[Wittrs] Re: The Epiphenomenalism of Dennett-Consistent Philosophies of Consciousness
- From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 21:50:51 -0000
Justin,
The problem with this argument is that, were it valid, it would prove too much.
The periodicity of the elements cannot be derived entirely from principles of
physics. We can make some generalizations and point to various facts of
physics that would account for this periodocity, but we can't get to the
periodicity from physics.
Does this prove that chemical reactions aren't physical processes?
They aren't processes described by physics. But they are physical processes.
And this helps to pinpoint one flaw in your argument: 1a-1c involve an
equivocation in the use of "physical".
JPDeMouy
PS I'm not really a partisan in these discussions but I wanted to comment on
the argument on its own terms.
> 1a) We have agreed to describe my awareness as physical.
> 1b) It is the job of physics to describe what we agree to call
> physical.
> 1c) Therefore physics should describe my awareness.
>
> 2a) A description of the motion of particles is not a description of
> awareness.
> 2b) Physics is only a description of the motion of particles. (Using a
> version of classical physics as a first order approximation)
> 2c) Therefore physics does not describe my awareness.
>
> 1c) Physics should describe my awareness
> 2c) Physics does not describe my awareness
> 3c) Physics needs to be modified to include a description of
> awareness.
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