[lit-ideas] Anomalous Monism alla Grice
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2013 22:46:04 -0500 (EST)
In a message dated 11/19/2013 9:14:56 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Since I am 'unable' to create new thread headings, may I use this
opportunity to tortuously segue back to "anomalous monism"?
Yes.
O. T. O. H., I _am_ able to create new thread headings.
I wonder if a computer expert can explain and deduce why McEvoy can not or
is unable to create new thread headings.
-----
McEvoy continues:
"What Davidson may be seen as doing is trying to circumvent the
dualism-monism dilemma by way of a causal analysis that admits 'mental events
cause
physical events' as per interactionism but then insists 'all causation is
physical causation' as per eliminative physicalism."
Yes. Of course, 'cause' is 'ambivalent', shall we say. In Greek, 'aitia' is
best used in connection with things like James Dean's "rebel without a
_cause_".
I.e. Dean, a rebel, lacks a 'cause', where 'cause' cannot be used alla
Davidson, but alla Greek. E.g. Menelaus had a 'cause' to go and fight in Troy
(and he wasn't a rebel).
"Cause" was originally then a legal term that applied to intentional
language -- 'aitia' in Greek. Latin 'causa' is a different animal,
metaphorically.
McEvoy continues:
"There are many reasons the mind-body problem may not be solved by this
kind of analytical legerdemain (which depends partly on appealing to an idea
of 'causation' that has long been superseded). Consider where matter
interacts with a force - say the planet Earth and gravity. Are we able to
prioritise within this interaction so as to say that, while planets may affect
gravity and gravity may affect planets [interactionism], all causation is
nevertheless matter-causation or all causation is nevertheless
force-causation?
From what point of view could we make any such claim? We might be motivated
to make such a claim because we wish to deny the distinct existence of
either matter or forces - i.e. maintain either that forces are simply forms of
matter or that matter is forms of forces: but we cannot claim this
motivation is justified by the nature of causal interaction between forces and
matter - rather we are being motivated to insist on a one-sided nature to that
causal interaction to vindicate our motivation."
I think the Australasian (Oxford educated) Romano Harré has studied this.
With Madden. They speak of a 'causal power'.
Where 'power' indeed is ambivalent for 'force'.
I'm never sure if the Greek philosophers, as they philosophised in Greek,
had a notion of 'force'. Newton did but he was neither Greek nor a
philosopher.
In Italian, 'force', forza, relates to Latin 'fortis', strong. But I don't
think the Greeks needed this term in their philosophical vocabulary. In
English, Geary uses 'mighty' with the same 'ambivalence' (as in "God
almighty', i.e. God who or that has all ("al-") the 'power' ('might').
McEvoy continues:
O. T. O. H., the idea of 'matter' is indeed very Greek ('hyle'). So I would
give priority to 'matter' over 'force', if only on linguistic grounds.
McEvoy continues:
"This is a bad way to argue, for we have provided no independent argument
for our causal analysis and so our causal analysis does not provide an
argument to favour our motivation: rather our causal analysis is a by-product
of
a prior (metaphysical) commitment to either matter or force as leading the
way to the analysis of the other."
Well, Aristotle indeed, who speaks of 'matter' (Hyle), as does Hume (whom
McEvoy finds superseded), ALWAYS combines 'matter' with 'form' --
hylemorphism. The 'morphe' would be something like the 'force', because matter
per se
seems inactive.
We need an 'individuum', which is a combo of some matter and some 'shape'
or form. Of course, this is atomism. With subatomic particles the idea
becomes weaker, but then quantum theorists are never clear as to what they
mean
by what they say (or vice versa).
McEvoy continues:
"Analogously, we might ask that if 'mental events cause physical events'
[as per interactionism] on what independent ground can we insist that
nevertheless 'all causation is merely physical causation'? If this objection is
right, we may see why I used the term "dead end" re "anomalous monism".
"Dead ends" actually have some appeal to them. In suburban neighbourhoods,
a 'dead end' usually means a nice spot where public byways are not to be
pursued.
In any case, the antagonist, 'nomalous monism' seems otiose.
We know that Popper is a dualist, rather than a monist, and the implicature
is obvious.
As McEvoy notes, if Dylan had cocaine and cannabis, it seems
underinformative to assert that he was addicted to 'cannabis' when he was
addicted to
cannabis _and_ the stronger cocaine.
Similarly, if Popper is a dualist, one may wonder if he is a trialist --
the three-realm theory. And if he is a trialist, one may wonder if he is (or
is not) a pluralist.
On the other hand, strictly, a dualist IS a pluralist, since 'two' is
plural.
The Greeks of course would disagree. They restricted the use of 'plural' to
_three_. Thus, Homer, writes: "And Achilles's two horses neighed
strongly", where the verb he uses is in the DUAL number, NOT the plural.
So we have
anomalous monism -- vs. nomalous monism
anomalous dualism -- vs. nomalous dualism
anomalous trialism -- vs. nomalous trialism
anomalous pluralism -- vs. nomalous pluralism
The idea of 'nomalous' is of course otiose. But then, so is that of
'anomalous'. Davidson is using an old Greek verb that never got properly
translated to Latin or English, 'nomos'.
The idea is that there are NO generalisations (hence the 'anomalous').
Still, philosophers can philosophise, because scientists only (as Popper
testifies in "Logic of Scientific Discovery") are interested in 'laws' (or
'nomoi', to use the Greek plural).
Popper goes on to postulate a 'demarcation' between the search for 'laws',
which he calls 'scientific', and "all other stuff" which falls within the
metaphysical (and in his early writings, 'meaningless') realm.
There is an American journal of philosophy called "The Monist". Strictly,
since there is an Editorial Board to them, it is best referred to as "The
Monists".
Cheers,
Speranza
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