[lit-ideas] Re: A Griceian Easter

From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza" for DMARC)
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2016 16:03:23 -0400

In a message dated 3/27/2016 11:02:32 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "We must have been up and down, in and out,
and
in circles as John alleges"

Which reminds me of Meinong. His favourite circle was 'square'. Meinong's
thesis supervisor said, in German:

i. That's ridiculous!

But Meinong's references to the 'quadratura circuli' impressed him and he
got an A+ on his dissertation ("On the square circle and other Meinongian
objects", by Meinong).

"as well as in many another shape,"

Well, triangles tend to be more boring. The etymythology of the
triangularly-shaped cucumber sandwiches, eaten on Easter, is said to invite the

implicature that their form symbolises the Trinity, the holy Trinity, that  is.

McEvoy:

"on whether Popper is a meaning-philosopher i.e. a philosopher who bases
his views on what makes 'sense'. Grice and Wittgenstein being two kinds of
meaning-philosopher, and with some philosophers after the 'lingustic turn'
talking about philosophy as if there can be no other kind than
meaning-philosophy. We know that Popper disavowed that he was a
meaning-philosopher,
whereas others said he was. AJ Ayer initially maintained  falsifiability was
offered by Popper as a criterion of meaning. Again and again,  JLS treats
Popper as if he was a meaning-philosopher, and again and again I set  out why
Popper is not a meaning philosopher and should be taken at his  disavowal."

While this is noble, I'm not sure is refutable. Someone may say:

i. I'm not a liar.

And that's OK.

But if he says:

ii. I'm a liar.

that's not so okay. Because the utterer of (ii) should NOT be taken at his
disavowal -- unless he is and we end up with Epimenides's paradox.

We are considering now:

iii. Observe!

McEvoy sets the record straight (cfr. the Biblical origin of 'straight and
narrow' -- the gate that the camel was supposed to cross --: "[Popper] does
say  the injunction [(iii)] led [the physics graduate] students to query
(iv)."

iv. "Observe what?"

McEvoy expands:

"(iv) could hardly be made if the injunction were meaningless."

I like 'hardly'. I would rank it as McEvoy's third favourite adverb: the
first being 'merely' and the second being 'utterly'. "Hardly" sometimes
invites  the wrong implicature, sometimes not. It is sometimes confused with
"barely".  Cfr. "Observe!" could barely be made if the injunction were
meaningless."

This may depend on what we apply 'mean' to:

A. The expression may be meaningless.
B. The utterer may still mean something by it.

This was Ziff's example to support Grice. His example was, by uttering a
succession of phones that sounded meaningless in English (but which is
meaningful in some native American language), the professor meant that he was
crazy. Ziff says this follow from Grice's analysis of meaning in terms of
intention. But Stampe and Paton, "On Ziff on Grice" refudiate Ziff. For surely,
by uttering "gavagai gavagai gavagai", the professor did NOT intend this
intention ("I'm uttering something meaningless") to be recognised. The
professor's whole point was to get his addressee believe that he (the
professor)
was crazy by using something that the addressee could not make head or
tails of  (figuratively)

McEvoy:

"and that their understandable query"

iv. Observe WHAT, darling?

(If I had been in THAT class, surely I would have provided a neat report:
"The walls are white, the board is clean and Popper has yet written none of
his  handwriting on it. There are two big windows overlooking the campus. It
is sunny  and I wonder what I'm doing here. I've just seen a flock of
robins flying -- the  windows being so big. The windows have no curtains, which
I
think in bad taste.  The floor is not that clean. My fellow students don't
know what they are doing  here either. Now I will concentrate on Popper. His
nose is not big, but it's not  small either. He seldom smiles. I see a
spider behind him, but possibly  inocuous. The door is closed, and I wonder if
we are not LOCKED in here. The  desk is a mess, typical. Popper brought loads
of papers and I expect he won't  read them to us. There is a pot with a
plant that seems to be in terrible need  of water. The roof is, audaciously,
red. I wonder why I applied to this college.  There is a central lamp on the
roof, hanging. It is so kitch that I have to  concentrate on NOT observing
it, as it totally disconcentrates me. I'm using a  nice pen for writing this,
and I wonder why, because when Popper gave us back  our previous notes, he
used a cheap pencil, rather! Now there is a little cloud,  I can see through
the window, blocking the sun, but it'll soon pass, I'm  sure."

----

McEvoy: "... points up the flaw in the view that we start our knowledge
with observations, for observation is always from a point of view, and so the
start of our knowledge goes further back to this point of view - but the
point  of view is always relative to some problem or other, and so the actual
starting-point for knowledge is a problem, for knowledge is always
knowledge  relative to some problem."

Indeed. But I do think that Popper uses some synonym of 'meaningless' when
discussing this case. And I think it has to do with the 'priority thesis'
we  were considering. I shall have to revise this. Because Popper seems to
bring  back this reminiscences as an answer to the question whether
observation is  theory-laden? Popper seems in his reminiscence to confuse a few
things, since I  think he also brings in, for good measure, G. A. Paul's
problem,
"Is there a  problem about sense data?". And so, he is wondering about the
_what_ in "observe  what?". A sense-datum? Or a 'material' object, or a
thing? A phainomenon, or a  noumenon?

In German, 'Meinung' -- which is cognate with Grice's favourite word,
'meaning' -- may mean 'opine'. It's different from 'sinnlos' (senseless), and
so
I will need to revise what word Popper actually used and which one he
might have  been having in mind in his Austrian-speaking mind. There is an
usage
of  'meaningless' where it means something like 'purposeless', or 'otiose'.
But I do  NOT think Popper is having in mind clever observations like
Vendler when he  noticed that a waiter leaving the table by saying:

v. Enjoy!

he is being 'meaningless' because enjoyment cannot be controlled
rationally. So,

vi. Will you close that door, please? Only gypsies who live in tents leave
doors unclosed like that, darling.

is different.

vii. Close the door!

-- unlike "Enjoy!" -- is within the rational control of the addressee.
That's why Ali Baba,

viii. Open, Sesame!

is 'otiose' and meaningless, because a door cannot obey that injunction. It
would be different if Popper were to give that injunction in a morgue, to
a set  of corpses. Because THEY could not 'observe'. So there are loads of
qualifications to bring in.

McEvoy's point about the pov (a favourite acronym with McEvoy) is well
taken, and indeed, when I read that reminiscence by Popper I was reminded,
naturally of Grice's first Immanuel Kant lecture (at Stanford) on reason and
reasoning. Because he says that to say things like

ix.

I have 2 hands.
If I had 3 more hands, I would have 5 hands.
If I were to have double 5, I'd have 10 hands.
If 4 hands were removed, 6 hands would remain.
-----------------
Therefore, I would have 4 more hands than I have now.

Grice finds the reasoning 'brilliant, if otiose at heart' (figuratively).

McEvoy:

"The whole point of Popper's story is lost [unless we emphasise the
problem-solving thing]; its point is not to erect another dismal dogma of
meaning
but to illustrate the naivety of the traditional empiricist view that
knowledge is 'observation-based' in that it starts from 'observation'/sense
experience (when the term 'observation-based' was used in my earlier post, it
was used in inverted commas to mark that it is being used without commitment
to  this traditional empiricist view).'

I think. In scare quotes, that is.

Just checking I see Popper claims:

x. Clearly, the instruction "Observe!" is absurd.

Now let's see what synonyms in German we have for "absurd". The Romans used
the word to mean 'meaningless':

xi. Credo, quia absurdum est.

---- INTERLUDE ON Popper's "absurd".

Popper is using 'absurd' figuratively, i.e. metaphorically. The Romans used
it literally to mean 'out of tune'. But figurative usages are already
found, qua  implicaturae, in Roman speech. Of persons and things, 'absurdus',
'absurda' and  'absurdum' meant irrational, incongruous, _absurd_, silly,
_senseless_,  stupid.

ratio inepta atque absurda, Terenzio Ad. 3, 3, 22:
hoc pravum, ineptum, absurdum atque alienum a vitā meā videtur, id. ib. 5,
8, 21:
carmen cum ceteris rebus absurdum tum vero in illo, Cicerone Mur. 26:
illud quam incredibile, quam absurdum! id.
Sull. 20: absurda res est caveri, id.
Balb. 37: bene dicere haud absurdum est, is not inglorious, per litotem
for, is praiseworthy, glorious,
Sall. C. 3
Kritz.—Homo absurdus, a man who is fit or good for nothing: sin plane
abhorrebit et erit absurdus,
Cicerone, de Or. 2, 20, 85:
absurdus ingenio, Tacito, H. 3, 62; cf.:
sermo comis, nec absurdum ingenium, id. A. 13, 45.
—Comp., Cicerone. Phil. 8, 41; id. N. D. 1, 16; id. Fin. 2, 13.—Sup., Cic.
Att. 7, 13.
—Adv.: absurdē.
1    Lit., discordantly:  canere, Cic. Tusc. 2, 4, 12.—
2    Fig.,  irrationally, absurdly, Plaut. Ep. 3, 1, 6; Cic. Rep. 2, 15;
id. Div. 2, 58, 219  al.—Comp., Cic. Phil. 8, 1, 4.—Sup., Aug. Trin. 4 fin.

It may be a typical Roman expression, not a Hellenic one, for once!

--- END OF INTERLUDE.

McEvoy goes on: "Perhaps, after a decade or so of this, we should change
this game to one where I continually interpolate Popperian terms and maxims
into  a supposed account of Grice's writings? Cui bono?"

Well, 'decade' is usually ambiguous in usage if not meaning.

The Romans used 'decade', literally, "ten parts", of anything (that had ten
parts), originally in reference to the books of Livy -- which were divided
in ten parts to faciliate its reading by Roman students.

"Cui bono?"

Well, this is a trick. The apparently rhetorical question (x-question,
rather than yes/no question, as usually rhetorical questions go) is  used to
invite the implicature (cancellable) that the agent  having done action A may
be found among those who have something to  gain, usually inviting the
extra-implicature that this is done, with  an eye toward _financial_ gain.

In fact Cicerone, who discusses 'absurdum' in his Rhetoric, in his speech
"Pro Roscio Amerino" attributed the first use of "cui bono" (the Romans lack
the  interrogation sign, but they did raise the intonation, grave as their
reputation  has passed to be) to the Roman consul and censor Lucius Cassius
Longinus  Ravilla, if you heard of him (His mother called him just "Lucy")

Cicerone:

L. Cassius ille quem populus Romanus verissimum et sapientissimum  iudicem
putabat identidem in causis quaerere solebat 'cui bono'  fuisset.

(Rougly translated: "The famous Lucius Cassius, whom the Roman people used
to regard as a very honest and wise judge, was in the habit of asking, time
and  again, 'To whose benefit?'"

-- By using "time and again," Cicerone is inviting the implicature, "BORING
Lucy".

For the record, another example of Cicerone using "cui bono" is in his
defence of Milo, in the Pro Milone. He even makes a reference to Cassius: "let
that maxim of Cassius apply".

If Cicerone had known of Grice he would not have said, "Let that wise
Grecian maxim apply," but "Let that wise Griceian maxim apply."

So let us apply to resurrection. "Observe," the apostle said: "The tomb is
empty". "Surely he resurrected". "Does that follow?," the other apostle
asked.  "Cui bono?" To the everlasting glory of God, of course.

Indeed, the first element we encounter in the framework of the Easter
events is the empty tomb.

An observational statement if ever there was one.

In itself,

xii. Jesus's tomb is empty.

surely is NOT what Grice would have as "a direct proof" or 'index'  (Grice
loved Peirce's 'technocrypticisms') of Resurrection.

Surely, the absence of Christ's body from the tomb could be explained
otherwise.

Ask Hanson, and consider his explorations on 'inference to the best
explanation'. Is abductive reasoning at play here, if we don't want to offend
Popper by overusing an empiricist idea of 'induction'?

Even if not an index -- i.e. we wouldn't say

xiii. Jesus's tomb's being empty means-n that Jesus resurrected.

--- nonetheless, the empty tomb was seen or observed (perhaps, granted, by
those who were displaying 'theory-laden' observation -- still an essential
sign  for all those concerned with this particular tomb.

The discovery (a favourite word with Popper and Hanson) of the emtpy tomb
by Jesus's disciples was the first step toward recognizing the very "fact"
of  the Resurrection, or state of affairs (to use Wittgensteinian parlance --
"The  world is all that is the case."

This was the case, first with the holy women, and then with St. Peter (as
he then wasn't).

The disciple "whom Jesus loved", i.e. Peter, affirmed that when he  (Peter)
entered the empty tomb and discovered "the linen cloths lying  there", "he
saw and believed".

Popper would have observed and perhaps DISbelieved, but that is neither
here nor there.

Joe Orton wrote, "What the butler saw" (to be staged this year on the
Westport playhouse"). What Peter saw was an empty tomb. He "believed" he said,
not that the tomb was empty (that would be otiose -- cfr. 'seeing is
believing'). Rather he believed that Jesus had resurrected.

By "seeing and believing", Peter is implicating that he realized from  the
empty tomb's condition that the absence of Jesus' body could NOT have  been
of animal (e.g. jackal) or human doing and, furthermore, that Jesus had not
simply returned to earthly life as had been the case with Lazarus.

Mary Magdalene and the holy women who came to finish anointing the body of
Jesus, which had been buried in haste because the Sabbath began on the
evening  of Good Friday, were allegedly the first to see the Risen One.

"See" is factive. So if we say that Magdalene (Strawson was a fellow of
Magdalen, not to be confused with Cambridge's Magdalene) saw the risen one,
the  risen one was there to be seen (cfr. Grice, "Macbeth saw Banquo.") --
unless we  'disimplicate' and remain sceptic.

The women were the first messengers of Christ's Resurrection for the
apostles themselves.

The apostles were the next who saw the resurrected Jesus  appears.

First Peter, then the remaining eleven (it is after this tradition that
English football has 11 players on each team, since Peter was the first).

Peter had been called to strengthen the faith of his "brothers", and so
"sees" the Risen One before them.

It is on the basis of Peter's eye-witness testimony  that remaining eleven
exclaimed in unison: "The Lord has risen indeed,  and has appeared to
Simon!"

The invited implicature is

xiv. Peter = Simon.

-- where "Peter" is Jesus's wise use of "Petros", masculine of "Petra"
(stone, feminine in Latin), seeing that Peter was male.

"Blessed are you, Simon, for this was not revealed to you by flesh and
blood, but by my Father in heaven.
And I tell you that you are Peter ("Petros"), and on this rock ("petra") I
will build my church.

-- the rest is St. Peter's in Rome.

Later, by means of touch and the sharing of a meal, the risen Jesus
establishes direct contact with his disciples.

Jesus invites them in this way to recognize that he is NOT a  ghost.

The example interested Grice ("Macbeth saw Banquo") to the point of coining
'disimplicature'. "If we say that Hamlet saw his father, when all he saw
was the  GHOST of his father, we are not therefore misusing 'see' which
ENTAILS  that what is seen is OUT THERE to be seen, precisely. Rather, I would
like  to introduce as term of art 'disimplicature', for those occasions,
unlike  implicature, where we mean more than we say, but where we mean LESS
than
we say:  we merely drop the entailment that 'what is seen' needs to be out
there to be  seen; and we are not necessarily engaged in a sloppy or loose
use of 'see' that  LACKS this entailment."

So Jesus was not a ghost (but cfr. "Holy Ghost" -- cfr. Trinity)

Above all, Jesus invites his apostles to verify (to use Ayer's favourite
word) that the risen body in which he appears to them is the SAME body that
had been tortured and crucified, for it still bears the traces of his
Passion.

There is a famous painting by Caravaggio on this.

Grice was of course interested. Because by 'body', Jesus is making an
indirect reference to Grice's theory of personal identity. For Grice,

xv. I fell from the stairs.

means 'my body' fell from the stairs, as

xvi. I was hit by a cricket ball in the head.

(Grice, "Personal identity"). But

xvii. I am thinking of joining the navy soon.

-- Grice was writing this in 1939 -- it is not Grice's body, but his
_mind_.

So Jesus's authentic, real body possesses, and this is the 'paschal
mystery', if you will, the new properties of a glorious body -- something  the
materialist Descartes will find hard to conceive: a body not limited by  space
and time (res extensa) but able to be present how and when he wills.

Jesus's humanity can no longer be confined to earth, and belongs henceforth
only to the Father's divine realm.

It is only for this eschatological reason too that the risen Jesus enjoys
the sovereign freedom of appearing as he wishes: in the guise of a gardener
or  in other forms familiar to his disciples, precisely to awaken their
faith, which  invites the implicature (Platonic in nature) that the faith was
there to be  awoken!

Cheers,

Speranza

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[lit-ideas] Re: A Griceian Easter

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