"The term 'District Courts of the United States' as used in the rules
without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic
significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under Article
3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are Legislative Courts,
properly speaking, and are not district courts of the United States. We
have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar
to that vested in the district courts of the United States (98 U.S. 145)
does not make it a 'District Court of the United States'. "Not only did the
promulgating order use the term District Courts of the United States in its
historic and proper sense, but the omission of provision for the
application of the rules the territorial court and other courts mentioned
in the authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended."
Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201...Nguyen v.
United States, 539 U.S. 69...In light of this Court’s conclusion in Nunez
that the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial officer without
statutory authority violated the “[p]rocedural safeguards * * *
guarantee[ing] ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects[,]’” Nunez, 634 A.2d at 1171 (quoting U.S.
Const., Amend. IV), here, the state has not met its burden to show that
suppression is not required—particularly where this Court has declared that
wiretap orders must be held to a higher standard of protection.10 See
Luther, 116 R.I. at 29, 351 A.2d at 595. Therefore, the wiretap orders at
issue here were constitutionally insufficient, and the evidence was
unlawfully intercepted. We have held that the wiretap act “require[s] the
suppression of evidence that has been ‘unlawfully intercepted[.]’” Maloof,
114 R.I. at 386, 333 A.2d at 679 (emphasis added). We now hold that a
wiretap order that is issued by a judicial officer without statutory
authority results in an invalid order that is void ab initio,
see Nunez, 634 A.2d at 1170, 1171, and its use to garner wire, electronic,
or oral communications results in unlawfully intercepted evidence that must
be 10 Further, “it is the responsibility of those who must prepare the
authorization orders for which they seek court approval to ‘approach their
task with both the pertinent statute book before them and the desire for an
exacting standard of precision.’” State v. Sitko, 460 A.2d 1, 6 (R.I. 1983)
(quoting State v. Luther, 116 R.I. 28, 30, 351 A.2d 594, 595 (1976)). - 26
- suppressed. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 528; see also Maloof, 114 R.I. at
386-87, 333 A.2d at 679. Thus, we conclude that the evidence in the cases
at bar requires suppression. Although the state asserts that Justice
Thunberg had de facto, if not de jure, authority to issue the wiretap
orders, we decline to apply these doctrines to a judicial officer acting
without authority, particularly under the facts of these appeals. First,
having determined that, under the wiretap act, only the presiding justice
and senior associate justice have been vested with the authority to receive
applications and issue wiretap orders, there was no de jure authority for
Justice Thunberg, or any other associate justice, to perform these duties.
See Nunez, 634 A.2d at 1169, 1170 (determining that the retired judge was
not acting in a capacity allowed under statute and, thus, lacked de jure
authority). Second, the de facto authority theory is wholly inapplicable
here. There can be no color of authority, either “of title or on possession
of any office as acquiesced in by the public[,]” id. at 1170 (quoting Apice
v. American Woolen Co., Inc., 74 R.I. 425, 435, 60 A.2d 865, 870 (1948)),
when the Presiding Justice actively held the official office and Justice
Krause was designated, per administrative order, as the acting presiding
justice for all duties prescribed to that office. See Nguyen v. United
States, 539 U.S. 69, 77, 78, 79 (2003) (considering the distinction between
a va
lid act of a judge with de facto authority where there was a “‘merely
technical’ defect of - 27 - statutory authority[,]” and an invalid act
which could not have been taken). We decline to venture any further into
this theory. Accordingly, in the face of invalid wiretap orders,
suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy. Consequently, there
was no error in the trial justice’s finding that the evidence derived from
the invalid wiretap orders must be suppressed. C The Good-Faith Exception
Alternatively, the state asks this Court to adopt the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule as provided for in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984). In Leon, the United States Supreme Court created an exception
to the exclusionary rule “when an officer acting with objective good faith
has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within
its scope.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court,
however, recognized that “[t]he Fourth Amendment contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands,” and the exclusionary rule “thus operates as ‘a judicially
created remedy[.]’” Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974)). - 28 - We are hard-pressed to conceive that a
judicially-created exception to a judicially-created exclusionary rule,
such as the Leon good-faith rule, is applicable to the strict statutory
mandates under review in these cases. First, it is unlawful to intercept
wire, oral, or electronic communications unless specifically allowed in the
statute, and, second, the use of evidence obtained in violation of its
commands is expressly prohibited. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (declaring the
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communication unlawful “[e]xcept
as otherwise specifically provided” under the federal wiretap act); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (prohibiting use of evidence that violates the
federal wiretap act); Luther, 116 R.I. at 29, 351 A.
2d at 595 (establishing that the state wiretap act is intended to provide
“a higher standard of protection to our citizens than might otherwise be
afforded under the [F]ourth [A]mendment”). Thus, we find no reason to
deviate from our jurisprudence, and we “decline to consider whether we
shall adopt the ‘good faith exception’ rule propounded in [Leon].” Nunez,
634 A.2d at 1171. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order
of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motion to suppress. The
papers in these consolidated cases shall be returned to the Superior Court
for further proceedings. State v. Deric S. McGuire, 19-324, 326, 328, 329,
330, 333, 334, 335, 336, 344, 345, 346, 349, 352, 354, 355, 358, 361, 363
(R.I. 2022) (May 5th, 2022)
The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not apply where a lower
court is compelled to apply the precedent of a higher court. See 20
Am.Jur.2d Courts § 183 (1965)...howlett v rose 496 u.s 356...20 We conclude
that Delaware has a legitimate interest in allowing its corporations to
include FFP’s in their certificates of incorporation, and that any burden
on interstate commerce from the inclusion of an FFP does not exceed the
benefits provided by the statute. 2. Supremacy Clause a. Additional
Background The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution states
that federal laws are the “supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.” (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.)
Under the Supremacy Clause, “[a] state may not discriminate against rights
arising under federal laws.” (McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. (1934)
292 U.S. 230, 234.) The Supremacy Clause prohibits states from
“dissociat[ing] themselves from federal law because of disagreement with
its content,” and from refusing to allow state court jurisdiction over
federal claims while permitting state court jurisdiction over “similar
state-law actions.” (Howlett By and Through Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S.
356, 371, 378 (Howlett).) In Howlett, the United States Supreme Court
reversed a Florida state court judgment that dismissed a suit brought under
42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983), a statute that provides
a remedy when federal rights are violated by state government employees and
others “acting under color of state law.” (Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at p.
358.) The Florida state court dismissed a former student’s claim against a
school board on the basis of a state-law defense of “sovereign immunity,”
even though that defense would not have been available if the student had
brought the claim in federal court. (Id. at p. 359.) The United States
Supreme Court explained that “[f]ede
ral law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, 21
such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations” and
that the state court’s interpretation of Florida law “would make all such
defendants absolutely immune from liability under the federal statute.”
(Id. at p. 377.) If Florida’s law of sovereign immunity “reflect[ed] a
substantive disagreement with the extent to which governmental entities
should be held liable for their constitutional violations, that
disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law.” (Id. at pp.
377-378.) Nor could Florida simply exclude section 1983 claims from the
types of tort claims that the state court could hear against a school
board. That would be discriminatory, because the state exercised
jurisdiction over tort claims against school boards “of the size and type
of [the student’s] claim here, and it can enter judgment against them.”
(Id. at p. 378.) Here, as we have stated, Delaware law authorizes, but does
not require, Delaware corporations to adopt forum selection clauses
requiring 1933 Act claims to be brought in federal court. (Del. Code Ann.,
tit. 8, § 102, subd. (b)(1); Salzberg, supra, 227 A.3d at pp. 113-114.)
However, as we explain further below, Delaware law does not allow Delaware
corporations to adopt forum selection clauses that exclude Delaware state
court as a forum for “internal corporate claims,” which is a defined term.
(Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 115 (section 115).) Seeking an opening for his
Supremacy Clause claim, Wong contends that there are state law securities
claims that are “internal corporate claims” similar to 1933 Act claims. We
understand Wong to be arguing that the Delaware statutory scheme that
permits FFP’s is unconstitutional because it protects state court
jurisdiction (in Delaware) for those state law securities claims, but fails
to protect state court jurisdiction (in Delaware or any other state) for
similar federal claims, thus discriminating against fed
eral law in 22 favor of state law in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
And, Wong argues, because the statutory scheme that allows the creation of
the FFP is unconstitutional, the FFP is unenforceable. Wong v. Restoration
Robotics, A161489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (April 28th, 2022)
2(a). That takes us to Mt. Pleasant's § 1983 claim against Greene County.
One aspect of that claim challenges the purported arbitrary enforcement of
§ 3.9.8 against Mt. Pleasant. Mt. Pleasant grounds that theory in both
substantive due process and equal protection principles. When a plaintiff
asserts a § 1983 claim against a municipality, commonly known as a Monell
claim, the plaintiff must prove both that (1) it "suffered a constitutional
violation" and (2) "a municipal policy or custom directly caused the
violation." Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017);
see also Winkler v. Madison County, 893 F.3d 877, 901 (6th Cir. 2018)
(listing the four ways by which a plaintiff can prove a municipality had a
"policy or custom" that directly caused a constitutional violation). MT.
PLEASANT BLACKTOPPING COMPANY v. GREENE COUNTY No. 21-3684 (United States
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit) (May 2, 2022)
revan-bennett act 2017 public law 53-1 sec 4...Justice KENNEDY delivered
the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-B, concluding:
1. The limited reach of the Bivens action informs the decision whether an
implied damages remedy should be recognized here. Pp. 1854-1859.
(a) In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress provided a specific damages remedy for
plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by state officials,
but Congress provided no corresponding remedy for constitutional violations
by agents of the Federal Government. In 1971, and against this background,
this Court recognized in Bivens an implied damages action to compensate
persons injured by federal officers who violated the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the following
decade, the Court allowed Bivens-type remedies twice more, in a Fifth
Amendment gender-discrimination case, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99
S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846, and in an Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause case, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64
L.Ed.2d 15. These are the only cases in which the Court has approved of an
implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself. Pp. 1854 — 1855.
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 - Supreme Court 2017 (June 19, 2017)
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court:
The question presented is whether 42 U. S. C. § 1988 allows attorney's fees
to be recovered from a governmental entity when a plaintiff sues
governmental employees only in their personal capacities and prevails..II
This case requires us to unravel once again the distinctions between
personal- and official-capacity suits, see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464
(1985), this time in the context of fee awards under 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
The relevant portion of § 1988, enacted as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, provides:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs" (emphasis added).
*164 If a plaintiff prevails in a suit covered by § 1988, fees should be
awarded as costs "unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust." S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976); see Supreme Court of Virginia v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 737 (1980). Section
1988 does not in so many words define the parties who must bear these
costs. Nonetheless, it is clear that the logical place to look for recovery
of fees is to the losing party — the party legally responsible for relief
on the merits. That is the party who must pay the costs of the litigation,
see generally Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(d),[7] and it is clearly the party
who should also bear fee liability under § 1988..A
Proper application of this principle in damages actions against public
officials requires careful adherence to the distinction between personal-
and official-capacity suits.[10] Because this distinction apparently
continues to confuse lawyers and confound lower courts, we attempt to
define it more clearly through concrete e
xamples of the practical and doctrinal differences between personal- and
official-capacity actions.
Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law. See, e.g., Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237-238 (1974). Official-capacity suits, in
contrast, "generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 690, n. 55 *166 (1978). As long as
the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity. Brandon, 469 U. S., at 471-472. It is not a
suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the
entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal
capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a
plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity
suit must look to the government entity itself.[11]
On the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is
enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused
the deprivation of a federal right. See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S.
167 (1961). More is required in an official-capacity action, however, for a
governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself is a
" `moving force' " behind the deprivation, Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S.
312, 326 (1981) (quoting Monell, supra, at 694); thus, in an
official-capacity suit the entity's "policy or custom" must have played a
part in the violation of federal law. Monell, supra; Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 817-818 (1985); id., at 827-828 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in judgment).[12] When it comes to defenses to liability, an
official in a personal-capacity action may, depending on his position, be
able to assert
personal immunity defenses, such *167 as objectively reasonable reliance on
existing law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (absolute
immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) (same); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity); Wood v. Strickland,
420 U. S. 308 (1975) (same). In an official-capacity action, these defenses
are unavailable. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980); see
also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464 (1985).[13] The only immunities that
can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign
immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh
Amendment. While not exhaustive, this list illustrates the basic
distinction between personal- and official-capacity actions.[14]
With this distinction in mind, it is clear that a suit against a government
official in his or her personal capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee
liability upon the governmental entity. A victory in a personal-capacity
action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than against
the *168 entity that employs him. Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action
is asserted against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to a
personal-capacity lawsuit and has no opportunity to present a defense. That
a plaintiff has prevailed against one party does not entitle him to fees
from another party, let alone from a nonparty. Cf. Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U. S. 424 (1983). Yet that would be the result were we to hold that
fees can be recovered from a governmental entity following victory in a
personal-capacity action against government officials..IV
Despite the Court of Appeals' contrary view, the result we reach today is
fully consistent with Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978). Hutto holds
only that, when a State in a § 1983 action has been prevailed against for
relief on the merits, either because the State was a proper party defendant
or because state officials properly were sued in t
heir official capacity, fees may also be available from the State under §
1988. Hutto does not alter the basic philosophy of *171 § 1988, namely,
that fee and merits liability run together. As a result, Hutto neither
holds nor suggests that fees are available from a governmental entity
simply because a government official has been prevailed against in his or
her personal capacity.
Respondents vigorously protest that this holding will "effectively
destro[y]" § 1988 in cases such as this one. Brief for Respondents 19. This
fear is overstated. Fees are unavailable only where a governmental entity
cannot be held liable on the merits; today we simply apply the fee-shifting
provisions of § 1988 against a pre-existing background of substantive
liability rules.
V
Only in an official-capacity action is a plaintiff who prevails entitled to
look for relief, both on the merits and for fees, to the governmental
entity. Because the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions required this case
to be litigated as a personal-capacity action, the award of fees against
the Commonwealth of Kentucky must be reversed.
It is so ordered. Kentucky v. Graham 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (June 28, 1985)
JOHNSON, Justice (the supreme Court of the United States) delivered the
opinion of the court: By making the note negotiable at the Bank of
Columbia, the debtor chose his own jurisdiction; in consideration of the
credit given him, he voluntarily relinquished his claims to the ordinary
administration of justice, and placed himself only in the situation of an
hypothecater of goods, with power to sell on default, or a stipulator in
the admiralty, whose voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of that court
subjects him to personal coercion BANK OF COLUMBIA v. OKELY, 17 U.S. 235
(1819)...Justice Souter, delivered the opinion of the Court: B
Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have understood
the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary action:
"The principal and true meaning of the phrase has never been more tersely
or accurately stated than by Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 4 Wheat. 235-244 [(1819)]: `As to the words from Magna Charta,
incorporated into the Constitution of Maryland, after volumes spoken and
written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at
last settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private right and distributive justice.' "
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884) County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 US 833...The limitations on the government's right to dismiss a
qui tam suit also would include instances in which the dismissal would be
"arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (quoting Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261
(1992)). Government action is "arbitrary in the constitutional sense" when
it "violate[s] a right otherwise protected by the substantive Due Process
Clause" and "shock[s] the con
science," Martínez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 64 (1st Cir. 2010), or when
government officials abuse their power and "employ[ ] it as an instrument
of oppression" to the extent that it "shocks the conscience," Lewis, 523
U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 126, 112 S.Ct.
1061)..In summary, the § 3730(c)(2)(A) hearing has two purposes: (1)
providing an opportunity for the relator to attempt to convince the
government to withdraw its motion to dismiss; (2) allowing the court to
assess any claim by the relator that, in seeking dismissal, the government
is transgressing constitutional limitations or perpetrating a fraud on the
court. If the relator seeks discovery to support his claim of impropriety
by the government, the court may grant the request only if the relator
makes the substantial threshold showing noted above. Because the
circumstances leading to a finding that the government is transgressing
constitutional limits or committing a fraud on the court are necessarily
case-specific, we leave further elaboration of these concepts to future
cases. Such circumstances may only *45 rarely be presented when the
government moves to dismiss a qui tam suit. Nonetheless, the §
3730(c)(2)(A) hearing is a meaningful opportunity for the relator to
challenge the government's motion on the grounds we have identified.[10]
See CIMZNHCA, 970 F.3d at 853 ("Whenever a party has the right to invoke
the court's aid, it has the obligation to do so with at least a
non-frivolous expectation of relief under the governing substantive law.
That is not always possible, but that does not make the right meaningless."
(citation omitted)). Borzilleri v. BAYER 24 F.4th 32 (2022) (January 21,
2022)
COX, Chief Justice (Supreme Court of Indiana): A "Constitution" is
legislation direct from the people acting in their sovereign capacity,
while a "statute" is legislation from their representatives, subject to
limitations prescribed by the superior authority. People v. May, 3 Mich.
598. [***] The Legislature, acting outside of the Constitution, is without
jurisdiction and its action null." ELLINGHAM v. DYE et al, 178 Ind. 336
(1912)...GILKISON, J. We have heretofore said:
"These provisions of the Constitution are a part of the fundamental law of
the state, declared by the people themselves acting in their sovereign
capacity. Ellingham v. Dye (1913), 178 Ind. 336. 99 N.E. 1, Am. Cas. 1915 C
200. As such they are entitled to strict construction. Lafayette, Muncie
and Bloomington R.R. Co. v. Geiger (1870), 34 Ind. 185. It has been said
that the language *33 of each provision of the Constitution is to be
considered as though every word had been hammered into place. State ex rel.
Hovey v. Noble (1888), 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244." Warren v. Indiana
Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 101, 26 N.E.2d 399. Hillman v. State,
123 NE 2d 180 (December 14, 1954)...Opinion by Justice Goff:..As we've said
before, "[t]he separation of powers provision exists not only to protect
the integrity of each branch of government, but also to permit each branch
to serve as an effective check on the other two." State v. Monfort, 723
N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ind. 2000). See also Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 589
n.4 (Ind. 2019) (noting that separation of powers "works both ways" in
terms of restraint and action). Thus, "in exercising the judicial function
of government," the judiciary has the power and "the inevasible duty" in
cases such as these "to declare legislative enactments void when that body
has, in such an enactment, gone beyond or outside of the power granted to
it." Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, 387, 391, 99 N.E. 1, 19, 21
(1912). Accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78, 2 L.Ed.
60 (1803) (noting that the federal legislature's powers are limited by the
United States Constitution, "that an act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution, is void," and that the judiciary has an obligation in
cases and controversies before it to declare unconstitutional laws as
such). In fact, the ability of an independent judiciary to check the other
branches and declare statutes unconstitutional "was one of the central
principles underlying the thinking of the framers of the Indiana
Constitution and also the Constitution of the United States." Monfort, 723
N.E.2d at 413 (relying on The Federalist No. 78, at 426, 428-29 (E.H. Scott
ed., 1894), and Noble Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172,
181-82, 125 N.E.2d 709, 714 (1955)). And the ability of the judiciary to
enforce separation of powers by checking the other branches is even more
important in a case—such as this one—where a party alleges that a statute
is unconstitutional special legislation because preventing special
legislation "was the most potent argument" for adopting our current
Constitution. See Herman & Kittle Props., Inc., 119 N.E.3d at 80. Cf.
Berry, 990 N.E.2d at 416-17 (relying on cases from other jurisdictions
finding questions to be justiciable when legislative power granted in a
constitution —as relevant here, the power to legislate —is limited by other
constitutional provisions—as relevant here, a limitation on special laws).
Holcomb v. City of Bloomington, 158 NE 3d 1250 (December 15, 2020)
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court:..A liberty
interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees
implicit in the word "liberty," see, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480,
493-494 (1980) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary psychiatric
treatment and transfer to mental institution), or it may arise from an
expectation or interest created by state laws or poli
cies, see, e. g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556-558 (1974)
(liberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of
good-time credits) We have held that the Constitution itself does not give
rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions
of confinement. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215, 225 (1976) (no liberty
interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low- to
maximum-security *222 prison because "[c]onfinement in any of the State's
institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the
conviction has authorized the State to impose"). We have also held,
however, that a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of
confinement may arise from state policies or regulations, subject to the
important limitations set forth in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472 (1995).
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 US 209 (June 13, 2005)...Justice SOTOMAYOR
respecting the denial of certiorari:..Judge Jenny Rivera's dissent below
ably explains how New York's policies as applied to people like Ortiz raise
constitutional concerns.[3] People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, 36
N.Y.3d 187, 207, 140 N.Y.S.3d 124, 139, 163 N.E.3d 1041, 1056 (2020).
Although individuals generally do not have a protected liberty interest in
conditional release before expiration of their sentences, such an interest
"may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or
policies." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162
L.Ed.2d 174 (2005); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484, 115
S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) ("States may under certain circumstances
create liberty interests ... protected by the Due Process Clause"). Here,
New York law provides that a defendant "shall ... be conditionally
released" once he earns sufficient credits, as Ortiz did. N. Y. Penal Law
Ann. § 70.40 (West 2021). As a New York City resident, Ortiz also enjoyed a
right to "shelter and board [for] each homeless m
an who applies for it." Callahan v. Carey, 307 App.Div.2d 150, 151, 762
N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (2003). In my view, under these New York state and city
policies, Ortiz may well have held a liberty interest at the point that he
became entitled to conditional release. At the very least, however, Ortiz
indisputably held a liberty interest in his release at the expiration of
his full sentence. Ortiz v. Breslin, 142 S. Ct. 914 (February 22, 2022)
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J. DECISION EN BANC:..B. Is There a Liberty Interest
in the Reagan Tokes Law? {¶ 134} A "liberty interest may arise from the
Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word
`liberty'" or "from an expectation or interest created by state laws or
policies * * *." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384,
162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005), citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-494, 100
S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (liberty interest in avoiding involuntary
psychiatric treatment) and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-556, 94
S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (liberty interest in avoiding the
withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits). To analyze
whether there is a liberty interest in the Reagan Tokes Law, I look first
to United States Supreme Court authority, then to Ohio law for guidance.
State v. Delvallie 2022 Ohio 470 (February 17, 2022)
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-B:..B
The District Court was also correct in holding that independently of §
83-180(1), the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital
must be accompanied by appropriate procedural protections. The issue is
whether after a conviction for robbery, Jones retained a residuum of
liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital without
complying with minimum requirements of due process.
We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental
hospital produces "a massive curtailment of liberty," Humphrey v. Cady, 405
U. S. 504, 509 (1972), and in *492 consequence "requires due process
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 580 (1975) (BURGER, C. J., concurring). The loss
of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of
freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental
hospital "can eng
ender adverse social consequences to the individual" and that "[w]hether we
label this phenomena `stigma' or choose to call it something else . . . we
recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact
on the individual." Addington v. Texas, supra, at 425-426. See also Parham
v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 600 (1979). Also, "[a]mong the historic liberties"
protected by the Due Process Clause is the "right to be free from, and to
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977). Compelled treatment in the
form of mandatory behavior modification programs, to which the District
Court found Jones was exposed in this case, was a proper factor to be
weighed by the District Court. Cf. Addington v. Texas, supra, at 427.
The District Court, in its findings, was sensitive to these concerns:
"[T]he fact of greater limitations on freedom of action at the Lincoln
Regional Center, the fact that a transfer to the Lincoln Regional Center
has some stigmatizing consequences, and the fact that additional mandatory
behavior modification systems are used at the Lincoln Regional Center
combine to make the transfer a `major change in the conditions of
confinement' amounting to a `grievous loss' to the inmate." Miller v.
Vitek, 437 F. Supp., at 573.
Were an ordinary citizen to be subjected involuntarily to these
consequences, it is undeniable that protected liberty interests would be
unconstitutionally infringed absent compliance with the procedures required
by the Due Process Clause. *493 We conclude that a convicted felon also is
entitled to the benefit of procedures appropriate in the circumstances
before he is found to have a mental disease and transferred to a mental
hospital. Vitek v. Jones, 445 US 480 (March 25, 1980)...HAMPSON, Judge: II.
Conclusion
¶ 73 The process of involuntary commitment necessarily involves "a massive
curtailment of liberty." Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct.
1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972). "Whether the individual is mentally ill and
dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy
turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert
psychiatrists and psychologists." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99
S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). "The medical nature of the inquiry,
however, does not justify dispensing with due process requirements[,]" as
"[i]t is precisely the subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnoses that
justify the requirement of adversary hearings." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 495, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980) (citation, internal
quotation marks, and alteration in original omitted). MATTER OF CG, 863 SE
2d 237 (July 20, 2021)...JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the
court, with opinion:¶ 25 The administration of involuntary mental health
services entails a "`massive curtailment of liberty.'"
In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 496 (1998) (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 491 (1980)); see also In re Torry G., 2014 IL App (1st) 130709, ¶
31 ("Autonomous decisionmaking in matters affecting the body and mind is
one of the most valued liberties in a civilized society." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). When the State seeks to forcibly administer
psychotropic medication to an individual, the interference with the
individual's liberty is "`particularly severe.'" In re Robert S., 213 Ill.
2d 30, 46 (2004) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992)).
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), a mentally ill person has a
liberty interest to refuse medical treatment, including the administration
of psychotropic medications. In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 213 (1994).
However, this liberty interest is balanced against the State's legitimate
parens patriae interest in furthering the treatment of a mentally ill
person who lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning his or
her need for such medication. IN RE MARCUS S., 2022 IL App (3d) 170014
(January 18, 2022)
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