Michael:
Very good questions, in my view.
One possible answer is to look at those organizations that have survived
for a century or more and understand both the net common management style
and—particularly—why those who do not conform to the common mien have
succeeded.
I found understanding 3M very useful, for example, wrt imbedding innovation
in a corporate culture.
The other—obvious—observation is that in the long run all organizations are
run my average performers....
Bill
On Wed, Apr 8, 2020 at 12:54 PM Michael Clive <zeinin@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Anthony,
Those policies tend to always be the spoken rule at most places, but I
have seen them used in different ways. I have found there are environments
where there is a very steep political/personal cost to slowing things down
for safety reasons. I have also found there are places that have iron-clad
no-consequences implementations of that rule. XCOR comes to mind.
I would suspect that the Starship development group has a huge amount of
social pressure to not slow down the works, under any circumstances. I
would bet that someone knew this was a risk, but someone else in the
organization talked them out of reporting it, much like what happened with
the cone weld last time.
The cultural norm on Starship seems to be forward-at-any-cost, even if
forward is directly into a brick wall, and anyone who stands in the way of
progress could be seen as weak or not-a-team-player.
One of the biggest unsolved questions for me (my own personal Millennium
prize) is a management theory one: Obviously, SLS style management is a
complete failure in terms of productivity per unit time and per dollar
spent. SpaceX style management is vastly effective at reaching the goals
set by Elon, at significant cost to company culture. The question is: What
is the middle ground? How does a manager build a high performing company
that accomplishes great things with a low amount of chaos and waste? are
those mutually exclusive?
On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 5:52 PM Anthony Cesaroni <anthony@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Anyone on my crew can stop anything if they are uncomfortable with it and
will get my support if they make a mistake. We learn this way, while
improving safety and quality.
Anthony J. Cesaroni
President/CEO
Cesaroni Technology/Cesaroni Aerospace
http://www.cesaronitech.com/
(941) 360-3100 x101 Sarasota
(905) 887-2370 x222 Toronto
*From:* arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> *On
Behalf Of *William Claybaugh
*Sent:* Tuesday, April 7, 2020 8:44 PM
*To:* arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Subject:* [AR] Re: SpaceX Crumple Test
Anthony:
Spoken like a manager....
Bill
On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 6:37 PM Anthony Cesaroni <anthony@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Isn’t it better to review, interview the crew and identify why the error
occurred? That way, the team learns and if there was an individual
responsible for the error, that individual can recognize and preempt the
situation from occurring again. That, educates and reinforces the
engineering and test system. If it’s neglect, then that needs to be
identified and the team needs to understand why that happened as well, in
order to mitigate neglect going forward. Firing staff just causes people to
cover up and avoid responsibility in my experience.
Anthony J. Cesaroni
President/CEO
Cesaroni Technology/Cesaroni Aerospace
http://www.cesaronitech.com/
(941) 360-3100 x101 Sarasota
(905) 887-2370 x222 Toronto
*From:* arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> *On
Behalf Of *ken mason
*Sent:* Tuesday, April 7, 2020 8:18 PM
*To:* arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Subject:* [AR] Re: SpaceX Crumple Test
It's such a basic mistake that could get some one fired on the spot.
Should of been double checked with other engineers and/or a test
reediness review meeting..
But as they said, it's not a fundamental design error. So suspect it will
get done right the 2nd time. I recommend a high volume (Cv) remote sensing
dome loading regulator like a Grove Poweractor or Tescom.
On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 5:09 PM Jonathan Goff <jongoff@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I wonder how much of it was due to overworking their team. And I wonder
if they'll actually learn any lessons from that.
~Jon
On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 5:00 PM roxanna Mason <rocketmaster.ken@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
A rookie mistake from the world leader in launch vehicle design. It
happens and I won't throw the first rock.
Import thing is to learn from our mistakes.
On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 2:33 PM Bob Herguth <bob@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From the twitter feed.
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1246677676733104130
*From:* arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:arocket-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
*On Behalf Of *roxanna Mason
*Sent:* Tuesday, April 07, 2020 1:09 PM
*To:* arocket@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Subject:* [AR] Re: SpaceX Crumple Test
Giving Space X the benefit of the doubt/speculation, my money is on some
equipment or component failure even a ruptured line albeit such low
pressures.
Once again, a company that has the accomplishments that it has under
their belts, hard for me to believe it's something even I would of avoided,
with ease.
Maybe they'll tell us.
On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 12:05 PM Henry Vanderbilt <
hvanderbilt@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 4/7/2020 11:45 AM, roxanna Mason wrote:
Back to this whole thing about Space-X failing that SS tank makes no
sense, are they that incompetent? Even I would of know the
thermodynamic difference between GN2 and GHe. Just like my pulse jet
on GH2 draining a K bottle under 5 sec,it sails thru pipes and
regulators,i.e.The square root of the diff of the respective MW.
So it's git to be something else, I mean heck, they're orbiting
satellites and recovering boosters almost routinely! Maybe they're
farming out some of their testing workload to save time.
It's all speculation at this point. Worth throwing even the less likely
possibilities out there to see if they might fit what's known. The GN2
vs GHe thing was one such. Though, again, the most likely related fail
would not have been miscalculated plumbing feed capacity - as you've
pointed out, that is pretty basic - but rather a higher than expected
chill rate of GN2 across a thin stainless bulkhead. (Mind, that one
might have gotten them even on GHe, if for some reason they assumed some
interval during which they wouldn't need to make up pressure.)
Simplest explanation is still either a test configuration error or a
test hardware failure causing under-pressurization of the tank that
crumpled. Either way, it's likely a simple fix-it-and-move-on thing.
Those few of us who care may well see the point casually mentioned in
another context six months from now. The rest of the world will sail on
regardless.
Henry
