[lit-ideas] Re: Anomalous Monism alla Grice
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 20:07:13 +0000 (GMT)
>How neutral yet interactionist can Popper get? These below are some ways a
Griceian approach help matters (or not). >
Popper is not a "neutral monist": nor is he someone who thinks there is a way
of neutralising the "mind body problem" by way of claiming minds and bodies are
constructions out of "neutral" material. The reference to TSAIB is to where
Popper explains why he thinks so-called "neutral monism" is only neutral in
name, for the so-called neutral elements are "mental". It was a reference to
Popper's criticism rather than endorsement of a 'neutralising' dissolution of
the mind-body problem.
>But_ it is 'more wrong' to REJECT the idea that Eccles wrote "The self and
its brain" on the ground that he co-wrote it with Popper.>
Certain books, articles etc. are "co-authored" in that all the material therein
is offered as the joint product of both authors working 'jointly'. TSAIB is not
"co-authored" in this sense: it is possible to almost entirely separate out
Popper's contribution and Eccles' [the Preface is joint]. Part I is by Popper
alone. Part II by Eccles alone. Part III are dialogues between the two
contributors: their respective parts in the dialogue are separate not 'joint',
and it is clear they differ on some important questions. It is therefore
perfectly in order to refer to Popper's contribution to TSAIB independent of
Eccles'.
Donal
On Wednesday, 20 November 2013, 16:20, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx"
<Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
How neutral yet interactionist can Popper get? These below are some ways a
Griceian approach help matters (or not).
In a message dated 11/20/2013 10:23:14 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"In this regard, my suggestion was that Davidson's "anomalous monism" does
not provide a viable alternative [however supposedly "anomalous"] to
dualism or monism and its causal analysis is inadequate to support it - it
either wavers between dualism/monism or must, on analysis, collapse into a
form
of dualism or of monism [most likely the latter]. It provides no real
advance in addressing the mind-body problem. (Also its use of causal analysis,
asides from being inadequate to support it, is flawed - e.g. not all
causation is law-like).
JLS' response seems unclear as to whether he accepts or rejects these
suggestions."
Let's consider:
"It provides no real advance in addressing the mind-body problem."
I am reminded of Roscelin.
Roscellinus, also called Roscelin of Compiègne or in Latin Roscellinus
Compendiensis and Rucelinus (c. 1050 – c. 1125), was a French philosopher and
theologian, often regarded as the founder of nominalism (cfr.
Scholasticism).
We may say that Roscelin's analysis "provides no real advance in addressing
the problem of universals".
For Roscelin implicates that the problem of universals is a pseudo-problem.
Anita Avramides, a Brooklyn-born Oxford-educated tutor (in Oxford --
educated Somerville, associated with Queen's) has written her DPhil Oxon on
Davidson. She prefers the term
'symmetrical'
and
'asymmetrical'.
Her DPhil advisor was Sir Peter Strawson, a student of Grice.
Admittedly, 'symmetrical' and 'asymmetrical' applies to 'the semantic'
versus 'the psychological', where the 'psychological' I take as IDENTICAL to
McEvoy's use of 'mind' (in his "mind-body" problem).
Avramides grants that Davidson is WRONG -- his 'symmetricalism' is wrong.
Davidson, Avramides shows, holds that the semantic ('mean') and the
'psychological' ("intends") are symmetrical terms: one cannot have one without
the
other.
Grice, Avramides has it -- as I do -- has it right: 'the psychological' and
the 'semantic' are ASYMMETRIC: the psychological (or 'mind') is BASIC.
One thing is to provide an analysis of the psychological and another is to
have a theory of 'the mind' (a grand term that Davidson and Grice would
reject on anti-Rylean grounds -- 'the concept of mind').
Popper and Eccles don't have any qualms with using the substantive 'mind'
(when what counts is, to echo Geary, the 'minding', not the mind -- "For
any noun, there is a more basic verb").
So, we have one problem with one term of the 'problem', 'mind-body'
problem. We are never sure how to use 'mind', or frame of mind. "She changed
her
mind" is something that needs a Popperian refutation.
On the other hand, there's the BRAIN versus the 'body'. Body is best not
used -- vide Jane Fonda, "My Life So Far"). It lacks a Graeco-Roman pedigree,
and 'corpus', which does, means 'corpse' in English.
So, with 'monism', Davidson is sticking to the idea of a continuum or
individualism in the compound of 'mind-body'. This SEEMS to advance on the
'mind-body problem'.
McEvoy, who has read Witters extensively, may agree that there is something
of a pseudo-problem in the problematic talk of the 'mind-body problem' --
philosophers seeing 'problems' (or questions) which are best seen as
'unanswerable') or 'dissolvable'.
Or not.
Grice never developed a philosophy of mind, since he avoided the term
'mind'. He thought the realm is 'rational psychology', and he does speak of
'philosophical' psychology. It's the 'soul', rather than the 'mind', that we
are into. He uses 'soul' to translate Greek 'psyche'. He sees 'psyche' or
psychological predicates as 'theoretical terms', alla Ramsey. The observble
predicates are 'behaviour' predicates, but we have to be careful, since most
behavioural descriptions already trickingly presuppose or implicate some
appeal to the psychological ("After he approached him, he hit him with
rancour").
On the other hand, to stick with 'brain', rather than 'body' leads us to
problem of 'multiple realisation' of psychological states or events in terms
of 'neurological states'. I.e. In what we may call a post-Smart identity
theory era, few philosophical psychologists allow for a one-on-one
correlation of one psychological state and one neural state.
The problem with Eccles and Popper (and Popper and Eccles) resembles or
reiterates Russell and Whitehead ("Principia Mathematica" -- by Whitehead and
Russell) and "In defense of a dogma" by Grice and Strawson (or Strawson and
Grice).
We never sure if, for any single sentence in Popper's and Eccles's book
(or Eccles's and Popper's book, if you must), it comes from the 'mind-body' of
Popper or the 'mind-body' of Eccles.
There are some implicatures to hand:
Popper and Eccles wrote "The self and its brain".
Eccles and Popper wrote "The self and its brain".
Eccles and Popper wrote "The self and its brain"
---- Therefore, Eccles wrote "The self and its brain".
It could be argued, wrongly, that, since it was Eccles AND Popper who wrote
"The self and its brain", it is wrong to deduce "Eccles wrote "The self
and its brain".
Grice shows that this is not a logical implication, though, but an
implicature. The idea is that if you talk, you try to be as informative as you
should, and why state that Eccles wrote "The self and its brain" when you know
it was Eccles AND Popper.
_But_ it is 'more wrong' to REJECT the idea that Eccles wrote "The self and
its brain" on the ground that he co-wrote it with Popper.
Queen Victoria solved the problem of the neutral monism in a rather
brilliant manner: "We are not amused", where 'we' gives the impression (or
'disimplicature') that she was a pluralist at heart.
Cheers,
Speranza
Cheers,
Speranza
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