[Wittrs] [C] Re: Wittgenstein's Way
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 01 Nov 2009 06:16:34 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > There is "caused" and "caused".
>
> Yes. The word alone can mean this or that. Let's look closely.
>
> > That our brains cause our consciousness (the occurrence of minds)
> doesn't mean that minds don't think, have motives
>
> Right. If by cause you mean a condition.
I don't. I mean cause as distinct from condition. Here are definitions from
Merriam-Webster sourced on-line:
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/condition
Main Entry: con·di·tion
Pronunciation: \kən-ˈdi-shən\
Function: noun
2 : something essential to the appearance or occurrence of something else :
prerequisite: as a : an environmental requirement <available oxygen is an
essential condition for animal life> b : the subordinate clause of a
conditional sentence
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cause
Main Entry: 1cause
Pronunciation: \ˈkȯz\
Function: noun
1 a : a reason for an action or condition : motive b : something that brings
about an effect or a result c : a person or thing that is the occasion of an
action or state; especially : an agent that brings something about
While it is a condition for an organism to have a mind that it also have a
brain (or an equivalent) as far as we know, That condition is causal in form,
i.e, having a brain alone doesn't suffice. A brain may be damaged or
insufficiently developed, etc. Moreover, a having brain is not like having
oxygen, also a condition for having a mind by the way. Being a condition is
not, by itself, causal though being causal may imply that it is also a
condition.
> The alarm causes me to wake up.
> Causes me to be conscious.
Only in one sense of "causes" and one sense of "conscious" (especially in only
one sense of "conscious")! After all having a working brain may also just mean
you are dreaming before you "wake up" thanks to the alarm clock! A rock isn't
going to wake up from the alarm clock.
> And then I decide whether to hit the snooze,
> etc, all volitional.
Does the brain decide to "hit the snooze" in order not to be conscious? (Isn't
this, once again, the endless argument that continues to hold you in thrall?)
> Now we have two choices, and this is the B/M
> problem you want to avoid.
>
The "B/M problem" is your problem. I have already avoided it. That you can't
doesn't mean others can't.
> If all of my behavior upon waking is causal
There are different senses of "causal". Failing to distinguish them (and use
the right ones in the right circumstances) keeps you stuck in your favorite
problem.
> then I'm a machine
Well you ARE, in one sense. Otherwise where's that ghost in the machine you
are, the one you say you don't believe in and yet constantly invoke in an
effort to claim you aren't machine-like. You say you aren't a dualist yet
constantly proclaim the mind-body problem which is, as it happens, the
expression of dualism in this matter (i.e., there are minds and bodies and
explaining how they intersect and interact is difficult because they are so
utterly different -- but are they really?).
>and my
> motives are no ones because I don't exist except as something you choose
> to name "Bruce."
As far as I know, I had nothing to do with naming you! I do choose to refer to
you as "Bruce" but only because you have named yourself (assuming you grant
that it's intelligible to speak of being a self!) that.
> But this Bruce can have no life of his own. All Bruce
> can be is your description of him.
I consider you more than a figment of my imagination, even if we have never
met. But what has that to do with the question we have been endlessly debating
here, to wit, whether you are a brain AND something else called a mind (or, as
you once put it, a "spirit') or whether you are a body, including a brain that
causes your consciousness and all the stuff associated with being the subject
named "Bruce"?
> Then again, SWM doesn't exist, as a
> person, just a machine making sounds.
>
Could be but then that would be a strange solipsistic way of dealing with the
posts on this list!
> Or if a causal event leads to purposive behavior then we have explain
> the crossing over from causal to volitional.
>
Some causes are a matter of motive, of choice by a subject, and some causes are
simply physical phenomena. And, of course, there are ranges of meaning within
both categories.
> Again, its not the way you choose to use cause but they way you use it
> to deny agency and purpose,
That's in your mind. I have never denied agency and purpose and nothing I've
said implies its denial.
> in order to cleave to your
> physical/mechanical thought and then attribute agency when suits you. As
> in this remark
>
> > We don't infer smiles, we see them and recognize them!
>
> Now we are an active agent that makes sense out of the world. You didn't
> write "recognition" is caused.
After everything else I have been saying, why would I have to? Of course
recognition is caused -- by the right kinds of brains doing the right sorts of
things!
> But to say deny that we infer from what
> we see makes it sound as if smile recognition were causal.
To say we "infer" a smile when we see it implies an extra step of reasoning
involved. When a baby sees an adult face above it smiling and smiles back, is
it inferring something about that adult's face? Or is it just responding on a
raw, pre-conceptual level?
> That a smile
> is an inference can be easily demonstrated when folks disagree about
> what they see.
>
Just because we don't always agree doesn't mean that inferring is at work re:
what it is we are disagreeing about. But when we do disagree it sometimes
happens that we try to figure it out and then, in some cases, we do move toward
inferring to get us to a point of understanding. But then reasoning is being
introduced, something that has no part in the gut reaction we have to what is
clear, i.e., the smile on the mommy's face.
> > but the smile on a face is no less physical than the face on which it
> appears.
>
> I agree, actually, because a face isn't physical either. A face is not
> just a collection of material bits. It is a way of seeing something. A
> way of seeing isn't causal event.
>
The face IS physical even if we're not attending to the physical material of
the face when we see it but to the arrangement of that material. The smile is
part of the arrangement of the arrangement. The eyes, nose, mouth, etc., all
are physical. They can be pointed to and recognized for what they are and
together make a face. But the smile is a turn of the mouth that is part of the
face. So while we can point to the mouth as a physical constituent of the face,
we cannot point to the smile as a physical constituent of the mouth!
> > The smile, like the face, occurs in a physical location...
>
> Not really. Sure, "the face", but where does it begin and end? This
> question is absurd because a smile is there, before us, not there, in
> the big toe, though it might if the toe were involved, as in shyness,
> and not really anywhere.
>
As I say above: "So while we can point to the mouth as a physical constituent
of the face, we cannot point to the smile as a physical constituent of the
mouth!"
> Bruce: Not all facts are physical. Falling in love is a fact but not
> physical.
>
> > Sure it is. However, we don't always notice the physical aspects, for
> instance the heightened hormonal levels...
>
> And the mental aspects? Just where does your physical and everyone elses
> mind connect.
>
> bruce
>
The mental aspect of being in love is physical, too. It includes certain
activities of the body, including brain activity, hormonal activity, etc.
SWM
=========================================
Manage Your AMR subscription: //www.freelists.org/list/wittrsamr
For all your Wittrs needs: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
