[lit-ideas] Charles Taylor - SOS - long
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "Lit-Ideas@Freelists. Org" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 18 May 2006 07:20:44 -0400
Taylor takes the self to be a project, the success of which is never
assured. What puts the project at risk is not time, or economic means,
or even one?s own nature, but rather the criterion by which one measures
a self. Taylor adopts the idea of a framework.
"... a framework is that in virtue of which we make sense of our lives
spiritually. [NB. What Taylor means by ?spiritual? is the conviction
that strong evaluations are possible because there are standards that
exist beyond us against which things can be evaluated.] Not to have a
framework is to fall into a life which is spiritually senseless. The
quest is thus always a quest for sense." (p.18)
Meaning is rooted in our ability to identify ourselves as living within
a framework. This framework provides the sense for our convictions and
judgements, functioning as a ground or foundation that gives us the
means for identifying what is worthwhile and justified. The self,
therefore, finds its sense within a structure of predetermined values
and rationales.
Taylor, however, also tells the story of disenchantment, where
frameworks once operated unquestioned, and often times implicitly, but,
with modernity, have been questioned and challenged.
"... frameworks today are problematic. This vague term points towards a
relatively open disjunction of attitudes. What is common to them all is
the sense that no framework is shared by everyone, can be taken for
granted as the framework tout court, can sink to the phenomenological
status of unquestioned fact." (p.17)
Taylor continues that this suspicion of frameworks has led some people
to question the very notion of a framework, attempting to naturalize the
self. This disenchantment, according to Taylor, has its roots in Plato
who shifted the virtues away from an honour ethic, rooted in the service
of the polis, to virtues rooted in reason. With this move from the life
of the people to the life of thought, there came with it a demand for
justification. What was once assumed as the values of ?us? now needed
to be justified. Modernity, with its pluralism and epistemology, went a
step further and attacked the very notion that values could be
justified. Once frameworks were understood as lacking any ?deep?
justification, the self lacked solid ground resulting in people
suffering from a variety of illnesses rooted in the experience of
emptiness or meaninglessness. For Taylor, then, the challenge to the
project of becoming a self lies in the long term erosion of the ability
for frameworks to provide sense to our lives.
Taylor turns to the metaphor of moral space in order to further develop
his notion of a framework. Taylor responds to the claim that if
frameworks are variable, rooted not in the nature of being but in human
interpretation, then perhaps these frameworks can be dispensed with. He
argues that:
"living within such strongly qualified horizons [i.e. frameworks] is
constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would
be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral,
that is, undamaged human personhood." (p.27)
Taylor?s response therefore has two parts: that frameworks represent
strong qualifications of the world and that it is impossible to reject
such qualifications and still be a self. A framework orients the
individual in two different ways. First there are universally valid
commitments such as being Catholic or Quebecois whereby the individual
is located within larger, pre-existing spheres of identity. These are
universal in not being dependent on any particular individual and bestow
identity on those who come to stand in this space. Second, there is an
orientation which is particular and contingent. This orientation
includes having a particular name (e.g. John Doe), entering into
particular relationships (e.g. the husband of Mary), and having a
particular social standing (e.g. teacher). These qualities are
particular in that they are not pre-determined and are largely open to
the contingencies of history. For Taylor, then, in response to the
fundamental question of identity, that is ?Who??, two kinds of answers
can be given which locate the individual.
If Taylor is right, then the claim that frameworks could be dispensed
with is nonsensical. Whether our commitments are of the universal or
particular sort, they are inescapable. We cannot conceive of a healthy,
functioning human being who had no national identity, no familial
relations, or no place in society. It is precisely these sorts of
relationships which form the basis upon which the individual makes
judgements. That is, we negotiate our way in the world by virtue of the
relationships we are already engaged in. The person who lacks such
relationships also lacks a place to stand and make decisions. ?Such a
person wouldn?t know where he stood on issues of fundamental importance,
would have no orientation in these issues whatever, wouldn?t be able to
answer for himself on them.? (p.31) Therefore, the claim that one could
dispense with frameworks is nonsensical because the lack of frameworks
would rule out the ability to act in any recognizable form as a human
being.
Identity, however, is not simply a matter of having frameworks. We can
imagine someone who possesses frameworks but is disillusioned or feeling
impotent, all of which undermine identity. What is lacking here is a
sense that these frameworks aim towards a greater good. It is this
concern for the good which Taylor describes as the absolute question.
"Since we cannot do without an orientation to the good, and since we
cannot be indifferent to our place relative to this good, and since this
place is something that must always change and become, the issue of the
direction of our lives must arise for us." (p.47)
The self, therefore, must raise fundamental questions like ?What is
worth doing?? and ?Does my life have meaning??. The frameworks within
which the self operates must therefore possess a moral quality.
While I would agree with Taylor concerning the necessity of frameworks
and the significance of the good within these frameworks, something is
missing. That something is missing is evidenced by the fact that
providing an answer to the questions ?Who am I?? or ?What is worth
doing?? is not the same thing as the self doing something worthwhile.
The problem lies in Taylor privileging identity so that one is left with
the impression that providing an answer to these questions will
necessarily lead to action within moral space. Taylor acknowledges that
there are frameworks, and therefore answers, available, yet people
struggle with meaninglessness. The difficulty must, then, lie in
something other than asking questions and searching for answers.
The good is also essential in Taylor?s description of the self and it is
worth noting the similar role the good plays for the self.
"Just because my orientation to [the good] is essential to my identity,
so the recognition that my life is turned away from it, or can never
approach it, would be devastating and insufferable. It threatens to
plunge me into a despair at my unworthiness which strikes at the very
roots of my being as a person. Symmetrically, the assurance that I am
turned towards this good gives me a sense of wholeness, of fullness of
being as a person or self, that nothing else can." (p.63)
The good in Taylor functions as a principle of orderliness, making the
parts fit into an harmonious whole. In addition, Taylor also describes
the good as have a criterial function. An important aspect of being a
self is having, what Taylor calls, hypergoods which are second-order
goods by which we evaluate and judge other goods. Examples of such
hypergoods might be God, justice or freedom. The good is, therefore,
the moral point of our actions. However, the good is not something
external to ourselves and our experience of the world, but is rather
?defined by the moral intuitions I have, by what I am morally moved by.?
What Taylor fails to recognize is that if the good is defined by moral
intuitions arising from particular activities, then the good cannot at
the same time be the moral point of those same activities. That is, an
activity does not provide both the stuff to be morally interpreted and
the moral interpretation. For example, few people deny that abortion is
a moral issue, but clearly there is no way in which the issue tells us
which moral intuition is to be the moral point. There is, therefore, a
gap between our moral intuitions and what we hold to be the good.
An analogy might be helpful here. In the game of chess, there are rules
which govern the movement of the pieces. The point of these rules
clearly comes from the actual movement of the pieces. Yet, when it
comes to making a particular move, the rules cannot tell me which move
to make. There is, then, a difference between knowing the rules and
following the rules. What Taylor provides is an account of knowing the
rules of the good. The good is dependent on moral intuitions and gives
moral activities their point. But, as I pointed out earlier, Taylor
seems to assume that knowing the good is identical to doing the good.
Yet as we saw with the chess analogy, there is something called making
moral decisions. It is in the case of making moral decisions that the
point is bestowed on moral activities.
What is missing in Taylor is an account of moral practices. Taylor
leaves us with the conviction that hypergoods are essential for the self
without telling us how they are essential in particular cases. As I
mentioned earlier, one is left with the impression that what really
matters for Taylor is simply holding these hypergoods. Yet, the self
requires not only having hypergoods but the means for following through
with these goods. This is where the consistency of the good is of
utmost importance. Without an understanding of the good as practiced
over the course of a lifetime, I am not sure Taylor leaves us with much
of a self.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Toronto, ON
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