[Wittrs] Judging Wittgenstein by Judging the Argument
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 3 May 2011 00:17:18 -0700 (PDT)
.. One of the things that Wittgenstein could see extremely clearly was the
prejudice that academic social clubs have upon their own outlook. You sort of
have to become "a company man." No one truly interested in philosophy, however,
can be a "company man" for its social club, as Wittgenstein knew ("home to no
community").
To that end, I've always found it curious when the pets of philosophy tell us
that what they do (that makes them special) is "judging the argument." This
always seemed to me like one of those "company man" positions. The idea is that
philosophy-the-social-club trains one for this sort of occupancy: the argument
judger.
What does this occupancy consist of, empirically? It's not a connoisseur
judgment: it's not the way that one might judge a boxing match, e.g.. Or the
way
that art might train one to judge a painting. And it's not being a "debating
judge," either. (I've always found it funny when debate coaches think they have
some advantage in conversations).
The claim has something to do, they say, with knowing whether the point or
claim
is "sound" or "valid" (or something like that). Yet, what is curious about this
is that English professors purport to claim the very same jurisdiction. They
teach a class about, and claim to be experts upon, whether argumentation is
valid and sound. Much like debating coaches, I've never found English
professors
who rely primarily upon the things taught in rhetoric or argument courses to be
the kingpins of either conversations or claims.
In truth, these sorts of things are used to train children
or undisciplined thinkers in cognitive SKILLS. In much the same way, this is
what symbolic logic, induction, etc., does. These tools are only introductory.
The reason why I bring this up is because of Walter's position here:
"In any case, to be in a position to assess philosophical opinions of any
stripe
requires (or ought to require) the ability to tell whether an argument is valid
... To repeat (again) my main point was that [Wittgenstein] does use arguments,
so to assess his work one must be competent to assess arguments."
Here would be the counter idea. The "argument" is never the ultimate unit of
analysis; cultural orientation, experience, framework, and cognitive skills
are.
The "argument" is only the vehicle for the person's picture of account,
grammar,
sense of the ideas and his or her understanding of the state of affairs. Very
often, a person with poor logic or articulation simply reformats the structure
of the claim to re-deliver the picture of account. So much of "poor argument"
is
simply not being understood. Really, all that true conversation really is, is
"picture sharing."
Goodness. If you knew of another's picture, and had some familiarity with the
state of affairs, you would bypass the argument altogether and would not even
tender to it. Imagine how silly it would be in real life to doctor an argument
whenever a person offered you a point in ordinary conversation. "We can't shop
there, you logic's bad."
The folly of analytic philosophers is that they think the solution for
thinking-problems lies in the means by which one packages their thoughts. They
think that packaging problems are "real problems." Or that, one could not have
a
valid insight without first having a good package. It would be like saying a
present couldn't be good without a box.
The truth is that thinking problems are more likely the result of character
problems (e.g., things like greed, politics); a failure to see or understand
"picturing;" a lack of cognitive skills or experience with "judgment;" the
psychology of attachment; cultural and learned orientations; assertability
conditions (grammar), and so forth. In many disputes, what one really needs is
the cognitive trait to be able to see the other person's experience in life and
to know of the cognitive experience that forms his or her point -- and finally,
to be able to commensurate that against the other possible experiences. One
wants to say: a true judge of thought is both a doctor of the idea as well as
its connoisseur.
Of course, there is something else here. This point is much more basic. If two
people argue about the best way to drive Datyon from Raleigh, we have one
thing.
Imagine judging that argument. We'd use the debate coach or the English
professor. But if one argued for why the tree was real or why one knew they
existed, we'd have another matter entirely. Or if they argued that men had
souls. It is here that the importation of the grammar of "argument-judge" (from
the ordinary sort of problems) becomes problematic. The problem is that latter
types of claims do not resolve themselves using argument-checkers. They, in
fact, perpetuate themselves that way. Instead, all that they ever ask is that
the person experience their picture of account and its nature before one comes
to say "yes or no."
It is true, of course, that in rare cases, two heads that beat against a wall
might knock something down. But this is no different from saying that driving
without a sense of direction sometimes gets you home.
The point in philosophy is never to judge arguments; it is to catch the
framework.
Regards and thanks.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://tinyurl.com/3eatnrx
Wittgenstein Discussion: http://seanwilson.org/wiki/doku.php?id=wittrs
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