--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Martin N Brampton <martin.lists > > Isn't the problem the question of whether any kind of negation sign > could be said to be a picture of anything? > Yes, but as I suggested in my reply to Anscombe, I don't see what strictly prohibits it. For example, if the two fencing stick figures means that the Joneses have separated, in answer to your question "So, have they??" a picture of the twain with their swords on the ground might mean that they have not. In my view the picture theory breaks down because "picture" is as malleable as "game." This "non-impossibility" seems to me to be in line with pretty much everything you've written in your last several posts, which I generally agree with. It also suggests that we two (and Neil as well, as I read him) agree with many of W's own later criticisms of the Tractatus. One thing I do want to ask you, though, is why you say that W is thought to deny that there are logical truths. His position in the Tractatus seems rather to be that every necessary truth must be a tautology (and he struggles with those statements like, "If this is green it is not red." which seem not to be empirical, but which can't easily be analyzed into a "p v -p" form. Walto