[list_indonesia] Re: [ppiindia] asia
- From: "Ambon" <sea@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <ppiindia@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 20 Mar 2005 16:35:29 +0100
** Mailing-List Indonesia Nasional Milis PPI-India www.ppi-india.da.ru **
Bgusnya kalau dikasi referensi sumber.
----- Original Message -----
From: "antonhartomo" <antonhartomo@xxxxxxxxx>
To: <ekonomi-nasional@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>; <ppiindia@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, March 20, 2005 3:55 PM
Subject: [ppiindia] asia
>
>
> rehat minggu
>
>
> ---
>
> The real 'China threat'
> By Chalmers Johnson
>
> I recall 40 years ago, when I was a new professor working in the
> field of Chinese and Japanese international relations, that Edwin O
> Reischauer once commented, "The great payoff from our victory of
> 1945 was a permanently disarmed Japan." Born in Japan and a Japanese
> historian at Harvard, Reischauer served as US ambassador to Tokyo in
> the administrations of presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.
> Strange to say, since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and
> particularly under the administration of George W Bush, the United
> States has been doing everything in its power to encourage and even
> accelerate Japanese rearmament.
>
> Such a development promotes hostility between China and Japan, the
> two superpowers of East Asia, sabotages possible peaceful solutions
> in those two problem areas, Taiwan and North Korea, left over from
> the Chinese and Korean civil wars, and lays the foundation for a
> possible future Sino-American conflict that the United States would
> almost surely lose. It is unclear whether the ideologues and war
> lovers of Washington understand what they are unleashing - a
> possible confrontation between the world's fastest-growing
> industrial economy, China, and the world's second-most-productive,
> albeit declining, economy, Japan; a confrontation that the United
> States would have caused and in which it might well be consumed.
>
> Let me make clear that in East Asia we are not talking about a
> little regime-change war of the sort that Bush and Vice President
> Richard Cheney advocate. After all, the most salient characteristic
> of international relations during the last century was the inability
> of the rich, established powers - Great Britain and the United
> States - to adjust peacefully to the emergence of new centers of
> power in Germany, Japan and Russia. The result was two exceedingly
> bloody World Wars, a 45-year-long Cold War between Russia and
> the "West", and innumerable wars of national liberation (such as the
> quarter-century-long one in Vietnam) against the arrogance and
> racism of European, US and Japanese imperialism and colonialism.
>
> The major question for the 21st century is whether this fateful
> inability to adjust to changes in the global power structure can be
> overcome. Thus far the signs are negative. Can the United States and
> Japan, today's versions of rich, established powers, adjust to the
> re-emergence of China - the world's oldest continuously extant
> civilization - this time as a modern superpower? Or is China's
> ascendancy to be marked by yet another world war, when the
> pretensions of European civilization in its US and Japanese
> projections are finally put to rest? That is what is at stake.
>
> Alice in Wonderland policies
> China, Japan and the United States are the three most productive
> economies on Earth, but China is the fastest-growing (at an average
> rate of 9.5% per annum for more than two decades), whereas both the
> US and Japan are saddled with huge and mounting debts and, in the
> case of Japan, stagnant growth rates. China is today the world's
> sixth-largest economy (the US and Japan being first and second) and
> America's third-largest trading partner after Canada and Mexico.
> According to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) statisticians in
> their Factbook 2003, China is actually already the second-largest
> economy on Earth measured on a purchasing-power-parity basis - that
> is, in terms of what China actually produces rather than prices and
> exchange rates. The CIA calculates the United States' gross domestic
> product (GDP) - the total value of all goods and services produced
> within a country - for 2003 as US$10.4 trillion and China's as $5.7
> trillion. This gives China's 1.3 billion people a per capita
> GDP of $4,385.
>
> Between 1992 and 2003, Japan was China's largest trading partner,
> but in 2004 Japan fell to third place, behind the European Union and
> the United States. China's trade volume for 2004 was $1.2 trillion,
> third in the world after the US and Germany, and well ahead of
> Japan's $1.07 trillion. China's trade with the US grew some 34% in
> 2004 and has turned the California cities of Los Angeles, Long Beach
> and Oakland into the three busiest seaports in the United States.
>
> The truly significant trade development of 2004 was the EU's
> emergence as China's biggest economic partner, suggesting the
> possibility of a Sino-European cooperative bloc confronting a less
> vital Japanese-American one. As the Financial Times observed, "Three
> years after its entry into the World Trade Organization [in 2001],
> China's influence in global commerce is no longer merely
> significant. It is crucial." For example, most Dell computers sold
> in the US are made in China, as are the digital-video-disc players
> of Japan's Funai Electric Co. Funai annually exports some 10 million
> DVD players and television sets from China to the United States,
> where they are sold primarily in Wal-Mart stores. China's trade with
> Europe in 2004 was worth $177.2 billion, with the United States
> $169.6 billion, and with Japan $167.8 billion.
>
> China's growing economic weight in the world is widely recognized
> and applauded, but it is China's growth rates and their effect on
> the future global balance of power that the US and Japan, rightly or
> wrongly, fear. The CIA's National Intelligence Council forecasts
> that China's GDP will equal Britain's in 2005, Germany's in 2009,
> Japan's in 2017, and the United States' in 2042. But Shahid Javed
> Burki, former vice president of the World Bank's China Department
> and a former finance minister of Pakistan, predicts that by 2025
> China will probably have a GDP of $25 trillion in terms of
> purchasing power parity and will have become the world's largest
> economy, followed by the United States at $20 trillion and India at
> about $13 trillion - and Burki's analysis is based on a conservative
> prediction of a 6% Chinese growth rate sustained over the next two
> decades. He foresees Japan's inevitable decline because its
> population will begin to shrink drastically after about 2010.
> Japan's Ministry of
> Internal Affairs reports that the number of men in Japan already
> declined by 0.01% in 2004; and some demographers, it notes,
> anticipate that by the end of the century the country's population
> could shrink by nearly two-thirds, from 127.7 million today to 45
> million, the same population it had in 1910.
>
> By contrast, China's population is likely to stabilize at
> approximately 1.4 billion people and is heavily weighted toward
> males. (According to Howard French of the New York Times, in one
> large southern city the government-imposed one-child-per-family
> policy and the availability of sonograms have resulted in a ratio of
> 129 boys born for every 100 girls; 147 boys for every 100 girls for
> couples seeking second or third children. The 2000 census for the
> country as a whole put the reported sex ratio at birth at about 117
> boys to 100 girls.) Chinese domestic economic growth is expected to
> continue for decades, reflecting the pent-up demand of its huge
> population, relatively low levels of personal debt, and a dynamic
> underground economy not recorded in official statistics. Most
> important, China's external debt is relatively small and easily
> covered by its reserves; whereas both the US and Japan are
> approximately $7 trillion in the red, which is worse for Japan, with
> less than half the US
> population and economic clout.
>
> Ironically, part of Japan's debt is a product of its efforts to help
> prop up America's global imperial stance. For example, in the period
> since the end of the Cold War, Japan has subsidized America's
> military bases in Japan to the staggering tune of approximately $70
> billion. Refusing to pay for its profligate consumption patterns and
> military expenditures through taxes on its own citizens, the United
> States is financing these outlays by going into debt to Japan,
> China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and India. This situation has
> become increasingly unstable as the US requires capital imports of
> at least $2 billion per day to pay for its governmental
> expenditures. Any decision by East Asian central banks to move
> significant parts of their foreign-exchange reserves out of the US
> dollar and into the euro or other currencies to protect themselves
> from dollar depreciation would produce the mother of all financial
> crises.
>
> Japan still possesses the world's largest foreign-exchange reserves,
> which at the end of January stood at around $841 billion. But China
> sits on a $609.9 billion pile of dollars (as of the end of 2004),
> earned from its trade surpluses with the US. Meanwhile, the US
> government and Japanese followers of George W Bush insult China in
> every way they can, particularly over the status of China's
> breakaway province, the island of Taiwan. The distinguished economic
> analyst William Greider recently noted, "Any profligate debtor who
> insults his banker is unwise, to put it mildly ... American
> leadership has ... become increasingly delusional - I mean that
> literally - and blind to the adverse balance of power accumulating
> against it."
>
> The Bush administration is unwisely threatening China by urging
> Japan to rearm and by promising Taiwan that, should China use force
> to prevent a Taiwanese declaration of independence, the US will go
> to war on its behalf. It is hard to imagine more shortsighted,
> irresponsible policies, but in light of the Bush administration's
> Alice in Wonderland war in Iraq, the acute anti-Americanism it has
> generated globally, and the politicization of America's intelligence
> services, it seems possible that the US and Japan might actually
> precipitate a war with China over Taiwan.
>
> Japan rearms
> Since the end of World War II, and particularly since gaining its
> independence in 1952, Japan has subscribed to a pacifist foreign
> policy. It has resolutely refused to maintain offensive military
> forces or to become part of America's global military system. Japan
> did not, for example, participate in the 1991 war against Iraq, nor
> has it joined collective security agreements in which it would have
> to match the military contributions of its partners. Since the
> signing in 1952 of the Japan-United States Security Treaty, the
> country has officially been defended from so-called external threats
> by US forces located on some 91 bases on the Japanese mainland and
> the island of Okinawa. The US 7th Fleet even has its home port at
> the old Japanese naval base of Yokosuka. Japan not only subsidizes
> these bases but subscribes to the public fiction that the US forces
> are present only for its defense. In fact, Japan has no control over
> how and where the US employs its land, sea and air forces based
> on Japanese territory, and the Japanese and US governments have
> until quite recently finessed the issue simply by never discussing
> it.
>
> Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has
> repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution
> (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and
> become what US officials call a "normal nation". For example, last
> August 13, then secretary of state Colin Powell stated baldly in
> Tokyo that if Japan ever hoped to become a permanent member of the
> United Nations Security Council it would first have to get rid of
> its pacifist constitution. Japan's claim to a Security Council seat
> is based on the fact that, although its share of global GDP is only
> 14%, it pays 20% of the total UN budget. Powell's remark was blatant
> interference in Japan's internal affairs, but it merely echoed many
> messages delivered by former deputy secretary of state Richard
> Armitage, the leader of a reactionary clique in Washington that has
> worked for years to remilitarize Japan and so enlarge a major new
> market for US arms. Its members include Torkel Patterson, Robin
> Sakoda, David Asher and James Kelly at the State Department;
> Michael Green on the National Security Council's staff; and numerous
> uniformed military officers at the Pentagon and at the headquarters
> of the Pacific Command at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
>
> America's intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-
> conservatives like to call the "Britain of the Far East" - and then
> use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China. On
> October 11, 2000, Michael Green, then a member of Armitage
> Associates, wrote, "We see the special relationship between the
> United States and Great Britain as a model for the [US-Japan]
> alliance." Japan has so far not resisted this US pressure since it
> complements a renewed nationalism among Japanese voters and a fear
> that a burgeoning capitalist China threatens Japan's established
> position as the leading economic power in East Asia. Japanese
> officials also claim that the country feels threatened by North
> Korea's developing nuclear and missile programs, although they know
> that the North Korean standoff could be resolved virtually
> overnight - if the Bush administration would cease trying to
> overthrow the Pyongyang regime and instead deliver on US trade
> promises (in return for North Korea's
> agreement to give up its nuclear-weapons program). Instead, on
> February 25, the State Department announced that "the US will refuse
> North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's demand for a guarantee of 'no
> hostile intent' to get Pyongyang back into negotiations over its
> nuclear-weapons programs". And on March 7, Bush nominated John
> Bolton to be US ambassador to the United Nations even though North
> Korea has refused to negotiate with him because of his insulting
> remarks about the country.
>
> Japan's remilitarization worries a segment of the Japanese public
> and is opposed throughout East Asia by all the nations Japan
> victimized during World War II, including China, both Koreas, and
> even Australia. As a result, the Japanese government has launched a
> stealth program of incremental rearmament. Since 1992, it has
> enacted 21 major pieces of security-related legislation, nine in
> 2004 alone. These began with the International Peace Cooperation Law
> of 1992, which for the first time authorized Japan to send troops to
> participate in UN peacekeeping operations.
>
> Remilitarization has since taken many forms, including expanding
> military budgets, legitimizing and legalizing the sending of
> military forces abroad, a commitment to join the US missile defense
> ("Star Wars") program - something the Canadians refused to do in
> February - and a growing acceptance of military solutions to
> international problems. This gradual process was greatly accelerated
> in 2001 by the simultaneous coming to power of President George W
> Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi made his first
> visit to the United States in July of that year and, in May 2003,
> received the ultimate imprimatur, an invitation to Bush's "ranch" in
> Crawford, Texas. Shortly thereafter, Koizumi agreed to send a
> contingent of 550 troops to Iraq for a year, extended their stay for
> another year in 2004 and, on October 14, personally endorsed Bush's
> re-election.
>
> A new nuclear giant in the making?
> Koizumi has appointed to his cabinets over the years hardline anti-
> Chinese, pro-Taiwanese politicians. Phil Deans, director of the
> Contemporary China Institute in the School of Oriental and African
> Studies, University of London, observes, "There has been a
> remarkable growth of pro-Taiwan sentiment in Japan. There is not one
> pro-China figure in the Koizumi cabinet." Members of the latest
> Koizumi cabinet include Defense Agency chief Yoshinori Ono and
> Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, both ardent militarists;
> Machimura is a member of the right-wing faction of former prime
> minister Yoshiro Mori, which supports an independent Taiwan and
> maintains extensive covert ties with Taiwanese leaders and
> businessmen.
>
> Taiwan, it should be remembered, was a Japanese colony from 1895-
> 1945. Unlike the harsh Japanese military rule over Korea from 1910-
> 45, it experienced relatively benign governance by a civilian
> Japanese administration. The island, while bombed by the Allies, was
> not a battleground during World War II, although it was harshly
> occupied by the Chinese Nationalists (Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang)
> immediately after the war. Today, as a result, many Taiwanese speak
> Japanese and have a favorable view of Japan. Taiwan is virtually the
> only place in East Asia where Japanese are fully welcomed and liked.
>
> Bush and Koizumi have developed elaborate plans for military
> cooperation between their two countries. Crucial to such plans is
> the scrapping of the Japanese constitution of 1947. If nothing gets
> in the way, Koizumi's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) intends
> to introduce a new constitution on the occasion of the party's 50th
> anniversary this coming November. This has been deemed appropriate
> because the LDP's founding charter of 1955 set as a basic party goal
> the "establishment of Japan's own constitution" - a reference to the
> fact that General Douglas MacArthur's post-World War II occupation
> headquarters actually drafted the current constitution. The original
> LDP policy statement also called for "the eventual removal of US
> troops from Japanese territory", which may be one of the hidden
> purposes behind Japan's urge to rearm.
>
> A major goal of the Americans is to gain Japan's active
> participation in their massively expensive missile defense program.
> The Bush administration is seeking, among other things, an end to
> Japan's ban on the export of military technology, since it wants
> Japanese engineers to help solve some of the technical problems of
> its so-far-failing Star Wars system. The United States has also been
> actively negotiating with Japan to relocate the US Army's 1st Corps
> from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Camp Zama, southwest of Tokyo in the
> densely populated prefecture of Kanagawa, whose capital is Yokohama.
> These US forces in Japan would then be placed under the command of a
> four-star general, who would be on a par with regional commanders
> such as Centcom commander John Abizaid, who lords it over Iraq and
> South Asia. The new command would be in charge of all US Army "force
> projection" operations beyond East Asia and would inevitably
> implicate Japan in the daily military operations of the American
> empire. Garrisoning even a small headquarters, much less the whole
> 1st Corps made up of an estimated 40,000 soldiers, in such a
> sophisticated and centrally located prefecture as Kanagawa is also
> guaranteed to generate intense public opposition as well as rapes,
> fights, car accidents and other incidents similar to the ones that
> occur daily in Okinawa.
>
> Meanwhile, Japan intends to upgrade its Defense Agency (Boeicho)
> into a ministry and possibly develop its own nuclear-weapons
> capability. Goading the Japanese government to assert itself
> militarily may well cause the country to go nuclear in order
> to "deter" China and North Korea, while freeing Japan from its
> dependency on the US "nuclear umbrella". Military analyst Richard
> Tanter notes that Japan already has "the undoubted capacity to
> satisfy all three core requirements for a usable nuclear weapon: a
> military nuclear device, a sufficiently accurate targeting system,
> and at least one adequate delivery system". Japan's combination of
> fully functioning fission and breeder reactors plus nuclear-fuel
> reprocessing facilities gives it the ability to build advanced
> thermonuclear weapons; its H-II and H-IIA rockets, in-flight
> refueling capacity for fighter bombers, and military-grade
> surveillance satellites assure that it could deliver its weapons
> accurately to regional targets. What it
> currently lacks are the platforms (such as submarines) for a secure
> retaliatory force in order to dissuade a nuclear adversary from
> launching a preemptive first strike.
>
> The Taiwanese knot
> Japan may talk a lot about the dangers of North Korea, but the real
> objective of its rearmament is China. This has become clear from the
> ways in which Japan has recently injected itself into the single
> most delicate and dangerous issue of East Asian international
> relations - the problem of Taiwan. Japan invaded China in 1931 and
> was its wartime tormentor thereafter as well as Taiwan's colonial
> overlord. Even then, however, Taiwan was viewed as a part of China,
> as the United States has long recognized. What remains to be
> resolved are the terms and timing of Taiwan's reintegration with the
> Chinese mainland. This process was deeply complicated by the fact
> that in 1987 Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, who had retreated to
> Taiwan in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war (and were
> protected there by the US 7th Fleet ever after), finally ended
> martial law on the island. Taiwan has since matured into a vibrant
> democracy and the Taiwanese are now starting to display their own
> mixed opinions
> about their future.
>
> In 2000, the Taiwanese people ended a long monopoly of power by the
> Nationalists and gave the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), headed
> by President Chen Shui-bian, an electoral victory. A native
> Taiwanese (as distinct from the large contingent of mainlanders who
> came to Taiwan in the baggage train of Chiang's defeated armies),
> Chen stands for an independent Taiwan, as does his party. By
> contrast, the Nationalists, together with a powerful mainlander
> splinter party, the People First Party headed by James Soong (Song
> Chuyu), hope to see an eventual peaceful unification of Taiwan with
> China. On March 7, the Bush administration complicated these
> delicate relations by nominating John Bolton to be the US ambassador
> to the United Nations. He is an avowed advocate of Taiwanese
> independence and was once a paid consultant to the Taiwanese
> government.
>
> Last May, in a very close and contested election, Chen Shui-bian was
> re-elected, and on May 20, the notorious right-wing Japanese
> politician Shintaro Ishihara attended his inauguration in Taipei.
> (Ishihara believes that Japan's 1937 Rape of Nanking was "a lie made
> up by the Chinese".) Though Chen won with only 50.1% of the vote,
> this was still a sizable increase over his 33.9% in 2000, when the
> opposition was divided. The Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
> immediately appointed Koh Se-kai as its informal ambassador to
> Japan. Koh has lived in Japan for some 33 years and maintains
> extensive ties to senior political and academic figures there. China
> responded that it would "completely annihilate" any moves toward
> Taiwanese independence - even if it meant scuttling the 2008 Beijing
> Olympics and good relations with the United States.
>
> Contrary to the machinations of American neo-cons and Japanese
> rightists, however, the Taiwanese people have revealed themselves to
> be open to negotiating with China over the timing and terms of
> reintegration. On August 23, the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan's
> parliament) enacted changes in its voting rules to prevent Chen from
> amending the constitution to favor independence, as he had promised
> to do in his re-election campaign. This action drastically lowered
> the risk of conflict with China. Probably influencing the
> Legislative Yuan was the warning issued on August 22 by Singapore's
> new prime minister, Lee Hsien-loong: "If Taiwan goes for
> independence, Singapore will not recognize it. In fact, no Asian
> country will recognize it. China will fight. Win or lose, Taiwan
> will be devastated."
>
> The next important development was parliamentary elections on
> December 11. President Chen called his campaign a referendum on his
> pro-independence policy and asked for a mandate to carry out his
> reforms. Instead he lost decisively. The opposition Nationalists and
> the People First Party won 114 seats in the 225-seat parliament,
> while Chen's DPP and its allies took only 101. (Ten seats went to
> independents.) The Nationalist leader, Lien Chan, whose party won 79
> seats to the DPP's 89, said, "Today we saw extremely clearly that
> all the people want stability in this country."
>
> Chen's failure to capture control of parliament also meant that a
> proposed purchase of $19.6 billion worth of arms from the United
> States was doomed. The deal included guided-missile destroyers, P-3
> anti-submarine aircraft, diesel submarines, and advanced Patriot PAC-
> 3 anti-missile systems. The Nationalists and James Soong's
> supporters regard the price as too high and mostly a financial sop
> to the Bush administration, which has been pushing the sale since
> 2001. They also believe the weapons would not improve Taiwan's
> security.
>
> On December 27, mainland China issued its fifth Defense White Paper
> on the goals of the country's national defense efforts. As one
> longtime observer, Robert Bedeski, noted, "At first glance, the
> Defense White Paper is a hardline statement on territorial
> sovereignty and emphasizes China's determination not to tolerate any
> moves at secession, independence or separation. However, the next
> paragraph ... indicates a willingness to reduce tensions in the
> Taiwan Strait: so long as the Taiwan authorities accept the one-
> China principle and stop their separatist activities aimed
> at 'Taiwan independence', cross-strait talks can be held at any time
> on officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides."
>
> It appears that this is also the way the Taiwanese read the message.
> On February 24, President Chen met for the first time since October
> 2000 with chairman James Soong of the People First Party. The two
> leaders, holding diametrically opposed views on relations with the
> mainland, nonetheless signed a joint statement outlining 10 points
> of consensus. They pledged to try to open full transport and
> commercial links across the Taiwan Strait, increase trade, and ease
> the ban on investments in China by many Taiwanese business sectors.
> The mainland reacted favorably at once. Astonishingly, this led Chen
> to say that he "would not rule out Taiwan's eventual reunion with
> China, provided Taiwan's 23 million people accepted it".
>
> If the United States and Japan left China and Taiwan to their own
> devices, it seems possible that they would work out a modus vivendi.
> Taiwan has already invested some $150 billion in the mainland, and
> the two economies are becoming more closely integrated every day.
> There also seems to be a growing recognition in Taiwan that it would
> be very difficult to live as an independent Chinese-speaking nation
> alongside a country with 1.3 billion people, 9.6 million square
> kilometers of territory, a rapidly growing $1.4 trillion economy,
> and aspirations to regional leadership in East Asia. Rather than
> declaring its independence, Taiwan might try to seek a status
> somewhat like that of French Canada - a kind of looser version of a
> Chinese Quebec under nominal central government control but
> maintaining separate institutions, laws and customs.
>
> The mainland would be so relieved by this solution it would probably
> accept it, particularly if it could be achieved before the 2008
> Beijing Olympics. China fears that Taiwanese radicals want to
> declare independence a month or two before those Olympics, betting
> that China would not attack then because of its huge investment in
> the forthcoming Games. Most observers believe, however, that China
> would have no choice but to go to war because failure to do so would
> invite a domestic revolution against the Chinese Communist Party for
> violating the national integrity of China.
>
> Sino-American, Sino-Japanese relations spiral downward
> It has long been an article of neo-con faith that the US must do
> everything in its power to prevent the development of rival power
> centers, whether friendly or hostile. After the collapse of the
> Soviet Union, this meant they turned their attention to China as one
> of the United States' probable next enemies. In 2001, having come to
> power, the neo-conservatives shifted much of the US's nuclear
> targeting from Russia to China. They also began regular high-level
> military talks with Taiwan over defense of the island, ordered a
> shift of US Army personnel and supplies to the Asia-Pacific region,
> and worked strenuously to promote the remilitarization of Japan.
>
> On April 1, 2001, a US Navy EP-3E Aries II electronic spy plane
> collided with a Chinese jet fighter off the south China coast. The
> US aircraft was on a mission to provoke Chinese radar defenses and
> then record the transmissions and procedures the Chinese used in
> sending up interceptors. The Chinese jet went down and the pilot
> lost his life, while the US plane landed safely on Hainan Island and
> its crew of 24 spies was well treated by the Chinese authorities.
>
> It soon became clear that China was not interested in a
> confrontation, since many of its most important investors have their
> headquarters in the United States. But it could not instantly return
> the crew of the spy plane without risking powerful domestic
> criticism for obsequiousness in the face of provocation. It
> therefore delayed for 11 days until it received a pro forma US
> apology for causing the death of a Chinese pilot on the edge of the
> country's territorial airspace and for making an unauthorized
> landing at a Chinese military airfield. Meanwhile, the US media had
> labeled the crew as "hostages", encouraged their relatives to tie
> yellow ribbons around neighborhood trees, hailed the president for
> doing "a first-rate job" to free them, and endlessly criticized
> China for its "state-controlled media". They carefully avoided
> mentioning that the United States enforces around the country a 200-
> mile aircraft-intercept zone that stretches far beyond territorial
> waters.
>
> On April 25, 2001, during an interview on national television,
> President Bush was asked whether he would ever use "the full force
> of the American military" against China for the sake of Taiwan. He
> responded, "Whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself." This
> was US policy until September 11, 2001, when China enthusiastically
> joined the "war on terrorism" and Bush and his neo-cons became
> preoccupied with their "axis of evil" and making war on Iraq. The
> United States and China were also enjoying extremely close economic
> relations, which the big-business wing of the Republican Party did
> not want to jeopardize.
>
> The Middle East thus trumped the neo-cons' Asia policy. While the
> Americans were distracted, China went about its economic business
> for almost four years, emerging as a powerhouse of Asia and a
> potential organizing node for Asian economies. Rapidly
> industrializing China also developed a voracious appetite for
> petroleum and other raw materials, which brought it into direct
> competition with the world's largest importers, the US and Japan.
>
> By the summer of 2004, Bush strategists, distracted as they were by
> Iraq, again became alarmed over China's growing power and its
> potential to challenge US hegemony in East Asia. The Republican
> Party platform unveiled at its convention in New York in August
> proclaimed that "America will help Taiwan defend itself". During
> that summer, the US Navy also carried out exercises it
> dubbed "Operation Summer Pulse '04", which involved the simultaneous
> deployment at sea of seven of the United States' 12 carrier strike
> groups. A US carrier strike group includes an aircraft carrier
> (usually with nine or 10 squadrons of planes, a total of about 85
> aircraft in all), a guided-missile cruiser, two guided-missile
> destroyers, an attack submarine, and a combination ammunition-oiler-
> supply ship. Deploying seven such armadas at the same time was
> unprecedented - and very expensive. Even though only three of the
> carrier strike groups were sent to the Pacific and no more than one
> was patrolling off Taiwan
> at a time, the Chinese became deeply alarmed that this marked the
> beginning of an attempted rerun of 19th-century gunboat diplomacy
> aimed at them.
>
> This US show of force and Chen Shui-bian's polemics preceding the
> December elections also seemed to over-stimulate the Taiwanese. On
> October 26 in Beijing, then secretary of state Colin Powell tried to
> calm things down by declaring to the press, "Taiwan is not
> independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that
> remains our policy, our firm policy ... We want to see both sides
> not take unilateral action that would prejudice an eventual outcome,
> a reunification that all parties are seeking."
>
> Powell's statement seemed unequivocal enough, but significant doubts
> persisted about whether he had much influence within the Bush
> administration or whether he could speak for Vice President Cheney
> and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Early in 2005, Porter
> Goss, the new director of the CIA, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and
> Admiral Lowell Jacoby, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, all
> told Congress that China's military modernization was going ahead
> much faster than previously believed. They warned that the 2005
> Quadrennial Defense Review, the every-four-years formal assessment
> of US military policy, would take a much harsher view of the threat
> posed by China than the 2001 overview.
>
> In this context, the Bush administration, perhaps influenced by the
> election of November 2 and the transition from Colin Powell's to
> Condoleezza Rice's State Department, played its most dangerous card.
> On February 19 in Washington, it signed a new military agreement
> with Japan. For the first time, Japan joined the US administration
> in identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic
> objective". Nothing could have been more alarming to China's leaders
> than the revelation that Japan had decisively ended six decades of
> official pacifism by claiming a right to intervene in the Taiwan
> Strait.
>
> It is possible that, in the years to come, Taiwan itself may recede
> in importance to be replaced by even more direct Sino-Japanese
> confrontations. This would be an ominous development indeed, one
> that the United States would be responsible for having abetted but
> would certainly be unable to control. The kindling for a Sino-
> Japanese explosion has long been in place. After all, during World
> War II the Japanese killed approximately 23 million Chinese
> throughout East Asia - higher casualties than the staggering ones
> suffered by Russia at the hands of the Nazis - and yet Japan refuses
> to atone for or even acknowledge its historical war crimes. Quite
> the opposite, it continues to rewrite history, portraying itself as
> the liberator of Asia and a victim of European and US imperialism.
>
> In - for the Chinese - a painful act of symbolism, after becoming
> Japanese prime minister in 2001, Junichiro Koizumi made his first
> official visit to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, a practice that he has
> repeated every year since. Koizumi likes to say to foreigners that
> he is merely honoring Japan's war dead. Yasukuni, however, is
> anything but a military cemetery or a war memorial. It was
> established in 1869 by Emperor Meiji as a Shinto shrine (though with
> its torii archways made of steel rather than the traditional red-
> painted wood) to commemorate the lives lost in campaigns to return
> direct imperial rule to Japan. During World War II, Japanese
> militarists took over the shrine and used it to promote patriotic
> and nationalistic sentiments. Today, Yasukuni is said to be
> dedicated to the spirits of approximately 2.4 million Japanese who
> have died in the country's wars, both civil and foreign, since 1853.
>
> In 1978, for reasons that have never been made clear, General Hideki
> Tojo and six other wartime leaders who had been hanged by the Allied
> Powers as war criminals were collectively enshrined at Yasukuni. The
> current chief priest of the shrine denies that they were war
> criminals, saying, "The winner passed judgment on the loser." In a
> museum on the shrine's grounds, there is a fully restored Mitsubishi
> Zero Type 52 fighter aircraft that a placard says made its combat
> debut in 1940 over Chongqing, then the wartime capital of the
> Republic of China. It was undoubtedly not an accident that, in
> Chongqing during the 2004 Asian Cup soccer finals, Chinese
> spectators booed the playing of the Japanese national anthem.
> Yasukuni's leaders have always claimed close ties to the imperial
> household, but the late Emperor Hirohito last visited the shrine in
> 1975 and Emperor Akihito has never been there.
>
> The Chinese regard Yasukuni visits by the Japanese prime minister as
> insulting, somewhat comparable perhaps to Britain's Prince Harry
> dressing up as a Nazi for a costume party. Nonetheless, Beijing has
> tried in recent years to appease Tokyo. Chinese President Hu Jintao
> rolled out the red carpet for Yohei Kono, Speaker of the Japanese
> Diet's House of Representatives, when he visited China last
> September; he appointed Wang Yi, a senior moderate in the Chinese
> foreign service, as ambassador to Japan; and he proposed joint Sino-
> Japanese exploration of possible oil resources in the offshore seas
> that both sides claim. All such gestures were ignored by Koizumi,
> who insists that he intends to go on visiting Yasukuni.
>
> Matters came to a head in November at two important summit meetings:
> an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Santiago,
> followed immediately by an Association of Southeast Asian Nations
> (ASEAN) meeting with the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea
> that took place in Vientiane. In Santiago, Hu Jintao directly asked
> Koizumi to cease his Yasukuni visits for the sake of Sino-Japanese
> friendship. Seemingly as a reply, Koizumi went out of his way to
> insult Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Vientiane. He said to Premier
> Wen, "It's about time for [China's] graduation" as a recipient of
> Japanese foreign-aid payments, implying that Japan intended
> unilaterally to end its 25-year-old financial-aid program. The
> word "graduation" also conveyed the insulting implication that Japan
> saw itself as a teacher guiding China, the student.
>
> Koizumi next gave a little speech about the history of Japanese
> efforts to normalize relations with China, to which Wen replied, "Do
> you know how many Chinese people died in the Sino-Japanese war?" Wen
> went on to suggest that China had always regarded Japan's foreign
> aid, which he said China did not need, as payments in lieu of
> compensation for damage done by Japan in China during the war. He
> pointed out that China had never asked for reparations from Japan
> and that Japan's payments amounted to about $30 billion over 25
> years, a fraction of the $80 billion Germany has paid to the victims
> of Nazi atrocities even though Japan is the more populous and richer
> country.
>
> On November 10, the Japanese navy discovered a Chinese nuclear
> submarine in Japanese territorial waters near Okinawa. Although the
> Chinese apologized and called the sub's intrusion a "mistake",
> Defense Agency director Ono gave it wide publicity, further
> inflaming Japanese public opinion against China. From that point on,
> relations between Beijing and Tokyo have gone steadily downhill,
> culminating in the Japanese-American announcement that Taiwan was of
> special military concern to both of them, which China denounced as
> an "abomination".
>
> Over time this downward spiral in relations will probably prove
> damaging to the interests of both the United States and Japan, but
> particularly to those of Japan. China is unlikely to retaliate
> directly but is even less likely to forget what has happened - and
> it has a great deal of leverage over Japan. After all, Japanese
> prosperity increasingly depends on its ties to China. The reverse is
> not true. Contrary to what one might expect, Japanese exports to
> China jumped 70% between 2001 and 2004, providing the main impetus
> for a sputtering Japanese economic recovery. Some 18,000 Japanese
> companies have operations in China. In 2003, Japan passed the United
> States as the top destination for Chinese students going abroad for
> a university education. Nearly 70,000 Chinese students now study at
> Japanese universities, compared with 65,000 at US academic
> institutions. These close and lucrative relations are at risk if the
>US and Japan pursue their militarization of the region.
>
> A multipolar world
> Tony Karon of Time magazine has observed, "All over the world, new
> bonds of trade and strategic cooperation are being forged around the
> US. China has not only begun to displace the US as the dominant
> player in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC),
> it is fast emerging as the major trading partner to some of Latin
> America's largest economies ... French foreign-policy think-tanks
> have long promoted the goal of 'multipolarity' in a post-Cold War
> world, ie, the preference for many different, competing power
> centers rather than the 'unipolarity' of the US as a single
> hyperpower. Multipolarity is no longer simply a strategic goal. It
> is an emerging reality."
>
> Evidence is easily found of multipolarity and China's prominent role
> in promoting it. Just note China's expanding relations with Iran,
> the European Union, Latin America and the Association of Southeast
> Asian Nations. Iran is the second-largest OPEC (Organization of
> Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil producer after Saudi Arabia and
> has long had friendly relations with Japan, which is its leading
> trading partner. (Ninety-eight percent of Japan's imports from Iran
> are oil.) On February 18, 2004, a consortium of Japanese companies
> and the Iranian government signed a memorandum of agreement to
> develop jointly Iran's Azadegan oilfield, one of the world's
> largest, in a project worth $2.8 billion. The US has opposed Japan's
> support for Iran, causing Congressman Brad Sherman (Democrat,
> California) to charge that Bush had been bribed into accepting the
> Japanese-Iranian deal by Koizumi's dispatch of 550 Japanese troops
> to Iraq, adding a veneer of international support for the US war
> there.
>
> But the long-standing Iranian-Japanese alignment began to change in
> late 2004. On October 28, China's oil major, the Sinopec Group,
> signed an agreement with Iran worth between $70 billion and $100
> billion to develop the giant Yadavaran natural-gas field. China
> agreed to buy 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from
> Iran over 25 years. It is the largest deal Iran has signed with a
> foreign country since 1996 and will include several other benefits,
> including China's assistance in building numerous ships to deliver
> the LNG to Chinese ports. Iran also committed itself to exporting
> 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day to China for 25 years at market
> prices.
>
> Iran's oil minister, Bijan Zanganeh, on a visit to Beijing noted
> that Iran is China's biggest foreign oil supplier and said his
> country wants to be China's long-term business partner. He told
> China Business Weekly that Tehran would like to replace Japan with
> China as the biggest customer for its oil and gas. The reason is
> obvious: US pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear-power
> development program and the Bush administration's declared intention
> to take Iran to the UN Security Council for the imposition of
> sanctions (which a Chinese vote could veto). On November 6, Chinese
> Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing paid a rare visit to Tehran. In
> meetings with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, Li said that
> Beijing would indeed consider vetoing any US effort to sanction Iran
> at the Security Council. The US has also charged China with selling
> nuclear and missile technology to Iran.
>
> China and Iran already did a record $4 billion worth of two-way
> business in 2003. Projects included China's building of the first
> stage of Tehran's Metro rail system and a contract to build a second
> link worth $836 million. China will be the top contender to build
> four other planned lines, including a 30-kilometer track to the
> airport. In February 2003, Chery Automobile Co, the eighth-largest
> auto maker in China, opened its first overseas production plant in
> Iran. Today, it manufactures 30,000 Chery cars annually in
> northeastern Iran. Beijing is also negotiating to construct a 386-
> kilometer pipeline from Iran to the northern Caspian Sea to connect
> with the long-distance Kazakhstan to Xinjiang pipeline that it began
> building last October. The Kazakh pipeline has a capacity to deliver
> 10 million tons of oil to China per year. Despite US bluster and
> belligerence, Iran is anything but isolated in today's world.
>
> The European Union is China's largest trading partner and China is
> the EU's second-largest trading partner (after the United States).
> Back in 1989, to protest the suppression of pro-democracy
> demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, the EU imposed a ban on
> military sales to China. The only other countries so treated are
> true international pariahs such as Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Even
> North Korea is not subject to a formal European arms embargo. Given
> that the Chinese leadership has changed several times since 1989 and
> as a gesture of goodwill, the EU has announced its intention to lift
> the embargo. Jacques Chirac, the French president, is one of the
> strongest proponents of the idea of replacing US hegemony with
> a "multipolar world". On a visit to Beijing in October, he said that
> China and France share "a common vision of the world" and that
> lifting the embargo will "mark a significant milestone: a moment
> when Europe had to make a choice between the strategic interests of
> America and China - and chose China".
>
> In his trip to Western Europe in February, Bush repeatedly
> said, "There is deep concern in our country that a transfer of
> weapons would be a transfer of technology to China, which would
> change the balance of relations between China and Taiwan." In early
> February, the House of Representatives voted 411-3 in favor of a
> resolution condemning the potential EU move. The Europeans and
> Chinese contend that the Bush administration has vastly overstated
> its case, that no weapons capable of changing the balance of power
> are involved, and that the EU is not aiming to win massive new
> defense contracts from China but to strengthen mutual economic
> relations in general. Immediately after Bush's tour of Europe, the
> EU trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, arrived in Beijing for his
> first official visit. The purpose of his trip, he said, was to
> stress the need to create a new strategic partnership between China
> and Europe.
>
> Washington has buttressed its hardline stance with the release of
> many new intelligence estimates depicting China as a formidable
> military threat. Whether this intelligence is politicized or not, it
> argues that China's military modernization is aimed precisely at
> countering the US Navy's carrier strike groups, which would
> assumedly be used in the Taiwan Strait in case of war. China is
> certainly building a large fleet of nuclear submarines and is an
> active participant in the EU's Galileo Project to produce a
> satellite navigation system not controlled by the US military. The
> Defense Department worries that Beijing might adapt the Galileo
> technology to anti-satellite purposes. US military analysts are also
> impressed by China's launch, on October 15, 2003, of a spacecraft
> containing a single astronaut who was successfully returned to Earth
> the following day. Only the former USSR and the United States had
> previously sent humans into outer space.
>
> China already has 500-550 short-range ballistic missiles deployed
> opposite Taiwan and has 24 CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missiles
> (ICBMs) with a range of 13,000 kilometers to deter a US missile
> attack on the Chinese mainland. According to Richard Fisher, a
> researcher at the US-based Center for Security Policy, "The forces
> that China is putting in place right now will probably be more than
> sufficient to deal with a single American aircraft-carrier battle
> group." Arthur Lauder, a professor of international relations at the
> University of Pennsylvania, concurred. He said the Chinese
> military "is the only one being developed anywhere in the world
> today that is specifically configured to fight the United States of
> America".
>
> The US obviously cannot wish away this capability, but it has no
> evidence that China is doing anything more than countering the
> threats coming from the Bush administration. It seeks to avoid war
> with Taiwan and the US by deterring them from separating Taiwan from
> China. For this reason, China's pro forma legislature, the National
> People's Congress, passed a law this month making secession from
> China illegal and authorizing the use of force in case a territory
> tried to leave the country.
>
> The Japanese government, of course, backs the US position that China
> constitutes a military threat to the entire region. Interestingly
> enough, however, the Australian government of Prime Minister John
> Howard, a loyal ally of the United States when it comes to Iraq, has
> decided to defy Bush on the issue of lifting the European arms
> embargo. Australia places a high premium on good relations with
> China and is hoping to negotiate a free-trade agreement between the
> two countries. Canberra has therefore decided to support the EU in
> lifting the 15-year-old embargo. Chirac and German Chancellor
> Gerhard Schroeder both say, "It will happen."
>
> The United States has long proclaimed that Latin America is part of
> its "sphere of influence", and because of that most foreign
> countries have to tread carefully in doing business there. However,
> in the search for fuel and minerals for its booming economy, China
> is openly courting many Latin American countries regardless of what
> Washington thinks. On November 15, President Hu Jintao ended a five-
> day visit to Brazil during which he signed more than a dozen accords
> aimed at expanding Brazil's sales to China and Chinese investment in
> Brazil. Under one agreement Brazil will export to China as much as
> $800 million annually in beef and poultry. In turn, China agreed
> with Brazil's state-controlled oil company to finance a $1.3 billion
> gas pipeline between Rio de Janeiro and Bahia once technical studies
> are completed. China and Brazil also entered into a "strategic
> partnership" with the objective of raising the value of bilateral
> trade from $10 billion in 2004 to $20 billion by 2007.
> President Hu said this partnership symbolized "a new international
> political order that favored developing countries".
>
> In the weeks that followed, China signed important investment and
> trade agreements with Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and Cuba.
> Of particular interest, in December, President Hugo Chavez of
> Venezuela visited China and agreed to give it wide-ranging access to
> his country's oil reserves. Venezuela is the world's fifth-largest
> oil exporter and normally sells about 60% of its output to the
> United States, but under the new agreements China will be allowed to
> operate 15 mature oilfields in eastern Venezuela. China will invest
> about $350 million to extract oil and another $60 million in natural-
> gas wells.
>
> China is also working to integrate East Asia's smaller countries
> into some form of new economic and political community. Such an
> alignment, if it comes into being, will certainly erode US and
> Japanese influence in the area. In November, the 10 nations that
> make up ASEAN (Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
> the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), met in the
> Laotian capital Vientiane, joined by the leaders of China, Japan and
> South Korea. The United States was not invited and the Japanese
> officials seemed uncomfortable being there. The purpose was to plan
> for an East Asian summit meeting to be held next November to begin
> creating an "East Asia Community". Last December, the ASEAN
> countries and China also agreed to create a free-trade zone among
> themselves by 2010.
>
> According to Edward Cody of the Washington Post, "Trade between
> China and the 10 ASEAN countries has increased about 20% a year
> since 1990, and the pace has picked up in the last several years."
> This trade hit $78.2 billion in 2003 and was reported to be about
> $100 billion by the end of 2004. As senior Japanese political
> commentator Yoichi Funabashi observed, "The ratio of intra-regional
> trade [in East Asia] to worldwide trade was nearly 52% in 2002.
> Though this figure is lower than the 62% in the EU, it tops the 46%
> of NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Agreement]. East Asia is
> thus becoming less dependent on the US in terms of trade."
>
> China is the primary moving force behind these efforts. According to
> Funabashi, China's leadership plans to use the country's explosive
> economic growth and its ever more powerful links to regional trading
> partners to marginalize the United States and isolate Japan in East
> Asia. He argues that the United States underestimated how deeply
> distrusted it had become in the region thanks to its narrow-minded
> and ideological response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997,
> which it largely caused. On November 30, Michael Reiss, the director
> of policy planning in the State Department, said in Tokyo, "The US,
> as a power in the Western Pacific, has an interest in East Asia. We
> would be unhappy about any plans to exclude the US from the
> framework of dialogue and cooperation in this region." But it is
> probably already too late for the Bush administration to do much
> more than delay the arrival of a China-dominated East Asian
> Community, particularly because of declining US economic and
> financial strength.
>
> For Japan, the choices are more difficult still. Sino-Japanese
> enmity has had a long history in East Asia, always with disastrous
> outcomes. Before World War II, one of Japan's most influential
> writers on Chinese affairs, Hotsumi Ozaki, prophetically warned that
> Japan, by refusing to adjust to the Chinese revolution and instead
> making war on it, would only radicalize the Chinese people and
> contribute to the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party. He
> spent his life working on the question "Why should the success of
> the Chinese revolution be to Japan's disadvantage?" In 1944, the
> Japanese government hanged Ozaki as a traitor, but his question
> remains as relevant today as it was in the late 1930s.
>
> Why should China's emergence as a rich, successful country be to the
> disadvantage of either Japan or the United States? History teaches
> us that the least intelligent response to this development would be
> to try to stop it through military force. As a Hong Kong wisecrack
> has it, China has just had a couple of bad centuries and now it's
> back. The world needs to adjust peacefully to its legitimate claims -
> one of which is for other nations to stop militarizing the Taiwan
> problem - while checking unreasonable Chinese efforts to impose its
> will on the region. Unfortunately, the trend of events in East Asia
> suggests we may yet see a repetition of the last Sino-Japanese
> conflict, only this time the US is unlikely to be on the winning
> side.
>
> (Source citations and other references for this article are
> available on the website of the Japan Policy Research Institute.)
>
> Chalmers Johnson is president of the Japan Policy Research
> Institute. The first two books in his Blowback Trilogy - Blowback:
> The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, and The Sorrows of
> Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic - are now
> available in paperback. The third volume is being written.
>
>
>
> --- End forwarded message ---
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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