Hi Mark, Cool, that's what I was thinking. None of my networks have been touched, but that might be due to all laptops require ICF. However, there has been an element of luck, because no VPN clients introduced the bug and none of my VPN servers have VPNq installed yet, and the CMAK client pieces have not been distributed. This does bring up a very very good point. Untrusted machines (machines such as laptops and VPN clients should not connect directly to the trusted network. VPN clients can connect to a DMZ can access published servers. Laptops should connect to their own network and access resources via published servers as well. Sort of like what we all naturally do with WLAN hosts. Hey Mark, you just gave me an idea for another article :-) Thanks! Tom Thomas W Shinder www.isaserver.org/shinder ISA Server and Beyond: http://tinyurl.com/1jq1 Configuring ISA Server: http://tinyurl.com/1llp -----Original Message----- From: Mark Hippenstiel [mailto:M.Hippenstiel@xxxxxxxxxxxx] Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2003 4:08 PM To: [ISAserver.org Discussion List] Subject: [isalist] Re: MS-Blast scripts http://www.ISAserver.org Tom, may I cite NAI on this: ==================== This worm spreads by exploiting a recent vulnerability in Microsoft Windows. The worm scans the local class C subnet, or other random subnets, on port 135. Discovered systems are targeted. Exploit code is sent to those systems, instructing them to download and execute the file MSBLAST.EXE from a remote system via TFTP. The worm contains a payload to initiate a Denial of Service attack against windowsupdate.com after August 16. The worm only checks the local system date upon execution. If an infected system is left on and the date rolls over to Aug 16, the payload will not kick off until the system is restarted. This payload involves sending 20 bytes SYN packets to windowsupdate.com on TCP port 80 for the purpose of preventing users from patching their systems via Windows Update. The source IP address is spoofed on each packet, using a random local CLASS B IP. [...] However, unless the system has been (MS03-026) patched, it is susceptible to the buffer overflow attack from an infected host machine. An infected machine (running msblast.exe) will send out malformed packets across the local subnet to the RPC service running on port 135. When these packets are received by any unpatched system, it will create a buffer overflow and crash the RPC service on that system. All this can occur without the worm actually being on the machine. This means that the remote shell will still get created on TCP port 4444, and the system may unexpectedly crash upon receiving malformed exploit code. ==================== I agree that imho the only way for the worm to get into a secured network would be by physically moving an infected machine into it. Of course there's always a chance that some machine has its own internet access for whatever reasons (maybe online banking) and gets infected that way. When the exploit was being discussed the first time, I said I was pretty sure that my setups would be safe, and you know what - they still are thanks to ISA and a proper configuration. By now I have the machines patched, so everything's at ease :) Mark ------------------------------------------------------ List Archives: http://www.webelists.com/cgi/lyris.pl?enter=isalist ISA Server Newsletter: http://www.isaserver.org/pages/newsletter.asp ISA Server FAQ: http://www.isaserver.org/pages/larticle.asp?type=FAQ ------------------------------------------------------ Other Internet Software Marketing Sites: Leading Network Software Directory: http://www.serverfiles.com No.1 Exchange Server Resource Site: http://www.msexchange.org Windows Security Resource Site: http://www.windowsecurity.com/ Network Security Library: http://www.secinf.net/ Windows 2000/NT Fax Solutions: http://www.ntfaxfaq.com ------------------------------------------------------ You are currently subscribed to this ISAserver.org Discussion List as: tshinder@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send a blank email to $subst('Email.Unsub')