[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's Intentional Stance
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 20 Jan 2010 17:26:34 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
>
>
> There is nothing in that 1983 book to remove the mystery that Searle
> created in his 1980 Chinese Room argument, where he gave magical
> properties to intentionality.
I would say he gave magical properties (I prefer to say "privilege")
to humans. Searle does allow intentionality to computers (and all
things) by attribution, very much like Dennett. But for Dennett the
attribution *is* the intentionality. For Searle, the intentionality,
original or derived, is real - reified, if you will, hypostatized,
but the derived variety is created only by the privileged humans, and
there is not a hint of explanation of where the human, original,
privileged version comes from. Oh, it comes from being biological,
from some undiscovered inherent physical property of the brain, or
whatnot, but those are totally speculative, at best, place-holders
or functionalist explanations like those for computation that Searle
savages (rightly).
My point, should I have one, is that I rather favor the Searle view,
that intentionality is really something beyond an attribution.
In fact, it only now occurs to me, that Searle does offer his own
purely attributional story in his Wordstar parable. He makes it out
to be absurd, does he not?
Josh
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