a way" is added by way of "conceptual analysis", to show that any "for
once" holds ONLY [emphasis Speranza's] "in a way" i.e. [as a necessary
condition]: without that "way" of its being, there could be no "for once"
that particular once-itude."
Lord Emsworth's once-itude, or onceitude, is indeed qualified, "in a way".
I would surmise that Emsworth went to Cambridge, and thus he is avoiding
the Oxford comma (in (ii)).
But possibly McEvoy would refute the hypothesis on the claim that Heidegger
doesn't use the Oxford comma, either.
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