[Wittrs] Re: Original and derived intentionality
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 04 Nov 2009 01:09:40 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
<snip>
> . . . you want to "account for intentionality." And by
> account, I take you to mean to point out the brain mechanism that are
> part and parcel of intentional act. So you write..
>
> > this could be accounted for via a system of linked associations that
> includes
> > a multi-layer complex of representational networks.
>
> about which neurology has more to say day by day, but, I'm afraid
> without clarifying the relationship between the brain and the person,
> e.g., "these are the networks that allow a person to act intentionally."
>
The relationship? The brain is the source of those features we recognize as
having a mind, being conscious that we count as constitutive of personhood in
the human way. Each person is said to have a brain though he or she is not
typically said to own it though, under certain circumstances, it might make
sense to say that, too. Do we own our other organs? Can we decide while alive
how we would like to see them disposed of when we die? Can we refuse to give up
a kidney or some other organ we could conceivably spare and still live if we
want to? These are characteristics of owning so in some sense we can be said to
own our organs and in that sense we might say we own our brains.
My sister once took me to task for speaking of "my dog" about a pet I had. She
said why do you put it that way? Isn't that chauvinist, as though you are
claiming ownership. I replied that I considered her "my sister" but that that
didn't mean I was claiming ownership of her. Words are used in lots of ways, of
course. But certainly one of the relationships we can be said to have with our
brains is possession. Nevertheless, that doesn't seem to mean much in the
context of the issue we're still gnawing over, does it?
> In other words, if our account of intentionality is the firing of
> multi-layer complex of representational networks then the person is
> superfluous.
That's absurd, actually. Who says that and how can you justify such a claim?
Whatever we are we are the result of something. Assuming it's some kind of
complex physical system how can that possibly make "the person superfluous"?
What can it mean for the person to be superfluous in this context anyway?
> But now we have a brain that is intentional and have
> returned to a vitalistic biology.
>
> bruce
>
>
How? What's the basis for that assertion? What, indeed, has vitalism to do with
any of what I've said?
SWM
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