[lit-ideas] Re: Counterfactual Pigs

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 19 May 2010 10:59:59 EDT

5:36:12 A.M., palma@xxxxxxxx writes:  
I was  reading andin one of the reaction to G. Orwell's animal farm, the 
reader  noted that pigs were very intelligent,
 
====
 
Yes, McEvoy's zeugma is unjustified.
 
He thinks he is being witty by making fun of Veronica,
 
---- if p, pigs will fly.
 
"But pigs will fly."
 
---- In fact, not all pigs will.
 
He adds injury to insult by talking of remote control for the landing of  
the plane. Surely a pig may be say to 'will' fly if I carry her in my bag, or 
 something.
 
The problem with a flying pig is essentialist.

As Popper knew, Australia is well noted by the existence of black swans  
which refuted "All swans are white". However, a white raven has not been 
found.  An albino raven maybe, but not really white.
 
If pig indicates
 
"sus domestica"
 
-- then a pig will NOT fly in the non-analogical sense (and ONLY sense) of  
'fly'. Sus domestica MAY develop wings -- by genetic transmutation, but 
Kripke's  point is that in such a case, a new species is best referred to, 
rather than as  a mutation of the old species.
 
----
 
In general, the reason why a pig cannot fly is the weight (of the pig).  
Similarly, an ostrich does not fly. To fly you need to have feathers, and be 
in  general very light (in weight). There is a scientific explanation for 
this. 
 
What Molleo wrote in fact was:
 
"If Iraq becomes a democracy, pigs will fly."
 
This is not a counterfactual pig. It is covered by Grice in his fourth  
lecture in WoW: "Indicative Conditionals".
 
In a way, if Tarski were true, one would schematically refer to 'pigs will  
fly' as "I am a Dutchman". "I'll eat my hat with my head in it."
 
In general, the inconceivability of 
 
"if p, I am a Dutchman"
 
underrates Dutchmen. -- It may even be used -- "Dutchman" -- broadly, to  
include Poirot (a Belgian) rendering the phrase innocuous.
 
The POINT of Molleo's utterance exceeds the 'literal' commitment, which is  
as it should be vacuous.
 
if p, q
 
p > q
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 0  0
0 1  0
 
----
 
"If Iraq becomes a democracy pigs will fly."
 
---
 
What Molleo implicates is, rather,
 
"If Iraq becomes a democracy then pigs will fly"
 
The 'then' makes all the difference. As Grice notes:
 
"There seem to me to be at least two different
forms of statement each of which has a good
right to the title of a conditional."
 
And the reason why Grice avoided the word 'conditional' like the plague,  
preferring 'if'.
 
"These are: "if p, q" and "if p, THEN q""
 
(WoW:63)
 
---
 
"These are the two forms which Strawson most signally 
fails to distinguish."
 
Strawson thus fail to distinguish between two 
distinct philosophical theses.
 
THESIS ONE. That the 'sense' of "if p, q" is given by the  horseshoe.
 
THESIS TWO. That the sense of "if p, then q" is given by the  horseshoe.
 
(WoW: 63).
 
"THESIS One is correct; whereas Thesis Two SEEMS incorrect,
since the meaning of "if p, THEN q" is little different
from "if p, in that case q", a linguistic form which has
a 
 
MUCH CLOSER connection
with ARGUMENT"
 
-- of the type Popper despised, as expressed in our only recourse in this  
area: ordinary English of the type explored and practiced by Oxonian  
philosophers --
 
"than would attach to the linguistic
form in which the word 'then' does not appear"

(WoW: 63).
 
"We should be careful, therefore, NOT TO allow
ourselves to be convinced that the meaning of
"if p, q" diverges from that of the horseshoe by a
silly argument which relies on a totally irrelevant
difference between "if p, THEN q" and 'p > q'"  (WoW:63).
 
(where '>' represents the horseshoe). 
 
 
The turning of the 'fact' (if it IS a fact, 'pigs will fly' -- the use of  
the future contingent renders this especially problematic -- cfr. "If Iraq 
is a  democracy, pigs FLEW") into a counterfact by the use of 'would' is 
otiose:
 
"If Iraq WERE a democracy, pigs WOULD fly".
 
In general, 'would' is meaningless. "As a child, I would swim in the lake"  
is best expressed by the simple preterite, "As a child I swam in the lake". 
Note  that in general, the preterite is ALSO meaningless. It carries the 
silly  implicature, "As an adult, I don't" which is false.
 
Grice's argument was best understood by J. L. Mackie, a colonial. R. C. S.  
Walker, a Scot, refers to Mackie in his brilliant "Conversational 
Implicature".  Mackie predates Kripke in a number of ways, and it is because of 
Mackie that  Grice entitled his thing with the issue of "indicative". For tense 
IS relevant  here, as Popper would NOT agree.
 
Cheers,
 
J. L. Speranza
--- for the Grice Club.

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