Sheesh! Everybody's a critic.
The "House Nigger" example may not have been the best example, but I
don't spend much time on details when I'm on a ramble.
Carl Jarvis
On 10/28/18, Miriam Vieni <miriamvieni@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Except I'm not sure that the Negroes had a choice about who would live in
the big house and who would be a field hand.
Miriam
-----Original Message-----
From: blind-democracy-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
<blind-democracy-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> On Behalf Of Carl Jarvis
Sent: Sunday, October 28, 2018 10:27 AM
To: blind-democracy@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [blind-democracy] Re: The Khashoggi Affair and the Future of Saudi
Arabia
It just makes my back shiver to think that the best method for "maintaining
control" in the Middle East is to destroy all vestiges of ancient
civilizations, crippling the people who cannot defend themselves, murdering
children, destroying people's health through disease and starvation. And to
what purpose? Democracy? Freedom to live as they wish? The right to speak
and work to make a better life for their people? No, none of that
silliness. We are telling our People that it is to defend Freedom and to
bring democracy to those oppressed nations. But our Media seldom mentions
the huge profits made from the sale of military hardware, or the profits
from the natural resources that we take control over. And all the time that
we are being spoon fed these lies, our own wealth is slipping away, along
with our quality of life and our personal freedom. Many Americans choose to
hitch their wagon to the American Corporate Empire's Star, hoping to have
some protection and some better quality of life. Like those Negros in
Slavery days, who licked the Massah's boots for a little better life in the
Big House, I understand what drives them.
But I can't sell my Soul to the Corporate Devil and Massah Greed.
Carl Jarvis
On 10/27/18, Miriam Vieni <miriamvieni@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The Khashoggi Affair and the Future of Saudi Arabia
October 25, 2018 . 71 Comments
If the Saudi power structure were to crumble in the wake of the
Khashoggi scandal there would be chaos at home and a shift in power
around the Gulf, says Daniel Lazare.
By Daniel Lazare
Special to Consortium News
If Donald Trump seems at a loss about how to respond to the Jamal
Khashoggi murder, it may not be because he's worried about his Saudi
business investments or any of the other things that Democrats like to
bring up to avoid talking about more serious topics. Rather, it's
likely because Trump may be facing one of the biggest U.S.
foreign-policy crises since the overthrow of the shah in 1979.
At that time the U.S. counted on support from Arab Gulf states no less
frightened by the Iranian revolution. That included Saddam Hussein's
Iraq, oil emirates Kuwait and Qatar, plus the Saudis themselves.
But if the Saudi power structure were ever to crumble in the wake of
the Khashoggi scandal, there would likely be chaos because there is no
alternative to replace it. The impact on the region would be significant.
With its 55-percent Shi'ite majority, Iraq is already in the Iranian
orbit after the U.S. overthrow of Saddam; Qatar and Oman are on
businesslike terms with Tehran, while Kuwait and the UAE could
possibly reach an accommodation with Teheran as well. The upshot would
be an immense power shift in which the Persian Gulf could revert to
being an Iranian lake. That's probably why the United States and
Israel will do everything in its power to prevent the House of Saud
from falling.
The consequences in terms of U.S. imperial interests would be nearly
incalculable. For decades, America has used the Gulf to shape and
direct its interests in the larger Eurasian economy. Thanks to
trillions of dollars in military investment, the Saudis control the
spigot through which roughly 24 percent of the world's daily oil
supply flows, much of it bound for such economic powerhouses as India,
China, South Korea, and Japan. Should control pass to someone else,
America would find its monopoly severely impaired. The effects would
also be felt in Syria, where Israel is incensed by the Iranian
presence. It would be even more so should the Saudi counterweight be
removed.
Expert consensus is that the regime is conservative,
consensus-oriented, and stable, and that all the king might have to do
ensure the regime's survival is to remove his son, Muhammad bin Salman
(MbS), as crown prince.
MbS: Are his days numbered?
However, the kingdom may be less stable than it appears. It was
already in trouble when MbS began his rise in early 2015. The second
generation of Al-Saud rulers appeared played out along with their economic
model.
Adjusted for inflation, oil prices had fallen two-thirds since the
2008 financial crisis while the kingdom was as dependent on oil as
ever despite forty years of lip service to the virtues of
diversification. Corruption was out of control while unemployment
continued to climb because young Saudis prefer to wait years for a
no-show government sinecure instead of taking a private-sector job in
which they might actually have to work. (Studies show that Saudi
government employees put in only an hour's worth of real labor per
day.)
Internationally, the country found itself facing growing headwinds as
Barack Obama firmed up his historic nuclear accord with Iran. Obama's
statement in April 2016 that Saudis needed to "share" the Middle East
with its arch-rival to the north would come as a blow to a family that
thought it could always count on unqualified U.S. support.
MbS' Trail of Disaster
Oil was supposed to keep Saudi Arabia rich and powerful, but instead
total reliance on it was threatening to eventually weaken it.
Something had to be done, and King Salman, although only
intermittently lucid, figured his 29-year-old son was the man. Shoving
rivals aside - most notably cousin Muhammad bin Nayef, the prince in
charge of combatting Al Qaeda - Muhammad bin Salman began grabbing the
reins and issuing orders.
The results have been disastrous. Within weeks of being named minister
of defense - his appointment as crown prince would take a few months
longer - MbS launched an air war on Yemen that would soon turn into a
classic quagmire, one that would cause as many as fifty thousand
combat deaths, propel much of the country to the brink of starvation,
and generate annual costs back home of $50 billion or more that the
kingdom could no longer afford.
In June 2017, bin Salman imposed a quarantine of Qatar on the grounds
of excessive cordiality with Iran and too close relations with the
Muslim Brotherhood, but he was taken aback when the emirate showed
that it could carry on despite the blockade. A few months later, MbS'
henchmen kidnapped Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and forced him
to read a resignation speech on Saudi TV. But Hariri repudiated the
speech as soon as he was back in Lebanon.
Every attempt to assert Saudi strength only underscored its growing
weakness. Bin Salman rounded up two hundred of the kingdom's richest
princes and businessmen last November, herded them into the Riyadh
Ritz-Carlton, and then, following beatings and torture, forced them to
hand over $100 billion or more.
Capital flight accelerated as a consequence while foreign direct
investment is now off eighty percent from 2016 levels. The crown
prince unveiled a series of grandiose vanity projects - an
entertainment park twice the size of Disneyworld, a $500-billion robot
city known as Neom, and a tourist park the size of Belgium - but then
had to put them on hold when his father blocked plans to privatize
five percent of Saudi Aramco, which he had been counting on as a
revenue source. He hiked gas prices by eighty percent and slapped on
a five-percent sales tax, but then went on a Marie Antoinette-style
spending spree, shelling out $550 million for a yacht,
$450
million for a painting, and $300 million for a French chateau.
Whatever the benefits of austerity, they were promptly undercut.
Now the torture, murder, and dismemberment of a dissident journalist
in Istanbul has made matters many times worse. With MbS persona non
grata across the globe, the kingdom's political and economic isolation
is as great as it has probably ever been. According to a report in
the Paris daily Le Figaro, moves have begun to replace MbS as crown
prince, second in line to the throne.
Salman with Trump: Who will replace him? (Official White House Photo
Shealah
Craighead)
An abundance of princely candidates compounds the confusion caused by
an unclear line of succession. Since Saudi kings have generally
claimed a right to choose their successors, it would be up to Salman
to appoint a replacement. So far, the rest of the family has been too
terrified to say otherwise. But if MbS departs the scene, factions
that suffered under his reign might grow bold enough to demand a say.
Since it is unclear what that would mean in an absolute monarchy, a
royal donnybrook could conceivably ensue.
Other forces might also weigh in. One is the military, which can't be
too happy now that Maj. Gen. Ahmed al-Assiri, a top intelligence
officer, is being set up as the fall guy in the Khashoggi affair.
Another is the Wahhabiyya, the ultra-conservative mullahs who have
allied themselves with the Al-Saud since the eighteenth-century, only
to see themselves shunted aside by a headstrong crown prince. MbS
seemed to go out of his way in recent months to stick it to the
mullahs. "No one can define Wahhabism," he said in an interview last
spring. "There is no Wahhabism. We don't believe we have Wahhabism."
Those are words that mullahs are not likely to forget, which is why
they will probably speak out if the question of a new crown prince is
raised.
The Extremist Threat
Then there is the threat of ISIS and Al Qaeda. After accusing Saudi
Arabia of "trying to secularize its inhabitants and ultimately destroy
Islam," Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Islamic State's self-proclaimed caliph,
launched an attack inside the kingdom in July that killed two people.
Al Qaeda, which also portrays itself as defender of the true Wahhabist
faith, has launched a similar campaign. Hamza bin Laden, Osama's son,
has released six videos denouncing the royal family as "agents of the
Americans," and called on "honest, glorious scholars . [to]
participate in promoting change with their tongues, their pens, their
media, and their tweets," and urging "youth and those capable of
fighting" to join the "mujahideen in Yemen."
Jihad abroad is a habit the Al-Saud can't kick. Since MbS launched his
ill-fated war on Yemen, Al-Qaeda's forces in that country have
mushroomed from near zero to an estimated four thousand fighters.
While its strength inside Saudi Arabia is unknown, there is no
question that the group continues to enjoy significant support.
According to a 2015 poll of Saudis between the ages of fifteen and
thirty-four, 28 percent say that groups like ISIS or Al Qaeda "are
mostly wrong, but sometimes raise issues I agree with," five percent
say "they are mostly right, but I disagree with some of their words
and actions," while ten percent say that "they are not a perversion at
all." Sympathy for such forces will likely grow as disorder mounts.
Disaffected royals thus demand political change along with angry
mullahs, obsessed jihadis, and millions of jobless young people. By
flooding Saudi Arabia with oil revenue and high-tech armaments and
allowing it to attack whomever it pleases, the U.S. has contributed to
an increasingly dangerous build-up of highly combustible forces.
Liberals may hope that a constitutional monarchy emerges out of the
current mess, but it's unlikely in the extreme. The Saudi crisis is likely
instead to intensify.
Daniel Lazare is the author of The Frozen Republic: How the
Constitution Is Paralyzing Democracy (Harcourt Brace, 1996) and other
books about American politics. He has written for a wide variety of
publications from The Nation to Le Monde Diplomatique and blogs about
the Constitution and related matters at Daniellazare.com.
