[Wittrs] Re: The Self-Refuting Argument
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 12:52:24 -0000
Joseph Polanik wrote:
Cayuse wrote:
Any claim for metaphysical solipsism is a claim to know that there is
nothing beyond the immediate data of experience, and my argument is
that such a claim is unsupportable.
the question is whether or not you reject solipsism *despite* being
unable to prove that it is false as a matter of logical necessity.
I neither accept it nor reject it -- it is of no concern to me.
Since conscious experience does not appear as a process or as
an object *within* conscious experience (i.e. within Nagel's "what it
is like"), the idea that there are other consciousnesses is a product
of the imagination rather than a matter of immediate experience.
you are avoiding the question.
What question?
the postulate (that there are other consciousnesses outside the data
of immediate experience) is itself experienced; and, the postulate
(that there are no other consciousnesses outside the data of immediate
experience) is itself experienced.
so, what?
There can be no empirical evidence either way, so this is not
an issue that can be addressed by the methodologies of science.
the point is that virtually everyone on the planet makes one of these
postulates.
I accept the first postulate as true even though it is a
metaphenomenal claim; namely, that there are other consciousness
besides me in the world.
the question is whether you make one of these two postulates; and, if
so, which one.
Holding the picture that other people are accompanied
by other consciousnesses is not a choice I make,
but a default condition (PI 425).
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