[Wittrs] Re: [C] Re: Free Will and Wittgenstein (for Stuart)
- From: John Phillip DeMouy <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 02 May 2011 18:46:36 -0400
Stuart,
> Zettel is rather early in Wittgensteinian terms.
That is patently and demonstrably false. The vast majority of Zettel is
from typescripts dictated after the Second World War. The remarks in
question, from Zettel 608-611, correspond to Remarks on the Philosophy
of Psychology (also, without question, a late work) 903-906.
Your insistence on attempting to dismiss Wittgenstein's remarks with
which you have a problem on the basis of their provenance or date
wouldn't be nearly so insufferable were it not for the fact that you so
often get these things wrong, even while presenting your claims
authoritatively.
> I find myself thinking (still without having looked at the text in
> context) that Wittgenstein would not have made such a remark later on
> in his career or in material he was preparing for publication.
The group of remarks recurs repeatedly, in various forms and polished to
varying degrees, in material preparatory for Part II of Philosophical
Investigations.
> It's too loose, too sloppy a thought, at least
> as it appears in isolation from whatever else surrounded it.
Apparently, your aesthetic judgments are not a reliable guide in such
matters. Do remember that in the future.
Incidentally, correcting this bit of misinformation led me to take a
second look at the posts preceding it.
You early remarked
"I don't know the context of that Wittgenstein excerpt (it's apparently
not from the PI -- I just checked) but, aside from the fact that it
recognizes that there is no logical necessity inherent in the
physicalist view of minds, it is completely out of sync with what we do
believe we know today about how minds come about and how they work, as
the second amply quote demonstrates. Absent the context I am loath to
judge Wittgenstein's comment but, taken in terms of today's knowledge,
it looks remarkably wrong."
Taking the physicalist view of minds as a matter of "logical necessity"
would be a complete muddle, so it would be remarkable if he didn't
recognize that. But from the context, I am not quite sure that's what
you meant to say.
And the second quotation, to which you refer...
> Modern psychology takes completely for granted that behavior and
> neural function are perfectly correlated, that one is completely
> caused by the other. There is no separate soul or lifeforce to stick a
> finger into the brain now and then and make neural cells do what they
> would not otherwise. Actually, of course, this is a working assumption
> only. ... It is quite conceivable that someday the assumption will
> have to be rejected. But it is important also to see that we have not
> reached that day yet: the working assumption is a necessary one and
> there is no real evidence opposed to it. Our failure to solve a
> problem so far does not make it insoluble. One cannot logically be a
> determinist in physics and biology, and a mystic in psychology. --
> D.O. Hebb, "Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory",
> 1949
...doesn't even support what you're saying.
"Actually, of course, this is a working assumption only. ... It is quite
conceivable that someday the assumption will have to be rejected."
Confusing what is "taken for granted" or "assumed" with what is "known"
is a muddle. And one that ignores some of the lessons of On Certainty.
I do hope (though it would at least make sense of the remark you made
about "logical necessity") that you aren't confusing a assumption being
necessary for one's work with the idea that what is assumed is a
necessary truth. And that you aren't confusing the logical
incompatibility of determinism in physics and non-determinism in
psychology (I avoid following the author's use of "mysticism", since
some mystics actually are determinists.) with idea that determinism is a
logical truth.
Other related posts:
